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
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THE CONFLICT OF COLOUR



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TORONTO

THE CONFLICT OF COLOUR

*The Threatened Upheaval
throughout the World*

BY

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AUTHOR OF

MANCHU AND MUSCOVITE; THE RESHAPING OF THE FAR EAST; THE
TRUCE IN THE EAST AND ITS AFTERMATH; THE COMING
STRUGGLE IN EASTERN ASIA; THE FORBIDDEN BOUNDARY;
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1910

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Set up and electrotyped. Published November, 1910.

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

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"Die Politik is keine Wissenschaft, wie viele der Herren Professoren sich einbilden, sondern eine Kunst."

Bismarck, speaking in the Reichstag on March 15, 1884.

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PREFACE

THE writer submits these pages in the full consciousness that they do no more than touch on the fringe of a mighty subject. Yet because that subject — world-politics and world-movements — has profoundly interested him since his earliest years, he ventures to hope that in these papers some guidance may be found to a general understanding of the growing Conflict of Colour throughout the world. The subject-matter has been cast in as popular a form as possible, so that it may be easily read — the more technical points being thrown into footnotes for purposes of reference.

It is necessary to state that a considerable portion of these papers appeared in an abbreviated form in *The World's Work* in both England and America; and the writer's thanks are due to the proprietors of that journal for permission to republish his studies in their present dress.

B. L. PUTNAM WEALE.

PEKING, CHINA, June, 1910.

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THE CONFLICT OF COLOUR

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THE task which the writer has set himself to perform in the pages that follow is at once definite and indefinite. In all matters where diligence of study and an observance of facts has made it seem permissible, he has not hesitated to express himself in uncompromising terms and to draw his own very definite conclusions.¹

¹ The historian Guizot (*History of Civilization in France*, Eleventh Lecture) gives a singularly lucid analysis of the duties of the historical writer in the following words:—

“Every epoch, every historical matter, if I may so speak, may be considered under three different points of view, and imposes a triple task upon the historian. He can, nay, he should, first seek the facts themselves; collect and bring to light, without any aim than that of exactitude, all that has happened. The facts once recovered, it is necessary to know the laws that have governed them; how they were connected; what causes have brought about those incidents which are the life of society, and propel it, by certain ways, towards certain ends.

“I wish to mark with clearness and precision the difference of the two studies. Facts, properly so called, external and visible events, are the body of history; the members, bones, muscles, organs, and material elements of the past; their knowledge and description from what may be called historical anatomy. But for society, as for the individual, anatomy is not the only science. Not only do facts subsist, but they are connected with one another; they succeed each

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But since in geo-politics there exists such a large number of imponderables — factors which, though they are not susceptible of accurate classification and estimation, are often more weighty than aught else — in many parts of this detailed enquiry it has been necessary for him to take refuge in generalities and to evade direct deductions. This is perhaps equivalent to confessing that nothing final or decisive can be said about the very matters which are just the most interesting, and regarding which people must always be most curious.

Yet though this serious limitation may be admitted as in some degree true, so clear has the conviction become in the writer's mind — after an exhaustive study in one great quarter of the globe — that certain forces are being inevitably ranged against one another as they have never been before, that he ventures to believe that a general consideration — no matter how imperfect it may be — of a subject which most intimately concerns every member of the human race, will be of very widespread interest. To the white races in the lands of the coloured peoples, the twentieth century, unlike all its predecessors, can only prove a century of retroaction and redemise; and it is from this point of view that the whole vast question of the conflict of colour will be considered. Though any orientation of politics based on a foregone conclusion is necessarily faulty, it is at least possible, by adopting this method, to avoid that distressing ambiguousness which, because it touches

other, and are engendered by the action of certain forces, which act under the empire of certain laws. There is, in a word, an organisation and a life of societies, as well as of the individual. This organisation has also its science, the science of the secret laws which preside over the course of events. This is the physiology of history.”

on all matters in strictly qualified language, not only fails to give real guidance but actually tends to increase doubt and confusion. The time has come when facts should be boldly met — when men should understand that the world, with all its inherited wisdom, is admittedly bewildered by being brought face to face once more with the oldest of problems — the conflict between East and West.

The first and main reason for this new state of affairs must be sought for solely in that vast double movement which some too confidently believe heralds the days when men will be inclined to compose their differences peacefully rather than resort to the arbitrament of war. This double movement is simply the modern growth of populations and the modern growth of real knowledge, as opposed to the old knowledge, which was so largely based on tradition and superstition and was therefore so false and so misleading; and because this movement is now so universal, it escapes the close study and attention it surely deserves.

The growth of modern populations is alone portentous: it is not only marvellous to the statistician, but it actually means that density of population will in future decide to an ever greater extent the grand movements in world-politics.¹ Yet to-day, perhaps because

¹ The writer is, of course, aware that there is an element of weakness in this argument, since it follows that if density of population is soon to become the determining factor in political evolution — a point which he himself constantly insists upon — nations which are standing still, such as France, Spain and Portugal, must sooner or later submit openly to the influence of others, who will pour in their men. This will mean war — not necessarily unsuccessful to the numerically weaker nations. But to put the matter differently and to use a useful simile, Europe

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they are a little weary, people are far more apt to dwell with melancholy on the solitary instance of a European State which seems to have reached the stationary condition — France¹ — than to reflect on the marvel may be compared to an unequal terrain on which water is steadily collecting in certain places to a greater and greater extent. An overspill is bound to occur on to the higher barren places when the level reaches a certain altitude. The greatest density of population in any European country is to-day about 600 to the square mile, in Belgium, and Belgians are already spilling into France. When Germany reaches that density a similar movement will possibly commence; and though Spain and Portugal are effectively isolated by mountain-ranges, it cannot be doubted that unless they arise from their torpor, their future is sealed. Thus we may really see one day a new infiltration of Germanic peoples over Latin Europe (with the exception of Italy), for it is impossible for populations to attain a density of 2,000 or even 1,000 to the square mile without overspilling on to more empty lands. But all this belongs to a political future too distant to be considered in any practical way to-day. A fresh mixture of Teutonic with Latin blood may cause a repetition of the history of fifteen centuries ago.

¹ Alison, in his *History of Europe*, written more than half a century ago, has the following informing footnote on this pregnant question of French population (Vol. I., p. 119):—

“Now, to show the capability of the soil of a country of this description to maintain an increase of inhabitants, let us consider merely what may be raised from 40,000,000 of arable acres, little more than one half of its arable ground, and considerably less than a third of its total superficies. The average produce of arable land in all the counties of England is two quarters and five bushels to an acre — M‘Culloch’s *Statistical Account of England*, p. 476. Take it as two quarters only in France, to be within the mark, and we shall have 40,000,000 acres yielding 80,000,000 quarters, which would feed 80,000,000, and that, without pressing upon the limits assigned by the physical extent of its natural capabilities to the increase of man, a hundred and twenty millions might be maintained with ease and comfort on the French territory. This calculation will excite surprise, and by many be deemed incredible: let those who are of this opinion examine

of the expansion of the English, a race which in some three centuries appears to have multiplied nearly twenty-five fold.¹ When it is remembered that to-day the world

and point out what is overcharged in the data on which it is founded. It leads to a conclusion of the very highest importance, and which bears with overwhelming force upon the history of the Revolution; for it shows that the French people, when that convulsion broke out, were far within the limits of their possible and comfortable increase; and consequently that the whole suffering which had preceded, and crimes which followed it, are nowise chargeable on Providence, but are to be exclusively ascribed to the selfishness, the vices, and the corruption of man.

"Another peculiarity in the physical situation of France, both before the Revolution and at this time, is very remarkable, and deserves to be noted, both from its important bearing on economical principles, and from rendering the dreadful devastation of the Revolution the more surprising. The agricultural population at the former period was 16,500,000, and it furnished food for 8,500,000 persons living in cities, or engaged in trade or manufactures; at this time 22,000,000 of agriculturists, in round numbers, are engaged in raising food for 11,000,000 persons engaged in pursuits unconnected with the productive soil—a quarter of grain being the average consumption of a human being for a year. This is leaving 92,000,000 acres for the support of horses, and for raising wood, vines, and butcher-meat for the use of man. If we suppose that 30,000,000 of the 76,000,000 arable acres in France are cultivated in potatoes, each acre will yield, according to M'Culloch (*Commercial Dict.*, art. Potatoes), food for two—according to Arthur Young and Newenham, for three—individuals. Take it at the lowest estimate of two individuals, these 30,000,000 acres would maintain 60,000,000 more persons, or 140,000,000 in all; still leaving 62,000,000 acres for luxuries, roads, canals, cattle, horses, etc., for this immense population."

¹ Lest exaggeration be seen in such a statement, the writer would lay the following figures before the reader. It is a well-substantiated fact that the population of England was never in excess of 2,500,000, and was often less, down to the end of the sixteenth century—the Wars of the Roses having exterminated immense numbers of men who were only slowly replaced. Assuming that at the end of the sixteenth century the rest of the British

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contains in round numbers 1,700 million people (and possibly more), and that by the end of the present century, should the present rate of increase be maintained, that number will have grown to some 4,000 millions, the time has plainly come when the study of vital statistics and general population-movements, Isles contained 1,500,000 persons, the total population may be then set at 4,000,000.

At the present moment the members of the English race may be reckoned as follows—accepting as “assimilated” all sub-races in British territory such as the French in Canada and the Dutch in South Africa:—

(1) British Isles	45,000,000
(2) Canada	8,000,000
(3) Australasia	6,000,000
(4) South Africa	1,500,000
(5) Britis (white) in Asia, in Africa, in Atlantic islands and elsewhere scattered	1,500,000
(6) Descendants of Britons in United States (American estimates)	40,000,000
Total	102,000,000

We know that in 1752 the population of Ireland was 2,373,000: in 1841 it had grown to 8,195,000, or nearly a four-fold increase in 90 years. The Celtic race has thus proved that it can breed much faster than the Anglo-Saxon. The mixing of these two races—making what may be called in a non-political sense Britons—produces the happiest results.

¹ This is a very simple but justifiable calculation. It may be assumed that whites, yellows, browns, and blacks, in the aggregate, now increase at such a rate that the world's population doubles every 70 years. Thus by 1980 the earth should contain 3,400 millions, and twenty years later 4,000 millions. It is this vast and constant growth in populations, just as much as the rise in the standard of living, which is stimulating commerce and industry so remarkably. From now on the trade of the world should increase by leaps and bounds.

instead of being entombed in the dull pages of reference-books, should be accessible to all in readable forms.

For it must now be clear to every thinking man that weight of numbers, as numbers become “drilled” industrially and ethically, as well as in a military sense, must soon play a much greater part in politics than heretofore. It is this eloquent fact which already impresses the meanest Englishman when he thinks of Germany. Germany, when she fought France forty years ago, had only a slightly larger population than her western neighbour; to-day she has 25 millions more; in less than twenty years from to-day her population will be 80 millions, or twice the population of stationary France; and though even this weight of numbers may not be held sufficient to overwhelm a country justly celebrated for its resisting and recuperative powers, there must clearly be an end to the present position in Central and Western Europe when the disproportion increases to a still greater extent.

It will one day be admitted that the real key to a thousand vaguely-defined problems lies in men’s breeding capacity — in their capacity to obey nature’s most imperative political law, which is multiply and increase, or die. Over-population¹ is a shibboleth

¹ Obviously over-population is something more than a mere matter of numbers, since the savage requires for his support more square miles than the civilised man needs acres, and an industrial nation can prosper in a land that produces little food or even none at all. It is only when men can neither raise food nor buy it that they must move on. In old days this produced migrations, or mass-movements by land; in modern days emigrations or stream-like movements over sea. Thus in very recent years we have had two remarkable instances of great streams of emigration setting in and then drying up. The first and capital

which only attracts the ignorant; for the expression is an absurdity, since nature will not allow the thing to stand. Yet so little have such matters been understood in the past that even that celebrated personage, Dr. Samuel Johnson, on being questioned regarding the future of Russia, a country which even in his day was mentioned as likely to become a great empire by reason of the rapid increase of its population, made the astounding reply that he saw no prospect of the Russians propagating more than any other nation, because "births at all times bear the same proportion to the same number of people." The unwisdom of this remark, made in a day when the science of statistics had not yet been conceived, is now being curiously illustrated all over the world; but nowhere more than in the country in question — Russia — where the breeding of men is going on at such a prodigious rate that, in the end, it

instance, of course, is the Irish emigration to America succeeding the potato famine of 1848. Accurate statistics show that between 1851 and 1907 no fewer than 4,103,015 Irish emigrated abroad. The second and more interesting instance is that of Germany. Two generations ago hundreds of thousands of Germans began to stream across the Atlantic to the El Dorado of the United States, until it looked as if this movement would Teutonise the American Republic. But no sooner had the good effects of the Franco-Prussian War become apparent than the movement slackened. As Germany's industrialism, from the 'eighties onwards, grew by leaps and bounds, the emigration of her sons fell off more and more, until to-day it amounts to no more than some 30,000 per annum. It remains to be seen whether there is any real limit to density of population in industrial countries. In agricultural regions the highest density is about 1,200 persons per square mile. This has been attained in three totally different regions — in the West Indian island of Barbados; in Bengal; and in the Chengtu plain in the Chinese province of Szechuan. Every rood may yet have its man!

must modify the entire European situation far more than the German increase can ever do.¹

Yet though statistics have now been generally available for a number of decades and their philosophy accessible to every student, it is significant that even Professor Charles H. Pearson in that informing work *National Life and Character*² — in which problems very similar to the present ones are considered — makes much of the fact that according to Gibbon the estimated

¹ The Russian birth-rate is to-day such that, were infant mortality only brought as low as it is now in England, the white world might soon become all Cossack — as Napoleon predicted. The net yearly increase of the population of the Russian Empire is now more than 2,500,000; and as great masses of vigorous men and women are pushed across the Ural into Siberia, there to thrive exceedingly, the birth-rate tends to expand still more. The writer was once given some remarkable figures regarding this Siberian birth-rate, which he hesitates to publish in the lack of independent confirmation; but the fact remains that by the end of the present century there should be 400,000,000 Russians! Even this immense figure will only mean a density of population equal to 50 persons per square mile of territory.

² Professor Pearson's main argument appears in his Introduction, viz.: —

“What we are most concerned with is not the limitation of the higher races of man to a small part of the earth; not the evolution of a new form of society — an autocratic and all-pervading State, instead of a State that gave free scope to individual ascendancy — but the question, what man himself will become under these changed conditions of political life, and under the influence of other changes that seem inevitable.”

The conclusions which Professor Pearson reaches are very pessimistic regarding the prospects of the white races. These the writer deals with in his own final chapter. It would seem that Professor Pearson gave too much weight in many parts of his inquiry to assumptions which are the assumptions of classical scholars and not those of men pursuing their inquiries from a purely politico-scientific standpoint. Already much that he wrote is hopelessly out of date.

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number of subjects in all parts of the Roman Empire at the time of Claudius was 120,000,000; and that when he wrote his own work the countries included in the old empire could only claim some 200,000,000 souls, thereby tending to show that the passage of nearly a score of centuries had brought no great change. As an index to the future, however, such a method of comparison is both extremely faulty and deceptive, and is calculated to produce on the mind of the reader an entirely erroneous impression.

For it should surely be noted that during a very long period after the fall of the Roman Empire the whole of Europe was in what may be called a state of solution, during which a “Law of Waste” certainly seemed in active operation. The iron Roman rule had been replaced by open lawlessness and anarchy, in which statistics have no place at all; and though with the gradual taming of the northern barbarians secular States arose, for a thousand years there was scarcely any peace from private wars, and save in fortified cities the common man remained unprotected until power was gradually centralised in the persons of monarchs, and strong military kingdoms arose. It is therefore only right to treat the entire period from the dissolution of the Roman Empire to the Renaissance and the discovery of America as one of no statistical importance — as a species of interregnum during which the materials for

¹ The territories included in the Roman Empire had at the time Professor Pearson wrote his work the following populations: — Italy, 29,000,000; France, 37,000,000; Great Britain, 33,000,000; Spain and Portugal, 21,000,000; Turkey in Europe, 15,500,000; Hungary, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, 17,250,000; Turkey in Asia, 16,000,000; North Africa, 14,000,000; total, about 202,000,000 people.

the foundations of modern Europe were being slowly assembled, assorted and hammered into their required shape. Ten or twelve centuries are perhaps a somewhat long period to treat in such cavalier fashion; yet from the standpoint of the modern statistician it is impossible to consider them otherwise.

Nor should it be forgotten that even after the foundations of modern Europe had been securely laid — that is, after the historic landmark of the year 1492 — brutal misgovernment, savage warfare and unchecked pestilence successfully foiled nature, until the vast explosions which celebrated the French Revolution throughout Europe had finally cleared the air. The downfall of Napoleon and the political settlement of 1815 may thus be said to mark the period when the value of statistics becomes thoroughly appreciable. It is not unwise to suppose that in 1815 the territories included in the most glorious period of the Roman Empire contained a population almost exactly equal to Gibbon's estimate. Thus in the last ninety-five years, in spite of the quasi-stationary condition of France, and in some degree of

¹ Few people realise in these peaceful, humane, and well-ordered days, what sickness and strife once meant to Christian nations. It is customary to point to the terrible Taiping Rebellion in China — in which 100 million people perished — as if it were a strange visitation of Providence. Such visitations were all too common in mediæval Europe, and even later. Leaving aside such plagues as the "Black Death," when the population of England seemed menaced with extinction, and turning to wars, it is only necessary to quote the capital instance of the ruin left in Europe by the Thirty Years' War — it cost Germany four-fifths of its population. Thus Würtemberg, which before the war had half-a-million people, was reduced after the battle of Nordlingen to 46,000. Similarly in England the Wars of the Roses not only ruined the country, but arrested its growth for at least a century.

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European Turkey and Spain during a portion of that period, it may be calculated that those numbers have approximately doubled. This gives the view which is valuable to-day. Whilst it is not necessary in this place to deal with figures relating to other regions of the world, it is quite certain that elsewhere during the nineteenth century the net gain in population has been even heavier than in the case of Europe. For purposes of comparison it is now generally assumed that blacks double their numbers in forty years; browns and yellows in sixty years; and whites in eighty years.

When we consider the other part of the great movement now going on — the almost universal growth of real knowledge¹ as opposed to knowledge largely

1 . . . "In a great and comprehensive view, the changes in every civilised people are, in their aggregate, dependent solely on three things: first, on the amount of knowledge possessed by their ablest men; secondly, on the direction which that knowledge takes, that is to say, the sort of subjects to which it refers; thirdly, and above all, on the extent to which the knowledge is diffused, and the freedom with which it pervades all classes of society.

"These are the three great movers of every civilised country; and although their operation is frequently disturbed by the vices or the virtues of powerful individuals, such moral feelings correct each other, and the average of long periods remains unaffected. Owing to causes of which we are ignorant, the moral qualities do, no doubt, constantly vary; so that in one man, or perhaps even in one generation, there will be an excess of good intentions, in another an excess of bad ones. But we have no reason to think that any permanent change has been effected in the proportion which those who naturally possess good intentions bear to those in whom bad ones seem to be inherent. In what may be called the innate and original morals of mankind, there is, as far as we are aware, no progress. Of the different passions with which we are born, some are more prevalent at one time, some at another; but experience teaches us that, as they are always antagonistic, they

based on tradition and superstition and generally inculcated by priests — we come to what is by far the most remarkable feature in the whole history of the last decades in Asia, in America, and in portions of Africa, as well as in Europe itself. Knowledge — real knowledge — has been lately diffused with marvellous rapidity, and darkness is everywhere giving way to light.¹ Yet though this is so, the world-influence of

are held in balance by the force of their own opposition. The activity of one motive is corrected by the activity of another. For to every vice there is a corresponding virtue. Cruelty is counteracted by benevolence; sympathy is excited by suffering; the injustice of some provokes the charity of others; new evils are met by new remedies, and even the most enormous offences that have ever been known have left behind them no permanent impression. The desolation of countries and the slaughter of men are losses which never fail to be repaired, and at the distance of a few centuries every vestige of them is effaced. The gigantic crimes of Alexander or Napoleon become after a time void of effect, and the affairs of the world return to their former level. This is the ebb and flow of history, the perpetual flux to which by the laws of our nature we are subject.” — Buckle: *History of Civilization*, Chap. IV.

¹ Accepting the gospel which Buckle preached in his *History of Civilization*, that civilisation and culture first arose where climate and soil easiest permitted the growth of wealth — Egypt, Babylonia; that it was transferred from there to the Mediterranean basin, and then on to Central and Northern Europe; that here the vigour of man exceeding the vigour of nature, it was permitted him to become a true master and advance farther than had been possible in any other region — accepting this, surely it is an interesting spectacle that is now unrolled.

For what do we now see? Not only are the literate classes in Asia and Africa devouring Herbert Spencer, Hegel, and John Stuart Mill, but all the mechanical inventions of the West are being studied and applied, whilst in their leisure moments the sons of the East ponder over the works of the great European masters of comedy and pathos. Thus the East is on the highway to

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this new growth, and its really vast significance are still so utterly unappreciated that the political and social unrest which this new knowledge necessarily brings in its train (in China and India, just as much as in Portugal and Spain) is attributed to the masses becoming infected with anarchistic ideas — that is, to their blind devotion to destructive and not to constructive principles — whereas, if the truth be known, so far from such being a true statement of the case, since masses no more than individuals do not willingly court destruction, this commotion is merely the sign that knowledge — with its accompanying conviction that political salvation lies within the grasp of all — is reaching the most widely-separated peoples, and therefore forcing them to refuse to accept government by a sort of half-hearted compromise with old-time superstition and bigotry. Though the masses may take no active part, they undoubtedly look to-day with secret approval on the actions of extremists in all lands who by the cruel use of high explosives blast away political anachronisms. They know, with the instinctive knowledge of the populace,

real progress, whilst the West seems unwilling to admit that any further progress is possible. The great American inventor, Mr Edison, picturesquely designated by the daily Press as a wizard because he is wise, has quite recently been tempted to state that man has only just progressed beyond the dog-stage, and that during the next few hundred years, as he discovers the meaning of nature's laws and forces, he may enter into the possession of true knowledge, and become in the proper sense of the words a higher animal. It would be well if those who still look upon the acquirement of a mediocre knowledge of the language and literature of two ancient peoples as a complete education in itself could be made to ponder over this, and understand that their ideal is exactly similar to the old, and now discredited, Chinese ideal — the learning by heart of Confucian classics and a proficiency in the wooden four-legged essay.

that changes must now come; and knowing this makes them applaud the use of the world's greatest lever — the lever of fear.

Now, in the last analysis, it is due to science, and to the spread of scientific thought throughout the world, that such phenomenal progress has lately been made in ethical and general principles, as well as in material development. The ferment of to-day is then due to the spread of truth — since science is only truth systematised — and the utter distaste which all quietist views now inspire actually makes for the increasing happiness of the entire human race. No longer will men, no matter of what colour they may be, believe in the old superstitious beliefs: no longer will they bow down to authority spiritual or temporal because it is authority.¹ They demand, and quite rightly do they demand, that such monkish — nay, slavish — ideas be shattered, and that henceforth mankind be governed as nearly as possible on scientific principles. And it is highly significant that with this change should come a distaste for all creeds, and an increasing belief in the sufficiency of what may be called Instinctive Morality.

¹ In this connection, it certainly seems doubtful whether the lead which Europe obtained over Asia several centuries ago will be permanently maintained — unless the habit of attempting to reconcile antiquated superstitious beliefs with scientific dicta is abandoned. Already it can be noted in certain directions that the Japanese — though accused foolishly in some quarters of "materialism," whatever that may mean — are beginning to possess a distinct advantage, insomuch as they do not have to place on the same basis the Doctrine of the Trinity and such exact mathematical theories, as for instance, the parallelogram of forces. Before we laugh at highly-educated Hindoos and Chinese returning to their native lands and prostrating themselves before false gods, let us know whether our own are true.

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Yet although in Europe thinking men begin to recognise that at last the downfall of dogma has come; and although there is much talk of the religion of the future as a faith which will not be racial or tribal, nor yet based on authority either spiritual or temporal — in spite of this admission the rapid spread of scientific knowledge still finds the vast majority among the white races nominally committed to practices — from which are spawned prejudices — which should be as distasteful to a really enlightened mankind as are the crude rites of some sects of Chinese Buddhists or the unintelligible rhapsodies of the mystery-worshipping Taoists.¹ Progress is in the air; superstition is no longer believed in; men are everywhere discontented; yet the old structures have been standing so long that the work of removing them can only be carried out slowly after the lapse of the very longest periods. Thus knowledge, though it has now admittedly spread far and wide, though it has accomplished much, has still an infinity of tasks to attend to; and many thousand suns must set before the work of political renovation is reasonably complete even in Europe. And this fact — this stout survival of prejudice — will have, as will be shown, a

¹ That such remarks will sound offensive in the ears of many readers the writer well believes, but it is impossible here to refrain from expressing an opinion which will one day be very general. No one indeed who has pursued studies with a reasonably open mind can escape the belief that the vast and curious fabric which has been raised in Europe since Christianity received the official sanction of Rome, is not a whit more worthy of receiving blind homage to-day than those other fabrics raised by other priesthoods in other regions of the world. All are doubtless excellent in their way as examples of human ingenuity and credulity — but they have nothing much more to recommend them. With moral codes the writer is not here concerned.

most important general bearing on all political problems for many decades.

Nor must it be forgotten that in Asia this spread of knowledge — this conviction that humanity at last imperatively demands a new orientation of old-as-the-world facts — is proceeding slowly and cannot be very much hastened; and this because of a circumstance which is something of a paradox. In Asia men have always been so close to nature that they have been crushed by her and have feared her greatly; and in their past ignorance they have found their sole relief in raising up countless idols to intercede on their behalf, and so to reduce the horrors which the uncertainty of an ever-present menace has seemed to lend to existence. The enervating climate which prevails in so great a part of this huge continent; the unequal seasons; the devastating floods; the famines; the great dreary distances which make men mad — all these things taught men thousands of years ago greatly to distrust themselves and their own limited powers, and to look with terror on this great chastising mother, whose vengeance, to their ignorant minds, knew no limits and could swallow up in a night what it had taken ten generations to evolve. Climate and environment affect man in his first stages of development far more greatly than they can affect the lower animals; for man possesses imagination. And so, no matter how much the inventions of a scientific age may be called into play to reinforce tropical peoples in their everlasting combat with the exuberance of nature, in Asia very many decades must elapse before worn-out beliefs can be even partially abandoned. Still, the progress which has been made during the last two generations is remarkable from

many points of view; and what has been already accomplished is destined to be entirely eclipsed in the near future. Education can effect greater miracles than the whole Bible records; and when Asia is as universally educated as Europe is to-day, it will be time to know that almost every old assumption regarding this great region must be modified. Gulfs which seemed unbridgable will have been quietly bridged overnight; and thus will it come about that the dawn will find those who have not prepared themselves for such changes unable to adjust their views and still weakly talking of conspiracies and revolutions, when what they are witnessing will be nothing but the natural evolution of the human race.

And yet that this strange state of affairs should exist is not surprising. Europe has always been ready to adopt the narrowest views in all matters concerning the history of its relations with Asia and Africa; and as the years go by, and rationalism unconsciously spreads its gospel of commonsense, it becomes increasingly evident even to humble men that the rigidly conventional, or orthodox, manner of viewing world-history, and especially this history of the relations of Europe with Asia and Africa, and the development of the nations which has sprung therefrom, will have to be abandoned. A strictly objective standpoint must be substituted for the old-time subjective method, which is excusable only in unenlightened peoples. Already those, who from the accident of residence in very distant regions, and their consequent detachment from old mental restraints, have seen how vast political problems, even in these artificial days, tend to work out by the play of what may be called natural forces, and not by any high-sounding

decrees of rulers or any spasmodic interference by other men — among these, something closely akin to amazement must inevitably manifest itself whenever a close comparison is made between the political estimate based on actual experience — that is, the true estimate — and the conventional estimate which is spread broadcast and believed in by the outer world because it suits old prejudices and is founded on vanity. Thus the historical importance which is to-day still attached — to the exclusion of really weighty matters — to insignificant feuds between the Greeks and the Persians in the pre-Christian era, as well as to the history connected with the rise of Rome (when the shores of the Mediterranean were merely playing the part of a cradle of civilisation, just as much for the Middle East as for the Middle West), is specially remarkable. It gives the keynote to that false manner of viewing history, and especially the history of the rise of Europe, which so greatly obscures the paramount and decisive racial influences, and which ignores vital factors that are to-day still powerfully operative. The history of the Mediterranean basin 2000 years ago is not the entire history of the civilisation of that time, as some seem to think. Confucius had been teaching for many years before Athens and Sparta were even mud villages; and in those early days the difference between the Mediterranean races and the so-called Orientals of the Nearer East was so small that it needed political rivalries to keep them asunder and to prevent the types from fusing. Nothing occurred during this period which, had it happened differently, would have changed the destinies of Europe.

Yet those who gain their historical inspiration from

such politically misleading works as Creasy's *Decisive Battles of the World* no doubt still believe in some dull way that Marathon, in which the loss of the Athenians amounted to 192 men, actually saved Europe from Asia. Indeed, this statement is made in many most serious treatises. Marathon, according to the ingenuous class of investigators who still are the teachers of the youth of Europe, was a contest in which "the noblest of causes was at stake and the interest of the world's history hung trembling in the balance. Oriental despotism was on one side, a world united under one sovereign lord, the world of Asiatics whose prayer and ideal was a good master. On the other was the Greek, the Athenian, whose interest bade him cry: 'No master! Liberty at any price is itself the highest good.'"¹

When the minds of reasonably intelligent youths are still fed on such stuff, it may be counted small wonder that, in spite of the vast spread of knowledge in Europe during the nineteenth century, Asia of the twentieth century should still be so misjudged, the politics of that region so misapprehended, and bigotry and prejudice still so much to the fore. Such statements as the one quoted — besides ignoring the vital fact that in the formative period of the white races single contests could have no abiding results — start with an untrue assumption, and can therefore only be false in other particulars. For liberty, as it was understood in those too-celebrated republics of Athens and Sparta, meant abject slavery to the vast mass of the population — slavery every whit as cruel as any in the Southern States of America Union before the War of Liberation;

¹ This passage is extracted from a reputable English history.

and what the Athenians were continually and desperately fighting for in all their political contests was nothing better than the aristocratic principle. In neither of these two republics did the freemen ever exceed twenty thousand, whilst the slaves ran into hundreds of thousands, and were used just as the slaves of Asiatics were used. Thus the Greek republics were simply cities in which a certain portion of the inhabitants, little qualified to exercise them, had acquired exclusive privileges, while they kept the great body of their brethren in a state of abject servitude.¹ Even the philosophers of this high antiquity, in their speculations concerning the perfect republic, could not extend their ideas beyond a small territory ruled by a single city, in which the great body of the people had no rights at all. Their very intellectualism was thus an exotic growth, and forced to bloom as in a hot-house. The cramping influences which this narrow intellectualism has exerted in certain ways on the European mind is to-day as evident as it was hundreds of years ago: and the attention still given to the insignificant history of these peoples is the final proof that rationalism has still many victories to win. Marathon and Salamis were of no more real consequence to Europe than were the conquests of Alexander to India, Persia, and the Near East generally. He who sees in such romantic history a subject of world-influence knows little of the laws of causation.

¹ In these passages the writer has followed very closely what Alison has written in the introductory chapter to his *History of Europe*, the subject being of no real importance to political students, and being here referred to only in order to deal chronologically with European matters.

The truth is that no wars or military expeditions — that is, no wars which are not true *Volkskriege*, when nations, obeying irresistible impulses, sweep down on their neighbours like tidal waves — can compare in political importance with nature's most simple functions, the bearing of men and their resultant distribution by the operation of definite laws. It is a fact, which anyone may verify for himself, that the temporary displacement of any body of armed men, however vast, in obedience to the iron will of a despot, is of scant racial importance when behind it lies no natural movement. Thus, even had Darius triumphed over Athens with his heterogeneous army drawn from forty nations and then formed military colonies all over Greece, such colonies could have had no more lasting effect in an era when the migration of races was still actively proceeding than did the Roman military colonies in England — colonies which have affected the character and institutions of England not at all. In other words military dominion, even when backed up by large numbers of males of the conquering race, was always of scant political importance in early and primitive times, when intercommunication was difficult, and, above all, when populations were thinly distributed and still in what may be called the formative state. As a matter of course assimilation had ultimately to follow, for the women captured the captors. This is exactly what has occurred with the Chinese in their four thousand years of authentic history. By the simple process of inbreeding they have virtually obliterated all traces of their many conquerors. What has been done in the past by the Chinese is going on elsewhere to-day, just as it has done in the past, thus giving

predominance to the more numerous race by steadily obliterating the trace of ephemeral victories.

The reason, then, why true European history — the history that is of paramount importance to the living, throbbing world of to-day — should be held to commence only with the last stages of the Roman Empire — with the break-up of that empire — is not only because of the evolution of the new idea of citizenship which then commenced, nor yet because of the rise of Christianity which destroyed Græco-Orientalism with the Slavish ideas; but also because of the peopling of the whole of Europe with those vigorous barbarian races destined to establish Europe's true hegemony over the rest of the world. That fact should be seized upon and rejoiced over to-day by everyone. With these barbarian races came the beginning of true or rational government, and therefore the beginning of a true human happiness founded on what may be called a natural equity. At last that strange formative period of Eurasia — during which races, impelled by forces over which no mere monarchs or ideas had exercised control, had wandered from one land to another — was at an end, and the successive waves of migration had finally spent their force. Because Roman and Greek ideals have played such a rôle in the formation of European society, there is no reason why the real strength and groundwork of that society should not be generally admitted. That strength and groundwork are summed up in the words,

¹ This is what is going on to-day in the more tropical portions of Latin America, where the autochthonous (Indian) races are steadily assimilating the descendants of the Spanish conquerors, thus producing a new type. It cannot be doubted that in a few hundred years most of Latin America will be entirely dominated by this type.

Northern Barbarianism. The peculiar institutions which have arisen in Europe are due to the fact that this dominant, powerful barbarianism, as it was brought in contact with the refinement of existing civilisations, was necessarily eclectic and chose that which seemed best, irrespective of origins. Only in the matter of liberty did the northern peoples retain their essential characteristic; and this is the seed from which has sprung the modern tree of life.

1 "The system of force, that is to say, of personal liberty, was at the bottom of the social state of the Germans. Through this it was that their influence became so powerful upon the modern world. Very general expressions border always so nearly upon inaccuracy, that I do not like to use them. Nevertheless, were it absolutely necessary to express in few words the predominating characters of the various elements of our civilisation, I should say, that the spirit of legality, of regular association, came to us from the Roman world, from the Roman municipalities and laws. It is to Christianity, to the religious society that we owe the spirit of morality, the sentiment and empire of rule, of a moral law, of the mutual duties of men. The Germans conferred upon us the spirit of liberty, of liberty such as we conceive of, and are acquainted with it, in the present day, as the right and property of each individual, master of himself, of his actions, and of his fate, so long as he injures no other individual. This is a fact of universal importance, for it was unknown to all preceding civilisations: in the ancient republics, the public power disposed all things; the individual was sacrificed to the citizen. In the societies where the religious principle predominated, the believer belonged to his God, not to himself. Thus, man hitherto had always been absorbed in the Church or in the State. In modern Europe, alone, has he existed and developed himself on his own account and in his own way, charged, no doubt, charged continually, more and more heavily with toils and duties, but finding in himself his aim and his right. It is to German manners that we must trace this distinguishing characteristic of our civilisation. The fundamental idea of liberty, in modern Europe, came to it from its conquerors." — Guizot: *History of Civilization in France*, Eighth Lecture.

For though the privilege of citizenship had been nominally given to the whole Roman Empire by the Emperor Antoninus, in the very last stages of the Empire slavery not only existed on a vast scale but was constantly spreading, and therefore disturbing that most vital matter in the early history of all States — the question of food-supplies. The immense quantities of food raised by slaves in North Africa and poured into the Italian provinces had alone so disturbed economic conditions that the whole Roman political system had been completely undermined long before it was actually thrown down; and no matter how much it may still be eulogised as an unique polity in the world's history, the Roman imperial idea was undoubtedly nothing but an Oriental idea. In spite of the polite fiction of citizenship, the destinies of scores of millions were effectively disposed of by a few thousands.

¹ Even Professor Pearson, who cannot be accused of any narrowness, unconsciously shows in the following passage how saturated he is with classical history and ideals, and therefore how unfitted to write on racial problems:—

“The preceding pages have aimed at showing that certain races which we regard as inferior, and the highest of which is certainly our inferior in military and political organisation, are likely to increase very largely in comparison with the races which at present constitute what claims to be the civilised world. Such an event has happened once before under such circumstances that its character and results are tolerably well known. An old order, which we call in the first period of its existence the Roman Empire, broke up as invaders poured down upon it from Germany and Russia, from Central Asia, and from Persia. It seems at first incredible that so magnificent a polity as Trajan succeeded to should not have been able to maintain itself. Lying centrally round the sea which was then the great highway and artery of commerce, the Roman dominion was traversed by roads, which gave its armies the great advantage of concentrating rapidly on any point that was menaced. Its population was incomparably

For Roman liberty, though an improvement on Greek conceptions, was, like all liberty of antiquity, confined really to those who, being present in the capital, could take an active part in the public deliberations. It was the liberty of a city and not of a land. It was therefore exactly similar in practice, if not in theory, to the kind of liberty which has always been understood in advanced Asiatic States — the system of government by equipoise and nothing else.¹ The idea greater than that of any neighbour; its generals and engineers and the equipment of its troops were unsurpassed in the world; and the emperors of capacity were sufficiently numerous to have atoned for the incompetence of a few. An observer speculating upon manifest destiny, and knowing nothing more of the earth than was known a little earlier to the elder Pliny, might surely have said with reason, in Trajan's time, that sooner or later the eagles would certainly fly in triumph over the whole habitable world. Even now, though we can trace the stages of decadence, it is difficult not to be astonished at the completeness of the ruin. Summing up the most obvious causes, we seem to see that the institution of slavery deprived Italy of a large part of her natural and best defenders; that the burden of taxes produced a depopulation in the provinces, as men ceased to marry, or escaped across the border and joined the barbarians; and that while Rome was thus losing her life-blood, Germans and Parthians were acquiring the arts of war, and becoming conscious of their strength. Even so, we have to fall back upon other explanations — upon famines and pestilences that desolated provinces, and upon an upheaval of peoples in the Far East, resulting in an exodus of Tartars across Europe — fully to understand why the attack on the Roman Empire became so strong, and was at last so weakly combated." — *National Life and Character*, Chap. II.

Briefly, Rome fell because real Europe had to arise, and because a multiplication of municipalities can never produce a real and enduring nation.

¹ "First of all, we must clearly represent to ourselves the nature of the Roman Empire, and how it was formed.

"Rome was, in its origin, only a municipality, a corporation. The government of Rome was merely the aggregate of the insti-

of giving those who lived at a distance from the capital any means of representing their wishes was never

tutions which were suited to a population confined within the walls of a city: these were municipal institutions — that is their distinguishing character.

"This was not the case with Rome only. If we turn our attention to Italy, at this period, we find around Rome nothing but towns. That which was then called a people was simply a confederation of towns. The Latin people was a confederation of Latin towns. The Etruscans, the Samnites, the Sabines, the people of Magna Græcia, may all be described in the same terms.

"There was, at the time, no country — that is to say, the country was wholly unlike that which at present exists: it was cultivated, as was necessary, but it was uninhabited. The proprietors of lands were the inhabitants of the towns. They went forth to superintend their country properties, and often took with them a certain number of slaves; but that which we at present call the country, that thin population — sometimes in isolated habitations, sometimes in villages — which everywhere covers the soil, was a fact almost unknown in ancient Italy.

"When Rome extended itself, what did she do? Follow history, and you will see that she conquered or founded towns; it was against towns that she fought, with towns that she contracted alliances; it was also into towns that she sent colonies. The history of the conquest of the world by Rome is the history of the conquest and foundation of a great number of towns. In the East, the extension of Roman dominion does not carry altogether this aspect: the population there was otherwise distributed than in the West — it was much less concentrated in towns. But as we have to do here with the European population, what occurred in the East is of little interest to us.

"Confining ourselves to the West, we everywhere discover the fact to which I have directed your attention. In Gaul, in Spain, you meet with nothing but towns. At a distance from the towns, the territory is covered with marshes and forests. Examine the character of the Roman monuments, of the Roman roads. You have great roads, which reach from one city to another; the multiplicity of minor roads, which now cross the country in all directions, was then unknown; you have nothing resembling that

considered at all; and so it was the populace of the capital, aided by such forces as might be introduced by the contesting generals or leaders, which held all the actual political power. Representative government — the only effective guarantee of liberty of any sort — had therefore not yet been dreamt of; and since it is this principle which has to-day become the paramount principle throughout the whole civilised world (because it is admittedly the root of happiness and justice), it must be from here — that is, from the entry of what may be called wholesale individualism into the political arena — that the real history of Europe commences. It is essential to trace in some detail the fortunes of this principle, in conjunction with that other truly European principle, the evolution of the doctrine of the balance of power, brought into existence by overindulgence in the ancient barbarian doctrine of force; for by so doing, in very few pages it is possible to summarise first European history, and then world-history; and thus to gain an enlightening objective standpoint from which to survey the present conflict of colour.

Alison has well said that the one priceless possession of the uncivilised Northern Barbarians was the liberty which they brought from their woods and deserts. This liberty was new in Europe and very peculiar, inso-

countless number of villages, country seats, and churches, which have been scattered over the country since the middle ages. Rome has left us nothing but immense monuments, stamped with the municipal character, and destined for a numerous population collected upon one spot. Under whatever point of view you consider the Roman world, you will find this almost exclusive preponderance of towns, and the social non-existence of the country." — Guizot: *History of Civilization in Europe*, First Lecture.

much as it knew no locality and was confined to no district: it was a sentiment which burned in the breast of the entire tribe. Leaders owed their elevation solely to the choice of their fellow-warriors; and it was the settlement all over Europe of these men — possessing this one elective principle — which for the first time in the history of white nations distributed power over vast regions instead of confining it to cities. Every barbarian warrior having received as his reward, on the break-up of the empire of the Cæsars, agricultural lands already tilled by a skilful but subservient tenantry, he was willing to establish himself permanently on his own domains, only assembling with the rest of his race whenever an actual convocation of the military array of his principality was summoned to settle questions of the day. It was the increasing difficulty of securing the universal attendance of military followers which finally led to the introduction of representative legislatures; and here it was that the Christian Church played a great political rôle by providing a concrete example of the methods which inevitably had to be pursued. From here onwards in Europe, civilisation and Christianity fitly become exchangeable terms — that is, until the dawn of the scientific era.

As is well known, the Councils of the Christian Church had by the sixth century introduced a perfect system of representation, so that the delegates from the most remote dioceses in Europe and Asia Minor met regularly together to order their affairs. As early as the year 325 that famous ecumenical council which promulgated the Nicene Creed had met at Nicæa for the specific purpose of settling matters arising out of

the Arian controversy; and this disciplinary measure of the Church gained for it great renown. The barbarian nations, as they accepted Christianity, accepted those methods of Christianity of which they had previously been ignorant; and amongst these methods this system of delegates is politically the most noticeable feature. But though there was this powerful example — though all credit is due to the Church for the historic rôle it has played — representative government would have never been so early possible in European countries and individualism so powerful a force, had not the rude rural aristocracy soon found it necessary to safeguard their scattered possessions by establishing an entirely new principle. That principle was primogeniture.

This principle, the right of preserving in every family the regular succession from father to eldest son, although to-day an anachronism, has exercised on the history of Europe a most powerful effect: it is the root-principle in the tenure of land in early civilisations, and wielded a most beneficent political influence. By insuring continuity and conservatism, it gradually but inevitably introduced law and order, and grouped round all the great land-owning classes new elements of strength. Herein Europe at last differentiated herself in a most essential particular from her great rival Asia.¹

¹ In trying to establish the difference between Europe and Asia — and Asia to him only meant the Near and Middle East — Alison has the following passage:—

“How, then, has it happened, that the same conquerors, subduing and settling in substantially the same physical circumstances, should have given birth to nations so essentially and diametrically opposite as those of Europe and Asia? Why have freedom and knowledge been sheltered from the lances of the one, and both invariably perished, from the earliest times, under the sabres

As has been constantly pointed out, the fundamental basis in Asia, both in public and private life, has always been the principle of selection, as opposed to this other principle which rests on a well-defined law. In Asia no guarantee has ever existed that any person — a son, an officer, or even the highest personage in the land — may not suddenly lose everything overnight through favouritism, thus weakening national life at every possible point. But regular succession, by locking men

of the other? And whence is it that the same corruption, which has so speedily in every age consumed or enfeebled the descendants of Asiatic conquest, has, after the lapse of a thousand years, still made comparatively little impression on the offspring of Gothic invasion? Simply, because the religion of the two quarters of the globe in which the same conquerors settled was different; because polygamy has not in Europe spread its jealousies, nor the harem its seductions; because superstitious belief, in barbarous times, restrained power by imaginary terrors, and Christian charity, in civilised, assuaged suffering by real blessings; because slavery has generally disappeared before the proclaimed equality of men, and a perpetual renovation been thus provided to the richer classes; because war has been softened by the humanity breathed into its conflicts; because learning, sheltered under the sanctity of the monastery, has survived the devastation of ignorance, and freedom, nursed by devotion, has acquired a strength superior to all the forces of despotism." — *History of Europe*, Vol. I.

To speak soberly, never was more foolish rodomontade written by a serious historian. It is, of course, due neither to religion nor to polygamy that Europe and Asia are different — since these are rather results than first causes. Climate, soil, and environment are the great first causes of the difference — climate alone being a sufficiently powerful factor, as those who have resided in hot climates know, to produce in a few generations the most remarkable changes. Until physiography is understood, no man is entitled to write history. The habit of speaking of Asia in the phlegethonic terms employed by Alison is merely a survival from mediæval times.

to the soil and identifying them permanently with their own districts, soon completed in Mediæval Europe the necessary fusion of conquerors and conquered which seemed at first so impossible. Hundreds of years, it is true, were consumed in effecting that compromise with various conflicting conditions which has given to each European country its essential present-day features; but through all this dreary blank of years is to be seen the steady preparation towards the allotted end.

It was thus only natural that the Frankish empire of Charlemagne, or Karl the Great, should have been the first real polity to arise between the fifth and ninth centuries, and that from this revival of the fiction of an universal empire should spring a train of circumstances which show their influence even to-day. Compounded of a mixture of Teutonic and Gallic blood, this mediæval empire had sufficient rude barbarism and sufficient refinement to be measurably superior to the pure barbarians who still lingered in German forests or on the shores of the Baltic; whilst to its armed force the refined serfs of more southerly latitudes could offer no firm resistance.¹ Therefore attracted to Rome and

¹ It is a fact which any student may verify for himself, that European history is largely the history of the development of armed force — quite contrary, for instance, to the history of China, where armed force has been a disintegrating rather than a constructive power, Chinese reason being always inclined to reject as a valid argument a blow, or a series of blows. In Europe, however, all liberties owe their existence to violence; had there been no violence there would have been no liberties. Here it is interesting to quote what even a writer such as Alison has said of the Mediæval Italian republics, which some people still believe, like the Grecian republics, to have been model States:—

“The States of Florence, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa were not in reality free; they were communities in which a few individuals

baptized the Holy Roman Empire, because Rome still remained the traditional ideal among the peoples of Europe, it was this peculiar polity which cast its shadow over the history of Europe for so many centuries and so sensibly influenced the growth and decline of nations.

Though the new empire could make no lasting fabric

had usurped the rights, and disposed of the fortunes, of the great bulk of their fellow citizens, whom they governed as subjects, or insulted as slaves. During the most flourishing period of their history, the citizens of all the Italian republics did not amount to 20,000; and these privileged classes held as many millions in subjection. The citizens of Venice were 2,500 — those of Genoa, 4,500 — those of Pisa, Siena, Lucca, and Florence, taken together, not above 6,000. The right of citizenship, thus limited, descended in a few families, and was as carefully guarded from invasion as the private estates of the nobility. To the conquered provinces no privileges were extended; to the republics in alliance no rights were communicated. A rigid system at once of political and mercantile exclusion directed their whole policy. The privileged classes in the dominant State anxiously retained the whole powers of government in their own hands, and the jealous spirit of mercantile monopoly ruled the fortunes of the State as much as it cramped the industrial energies of the subject territory. From freedom thus confined, no general benefit could be expected; on a basis thus narrowed, no structure of permanent duration could be raised. Even during their greatest prosperity these States were disgraced by perpetual discord springing from so unjust and arbitrary an exclusion; and the massy architecture of Florence still attests the period when every noble family was prepared to stand a siege in their own palace, in defence of the rights which they sternly denied to their fellow-citizens. The rapid progress and splendid history of these aristocratic republics may teach us the animating influence of freedom, even upon a limited class of society; their sudden decline, and speedy loss of public spirit, the inevitable consequence of confining to a few the rights which should be shared by a large circle, and governing in the narrow spirit of mercantile monopoly, not in the enlarged views of equal administration." — *History of Europe*, Vol. I.

out of peoples who were still in a state of solution, to the grandiose conceptions of a Charlemagne must be traced the formal addition to the already existing military system of the institution of feudalism — a curious institution of which many traces exist even to-day. To Dukes, Margraves, Barons, and other lieutenants of the Empire was confided the duty of preserving peace and order on the outskirts of civilisation, as it then appeared; and the great districts thus granted on military tenure were the germs from which sprang principalities and kingdoms — and, later, actual nations. The private wars which soon raged between these militant notables served largely to revive the military spirit among the masses of unwarlike serfs, and, better still, to unite them to the interests of their masters. Now forced to defend themselves or to suffer extirpation, the tillers of the fields in every region became inured to new hardships. From this peculiar regionalism grew the later plant of nationalism; and though the use of arms in Europe never obtained the general vogue it did in England — where the bowmen speedily became the backbone of the nation and won for themselves through the French wars a vast European celebrity — the new state of affairs hastened that movement which welded districts into provinces and provinces into kingdoms.

It was not, however, until kingship¹ received a new

¹ "There was another characteristic of royalty, not less important to observe: royalty was a power which, neither in its origin nor in its nature, was well defined or clearly limited. No one at that time could have assigned to it a special and precise origin. It was neither purely hereditary, nor purely elective, nor regarded as solely of divine institution. It was neither coronation, nor ecclesiastical anointing, nor hereditary descent, which alone and exclusively conferred the royal character. All these conditions,

and definite meaning that anything resembling the divisions of modern Europe are to be found, and that the day of mere *enclaves* is done with. It is indeed important to note that the first necessary step for the expansion of the white races over the world was nothing but the perfection of this idea of kingship, as opposed to the old idea of an ill-defined imperial sway which embraced all known peoples and really controlled none. To perfect this idea it was necessary to extinguish temporarily the purely European notion of liberty — the primitive form of representative government which had drifted into aristocratic privilege — and to substitute therefor the despotic or personal rule of sovereigns. To trace in detail how this came about would be merely to tread well-worn ground; but it is essential — keeping well in mind the special object of these pages — to mention some general causes, which at the moment have particular interest.

It may be boldly argued that so long as physical force properly speaking — that is the strength of men's

all these facts, were requisite; and other conditions, other facts, were afterwards added. You have seen the official account of the coronation of Philip I., and have recognised there evident indications of election; the persons present, the grand vassals, knights, people, expressed their consent; they said: We accept, we consent, we will. In a word, principles the most various, principles generally considered as wholly contradictory, combined and met together round the cradle of royalty. All the other powers had a simple definite origin; the manner of their erection and the date were readily assignable; every one knew that feudal suzerainty was derived from conquest, from the concession by the chief to his companions of territorial property; the source of that power was easily traced back, but the source of royalty was remote, various; no one knew where to fix it." — Guizot: *History of Civilization in France*, Thirteenth Lecture.

arms — was the dominant feature in European life, so long was it impossible for kings properly to combat the power of their vassals and to centralise the government in themselves. To put it differently, so long as the lance, the battle-axe, the heavy two-handed sword, and the longbow, were the decisive weapons, so long did Europe and Asia remain in their modes of government very much alike. In both regions the idea of kingship could not but be largely theocratic; though the nominal authority was immense, in all practical matters it was very small, and dependent not so much on the obedience as on the co-operation of great men. In Europe, the feudal barons, entrenched in their castles and always supported by devoted bands, howsoever loyal they might be when confronted by some imminent outer danger, were of a markedly independent spirit in times of nominal peace. To their rights and privileges they clung with passionate determination, pointing to them as the real safeguards of national liberty. Yet in reality, as the contest of Resebecque¹ conclusively proves, the ancient barbarian liberty had in the course of centuries become the liberty of a narrow class, which could not tolerate independence in any other class.

But with the invention of gunpowder and the miracle

¹ The instance of Resebecque is the best instance to quote, as here we have the one rival to feudal power — municipal power — which in the hands of the burghers of Flanders had grown to a respectable stature. But burghers have not the firmness of peasants; and so whilst in the fourteenth century the Swiss mountaineers secured their independence by the victory of Sempach, in the same century feudalism crushed the commercialism of municipalities and showed clearly that to destroy it something sterner than mere enlightenment was required.

of printing there came a vast change. The general diffusion of a knowledge concerning the immediate potency of these two agencies could not be arrested, and the real power of feudalism was automatically destroyed. It is surely a curious commentary on human nature to reflect that printing and the consequent general spread of knowledge would have meant very little to the unimaginative white races — with whom the doctrine of force is a first article of faith — had not the levelling influence of gunpowder long been at work. Placing in the power of the meanest man the ability of instantly destroying any opponent, however well-armed, well-horsed, and powerful he might be, gunpowder — though it first helped the power of kings — might to-day well have a statue raised to it by every democracy, were its historic claims as a liberator among the races properly understood. It is no wonder that to-day anarchists see in the higher explosives the sole engines with which to secure acceptance of their higher doctrines.

The immediate result of the spread of the use of gunpowder throughout Europe was remarkable, though feudalism, devoted to its privileges, died hard. Firearms require skilled hands to be used properly; skill requires constant practice; and constant practice could only be indulged in by those who were constantly employed. In this way standing armies in the employ of the sovereign were born; and the infantryman, destined henceforth to decide the destinies of Europe, soon becomes the leading figure in the drama of history.

Now, just as it was natural that the empire of Charlemagne should have arisen at the time and in the region it did — in Central Europe — so was it only natural that the first dominant Power — aiming at a

universal monarchy,¹ but in reality never more than a limited military monarchy — at the close of the feudal period and at the dawn of modern history, should have been Spain.

From the death of Charlemagne (842) to a period not long before the Reformation, there had been throughout Europe, in spite of the continued fiction of the Holy Roman Empire, but one really effective empire — the empire of the Popes. The Crusades, by uniting all men in the belief that their spiritual welfare

¹ The writer has taken the following from Lodge's *Student's Modern Europe* as showing very tersely and clearly this position: —

"In the dark ages, as in the middle ages, the political theorist regarded the whole of Christendom as forming one religious and political State. This idea of unity which gave rise to Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire was an impossible ideal, because Church and State were divided, as had been unknown before the introduction of Christianity; and being divided, it was logical that rivalry should lead to warfare. Thus what happened was that the practical power of the Empire was weakened and finally destroyed by the long struggle with the Papacy; for after the accession of the Hapsburgs, made necessary by the great interregnum (1251-72) which followed the fall of the Hohenstaufen, the empire had sunk to an ordinary territorial lordship, whilst the championship of the temporal, as opposed to the spiritual, power fell to stronger hands, producing schisms in the Papacy which finally resulted in the Popes themselves sinking into temporal rulers of the States of the church, though until the Reformation their spiritual authority was undiminished."

Thus the Papacy destroyed the Empire, and the Empire indirectly the Papacy. Absolutism, being only a fiction in Austria, became a fact when Austrian Princes succeeded to the heritage of Spain and Spain became the leading Power. France, revived by this spectacle, introduced absolutism herself, and we are suddenly transferred from an era of anecdotes to a time when far-reaching history was rapidly made.

came before all earthly things, had given the Popes marvellous authority, which it required centuries to undermine. So deeply had the theocratic conception sunk into men's hearts that even kings held their high office, in the popular view, far less by right of prescription than by right of papal sanction. The terrible threat of excommunication was a very real disciplinary measure, almost as disconcerting, because of its peculiar political force, to an absolute monarch such as the English king Henry VIII., as to a bigot such as Philip II. of Spain. Thus it is that we find throughout all those strange contests of mediæval times the dim figure in Peter's Chair exercising an undefined influence whenever the appeal to arms changes to an appeal to authority. Though Popes might be captured and imprisoned, their authority was not diminished, since it was to influence the sublime authority vested in their persons that such irreverent steps were taken.

With the rise of Spain a new era opens.

The astounding struggle against the Moors, in which the Spaniards had been engaged for so many centuries — a struggle without parallel in European history, since the struggle against the Turks was conducted by many nations — was undoubtedly responsible for the sudden and dramatic predominance of Spain in European politics. For seven hundred years this conflict had been not very different from that border warfare which must always exist between two rival peoples occupying the same land. But though it may not have been as fierce as the decimating contest in south-eastern Europe against the Turk, it was more continuous and better understood by all; and it had become such an article of faith with the mass of the population, that the lesson

had sunk deep into their hearts, and made of the Spaniards the most resolute fighters in Europe.¹

With the union of the Thrones of Aragon and Castile in 1479, and the clearer definition of Spanish nationality thus given, the struggle entered a new and last phase. Ferdinand and Isabella, spurred on by a variety of causes, soon had developed such a highly offensive policy that by the year 1491 — the year before the discovery of America — Moorish rule was completely broken and swept from the Iberian peninsula, and such Mahomedans as remained quickly sank to the miserable position of serfs. A united Spain at last existed, and buoyed up by a religious faith which had been purified in the fire of adversity and which saw in the Cross not merely a symbol of faith but a perpetual inspiration, world-wide results of the most remarkable nature followed each other in quick succession. The valour, the intelligence, and the energy which the Spaniards displayed at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, as Macaulay has well remarked, were the direct fruits of the ancient institutions of Aragon and Castile² — institutions eminently

¹ The writer is reserving for his final chapter the more particular effect of the struggle of Europe against Asiatic and African foes from the days of the fall of the Roman Empire — first on the soil of Europe, then out of Europe. This introduction merely examines certain internal aspects in Europe, the better to understand the present position throughout the world as dealt with in the body of the book.

² The liberal nature of the ancient institutions of Spain is best examined in Spanish America, whither were transplanted the old rights of Spaniards after the Spanish conquests had been made. A striking similarity exists between the old Anglo-Saxon town-rights and Castilian town-rights.

The Castilian Pueblo System was based upon the laws and lib-

favourable to the growth of public liberty and calculated to make Spain one of the first nations of the world, because the liberty and rights of the individual were openly acknowledged and most carefully safeguarded.

But this was not all. The fact that the Moor was not only a foreigner but a coloured infidel as well, had long accustomed the Spanish people to look on the outer world of Asia and Africa very differently from Central and Northern Europe. The Moor possessed erudition and skill; he had proved conclusively to the Spaniard that beyond the narrow boundaries of Europe were forces of unknown strength; and in Spain's proximity to Portugal—that land of mediæval explorers—was to be found another fortunate circumstance. Already, before the Moorish struggle had reached its last phase, Portuguese explorers had voyaged far down the coast of Western Africa, seeking for new lands and new routes; and as early as 1487 the Cape of Good Hope had actually been doubled by Bartholomew

erties of Castile compiled in the *Fuero Juzgo* (A.D. 693), the *Siete Partidas* (A.D. 1348), and the Castilian code of Montalvo (A.D. 1485), known as the *Ordenanzas Reales*, supplemented by additional Codes in the time of Queen Isabella. It was the great wish of that “good queen” to have the Municipal Law of Castile codified for the use of her subjects in Spanish America, and the work was in progress at the time of her death, and was subsequently known as the “Laws of the Indies.”

In the *Laws of the Indies* (Book II., Title i., Law 2) we read the following legal status of Spanish America:—

“We decree and command that, in all cases not decided nor provided by the laws contained in this compilation, the laws of our kingdom of Castile shall be observed according to the Law of Toro.”

The Cortes of Castile held at Toro in 1505 was largely devoted to the confirmation of town-rights.

Diaz.¹ The noise and celebrity which these voyages were making throughout Southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin spurred Columbus to his yet greater discoveries; and therefore while to Portugal fell by Papal Bull the heritage of the older world of Africa and Asia, for Spain was reserved the richer heritage of the New World. To put it differently, then, it was sudden contact with extra-European forces which at the dawn of modern history became the greatest propelling agency in the advance of the white nations; and Spain, being better situated than Portugal to use that agency in relation to the rest of Europe — being much larger and much stronger — speedily assumed the

¹ It is curious to see how, as the Turkish assaults on the Eastern Empire became fiercer, and the old communications with the East rapidly closed, at the other extreme end of Southern Europe men became quickened with desire to find a new and more open route. As early as 1415, Prince Henry of Portugal — surnamed “the navigator” — had made his name at the taking of Ceuta, the southern Pillar of Hercules, from the Moors. In 1418 he stationed himself on a rocky promontory at the extreme southwest of Portugal and built his observatory. Studying stars and maps year after year, he sent ship after ship down the African coast, gradually lifting the veil from land and sea. In 1434 Cape Bojador was discovered. In 1445 Diniz Diaz discovered Cape Verde; and by the time of the Turkish capture of Constantinople (1453) the first Portuguese had reached the Gambia. In 1471 the Portuguese flag had been carried across the equator; in 1484 Diego Cam reached the Congo; in 1487 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope. In 1498 Vasco da Gama reached successively the island of Mozambique and the long-sought shores of India. Thus the century which saw the last lingering remains of the Roman Empire swallowed up, and the book of the past finally closed, was rich with promise. Whilst the eastern half of the ancient Mediterranean world was merged in Asia, the western half, cut adrift from its old moorings, turned its back on bygone days, and became the starting-point for a magnificent future.

lead. Had she been wise, nothing could have taken that lead from her.

Unfortunately three weapons were even then being forged which, while centralising power in the hands of the Spanish kings — and thus making the rulers of Madrid, with their new and vast sources of wealth, the rulers of Europe — were destined ultimately to destroy the nation. These weapons, because they are two-edged swords, merit being thoroughly understood.

The first of these was the succession of the House of Austria to the Spanish Throne, with all that that succession necessarily implied; the second was the reflex action of the Reformation in this, the most catholic of all countries; the third was the acquisition of the riches of the New World, unaccompanied by any corresponding increase of national energy save in a military sense. Thus the three destroyers of Spanish greatness were absolutism, bigotry, and militarism — national foes in every age and in every clime. By the marriage of Philip, son of the Emperor Maximilian, to Joanne, sole daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, traditions utterly foreign to Spain were introduced into the country¹ — those imperial traditions which had become

¹ During the long reign of the Emperor Charles V., who abdicated a century before, the head of that house had united in his own person the two crowns of Austria and Spain, which carried with them, among other possessions, the countries we now know as Holland and Belgium, together with a preponderating influence in Italy. After his abdication the two great monarchies of Austria and Spain were separated; but though ruled by different persons, they were still in the same family, and tended toward that unity of aim and sympathy which marked dynastic connections in that and the following century. To this bond of union was added that of a common religion. During the century before the Peace of Westphalia, the extension of

centred in the House of Hapsburg ever since the ruin of the House of Hohenstaufen; those imperial traditions full of ominous pretensions regarding the control which princes may legitimately exercise over their subjects; those imperial traditions which only a French Revolution and the military blows of a counter-tyrant such as Napoleon could completely shatter in Europe. Grafted on to a united people, entrenched in a shut-off peninsula, this imperialism soon took a concrete form which was impracticable in a country with open land-frontiers, such as the old Germanic empire, and with numberless petty yet powerful princes to dispute the authority of the overlord. In a very few decades the old liberties of Spain were trampled under foot. The rapid march of the Reformation in Teutonic lands served only to intensify the already dominant note of clericalism in Spanish life, which, released from the secular warfare with the Moor, made bigotry and intolerance the order of the day, and soon so utterly transformed the ancient spirit of the Spanish Church, that its good qualities were completely submerged in the false zeal it now displayed against schismatics. The gold and silver of the New World transported in galleons soon fascinated the imagination of all Europe and seemed inexhaustible.

The Spanish monarchy, become all-powerful, thanks to the devotion of a population steeped in traditions of combat and adventure, was pleased to find in Philip II.

family power, and the extension of the religion professed, were the two strongest motives of political action. This was the period of the great religious wars which arrayed nation against nation, principality against principality, and often, in the same nation, faction against faction." — Mahan: *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. II.

the supreme expression of its genius; and Spain, fed by the riches of the New World secured for her by a valiant generation, and battenning on the carcasses of vanquished European nations, in many cases conquered because they differed in doctrine, seemed destined to become as powerful as Rome had been.

¹ It is a significant fact, that in spite of the glory which surrounds the names of Ferdinand and Isabella, it was they who established the hateful Inquisition in Spain as early as 1483, two Dominicans being the first judges of the Holy Office. Mahomedans and Jews were cruelly persecuted, and heretics of all sorts hunted out. Thus it may be said that the soil of Spain contains a malignant germ — the germ of intolerance — and that to escape from this curse will need something more than paper constitutions and the proclamation of the people's rights. An immense corps of educators — a sanitary corps in every sense of the words — is needed to neutralise the effects of a pestilential soil.

This is how Mahan brilliantly summarises the great religious struggles brought about by the Reformation: —

"The main interest of the history of all European countries during the last half of the sixteenth century centres round the success or failure of the counter-Reformation. In Italy and Spain Catholicism succeeded, not only in holding its ground, but also in sternly repressing all opposing beliefs. In France the long wars of religion ended in a compromise, the Edict of Nantes, but, on the whole, victory rested with the Catholics. In the Netherlands the grand conflict with Spain produced a division between the provinces. The northern States formed a republic under the House of Orange. The Wallon provinces, more exposed to Romish influence, returned to the Spanish allegiance. In England the Catholic reaction failed altogether owing to the national spirit evoked by Spanish intervention. In Sweden the Jesuits almost accomplished the conversion of John III. (1568-92), the second son of Gustavus Vasa; but national interests proved in the end too strong for them. John's son, Sigismund, an avowed Catholic, was elected King of Poland, but forfeited the Swedish crown to his uncle, Charles IX. Germany, the starting-point of the Reformation, was affected no less than other countries by the reactionary movement. The Thirty Years' War, to which

The evils produced by a bad government and a shameful religion — for every government is bad which is despotic, and every religion is shameful which is intolerant — require much time to become openly manifest; for it is well to remember that in spite of the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 — nearly a century after Spain had attained national unity — and the ultimate loss of Holland, Portugal, and other territories, as well as the eclipse sustained by the Spaniards in the Orient by the advent of the Dutch, Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth century was still mightier than any other European Power. Yet she was doomed; for by stamping on liberty she had stamped on her own soul and had prepared the way for the transference of the dominant power in Europe to France. No chapter in European history is more interesting than that which traces the rise and fall of the dominant power, and which, from the sixteenth century onwards, supplies the keynote of all diplomacy. For, in spite of the doctrine of the balance of power, invented in a more sophisticated age, a balance requires a pivot on which to swing; and that pivot is the dominant power. For four hundred years there has been in Europe at one time but one leading Power — though for the position of that Power to emerge clear and unmistakable has sometimes needed decades. To-day, as four hundred years ago, the same law applies. From Spain, the sceptre of power passed to France.

In France the methods pursued to lay the foundations of absolute power were not very different from those

this ultimately gave rise, proved a more desolating and extensive conflict than any of the other religious wars." — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. II.

used in Spain, though the conditions were necessarily not the same. Once again was it shown that the prime note of absolutism can only be a disastrous illiberalism, which must bring about a downfall in very few generations. In Richelieu, allied to Mary of Medicis, guardians of the infant Louis XIII., the loose-jointed French monarchy found the divine instrument which introduced imperialism. By the conversion of the territorial nobility into a race of courtiers not only was French provincialism largely swept away, but France became politically great.¹

¹ It is best again to quote Mahan regarding the rise of France:—

"It was natural that in France, one of the greatest sufferers from religious passions, owing to the number and character of the Protestant minority, this reaction should first and most markedly be seen. Placed between Spain and the German States, among which Austria stood foremost without a rival, internal union and checks upon the power of the House of Austria were necessities of political existence. Happily, Providence raised up to her in close succession two great rulers, Henry IV. and Richelieu, men in whom religion fell short of bigotry, and who, when forced to recognise it in the sphere of politics, did so as masters and not as slaves. Under them French statesmanship received a guidance, which Richelieu formulated as a tradition, and which moved on the following general lines: (1) Internal union of the kingdom, appeasing or putting down religious strife and centralising authority in the king; (2) Resistance to the power of the House of Austria, which actually and necessarily carried with it alliance with Protestant German States and with Holland; (3) Extension of the boundaries of France to the eastward, at the expense mainly of Spain, which then possessed not only the present Belgium, but other provinces long since incorporated with France; and (4) The creation and development of a great sea-power, adding to the wealth of the kingdom, and intended specially to make head against France's hereditary enemy, England; for which end again the alliance with Holland was to be kept in view. Such were the broad outlines of policy

The condition of France, previous to the reign of the weak Louis XIII., had been somewhat remarkable. Although one of the oldest monarchies in Europe, the powerful territorial nobility of France had often directly challenged the authority of the throne, and had so weakened that authority that at times it only extended a few leagues beyond Paris. Thus France, though nominally a kingdom such as England, was very different in point of fact; actually it may be said, indeed, to have resembled, in the diversity of its *de facto* rulers, the so-called German Empire, where petty princes frequently disputed the nominal overlordship of the emperor. Many causes contributed to this condition: none more than France's peculiar geographical position. The long and bitter contest between England and France during the middle ages, in spite of its happy termination for the French kings, had devastated the country and weakened respect for all authority which could not make itself instantly felt through the stern use of the sword. The nobles of France, possessed of countless feudal privileges and dwelling in the utmost state on their own domains, felt none of that respect for the Crown which had existed in England from days far anterior to the Norman conquest. Though the origin of their privileges was much the same as in England, a gradual development had carried the French nobles to a position no English populace would have tolerated in their peers. Holding the common people in contempt,

laid down by statesmen in the front of genius for the guidance of that country whose people have, not without cause, claimed to be the most complete exponent of European civilisation, foremost in the march of progress, combining political advance with individual development." — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. II.

their insolence regarding the ordinary rights of humanity went to lengths which are not readily to be believed, did not documentary proofs exist. Thus it is once more advertised that the remote causes of progress and decay must be sought for in what may be called original territorial conditions.

The problem that Richelieu had then to solve was first to destroy this independent power which still openly challenged even that of the throne. The methods which he adopted showed his masterly knowledge of men. By a variety of manœuvres he succeeded in attracting the great nobles in increasing numbers to the brilliant courts of France; and gradually making them more and more dependent on their royal master, in a generation he brought about a political metamorphosis of the first importance. Exhausting their fortunes in their attempts to outrival one another, the nobles of France soon found that kingly favour was necessary for their continued existence.¹ Now irrevocably divorced from their accustomed life of rural magnificence, with their estates mortgaged for huge sums on which they had to pay exorbitant interest, they soon looked on absence from the capital as the most hateful of exiles; and thus by the time

¹ The economic crisis which had already arisen in Europe, through the enormous influx of gold and silver from the New World, as well as by the wealth brought from Africa and Asia, was very far-reaching in its effect on the privileged classes. A very general rise in values and in the standard of living occurred, the landowners being, as usual, the first to suffer from this. Unfortunately it is only in chance remarks made by chroniclers living in these times that the great politico-social influence of this change is seen; but several Venetian ambassadors, with the shrewdness natural in a trading Republic, have told how sorely this revolution pressed on great continental landowners.

of the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV., a new France existed, because the great nobles had been transformed into great courtiers and nothing else.

The immediate result was that French imperialism was not only possible but quickly grew in a remarkable manner; and soon the boundaries of this central kingdom became the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine. Just as the Court of Philip II., in the previous century, had disposed of the destinies of Europe, so now did the Court at Versailles display a similar mastery. The power of the empire across the Rhine — the phantom Holy Roman Empire — finally undermined by the Thirty Years' War,¹ which had been fed by the astute diplomacy of Richelieu — was so lowered, that until the nineteenth century the Teutonic races ceased to have general political importance. For though the genius of Frederick the Great succeeded later in creating the

¹ "The great result of the Thirty Years' War, and of the religious differences from which it had arisen, was the complete annihilation of German unity. The name of the Empire was retained, but it had no longer any practical reality. Ferdinand II. had identified the imperial authority with the suppression of Protestantism. Protestantism survived the danger, and the result was the destruction of the authority which had menaced it. Germany became a loose federation in which the territorial princes were all-powerful. The right to determine the religion of their subjects, which had been admitted in the peace of Augsburg, was confirmed in that of Westphalia. The Imperial Diet continued its meetings, but it became a congress of plenipotentiaries. One great blessing the peace brought with it, the absolute termination of those religious quarrels which had produced such havoc and misery, and which were ended less by agreement than by exhaustion." . . .

"The Treaty of Nystadt finally settled the great question of the supremacy in Northern Europe. The position which the disunion of Germany and the genius of Gustavus Adolphus had

Prussian State in the teeth of French opposition, until 1866 and 1870 Prussia was internationally negligible. In France first occurred on a formidable scale that rise of mere talent to a position of high importance which soon became a new feature in European life.

The age of Louis XIV., ushered in in this magnificent manner, and yet sapping the life of the nation to contribute to the glory of kings, blotted out the memory of dominant Spain. Colbert, one of the greatest of many great French statesmen, controlled the finances. Louvois, never surpassed even by Napoleon as an organiser and administrator of armies, evolved a vast military machine which assured success in war. The French infantry, trained by an officer whose very name has passed into every language — Martinet — surpassed even the famous Spanish infantry of Alva. Vauban, the greatest of military engineers, carried the art of fortifying to a degree of perfection never before known. The creation of a powerful fleet of one hundred ships of the line, manned by 60,000 disciplined sailors, reduced maritime England to a position of extraordinary inferiority, and completed the disrating of Holland as a sea-power; and British merchant-men were no safer in the English Channel than on the high seas. Thus France, borrowing from Spain the new idea of an absolute monarchy founded on militarism, materially assisted in rendering still more antiquated and valueless the old theocratic idea of kingship, which during previous

won for Sweden was henceforth transferred to Russia. The only thing which to some extent neutralised the results of the transfer was the as yet almost unnoticed development of Prussia into a State of first-rate importance." — Lodge's *Student's Modern Europe*.

ages had been almost unchallenged. Henceforth kings to be kings had really to rule. Though the rage of ambition, which spurred Louis XIV. to develop his grandiose schemes and to interfere in the Spanish succession, ended in ruin because it aroused universal concern and arrayed half Europe against him, the lesson he taught travelled far.¹ Though from the date of the famous battle of Blenheim, fought in 1704, it was amply clear that fortune was turning against Louis, so strong was this centralised militarism, which he had erected, that it was not until 1713 and 1714 that those far-reaching treaties which are comprehended under the general title of the "Peace of Utrecht" were concluded, and France — having single-handed defied Europe — was proclaimed no longer the arbiter of European destinies.

Now it is important here to note that France, at the turning-point in her history which the reign

¹ "During the last thirty years of the seventeenth century, amid all the strife of arms and diplomacy, there had been clearly foreseen the coming of an event which would raise new and great issues. This was the failure of the direct royal line in that branch of the House of Austria which was then on the Spanish throne; and the issues to be determined when the present king, infirm both in body and mind, should die, were whether the new monarch was to be taken from the House of Bourbon or from the Austrian family in Germany; and whether, in either event, the sovereign thus raised to the throne should succeed to the entire inheritance, the Empire of Spain, or some partition of that vast inheritance be made in the interests of the balance of European power. But this balance of power was no longer understood in the narrow sense of continental possessions; the effect of the new arrangements upon commerce, shipping, and the control both of the ocean and the Mediterranean, was closely looked to. The influence of the two sea-powers and the nature of their interests were becoming more evident." — Mahan: *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. V.

of Louis XIV. evidently constitutes, deliberately concentrated her energies on a false objective — that is, on winning the acknowledged hegemony of Europe by a policy of conquest, when such a policy had become impossible owing to the very general growth in the sense of nationality, and to the universal growth of armies armed with modern arms.¹ Herein lay her fatal

¹ Two passages from Mahan may here be quoted:—

(a) "The changes effected by this long war and sanctioned by the peace, neglecting details of lesser or passing importance, may be stated as follows: 1. The House of Bourbon was settled on the Spanish throne, and the Spanish empire retained its West Indian and American possessions; the purpose of William III. against her dominion there was frustrated when England undertook to support the Austrian Prince, and so fastened the greater part of her naval force to the Mediterranean. 2. The Spanish empire lost its possessions in the Netherlands, Gelderland going to the new kingdom of Prussia and Belgium to the emperor; the Spanish Netherlands thus became the Austrian Netherlands. 3. Spain lost also the principal islands of the Mediterranean; Sardinia being given to Austria, Minorca with its fine harbour to Great Britain, and Sicily to the Duke of Savoy. 4. Spain lost also her Italian possessions, Milan and Naples going to the emperor. Such, in the main, were the results to Spain of the fight over the succession to her throne."

(b) "The demands made by England, as conditions of peace in 1711, showed her to have become a sea power in the purest sense of the word, not only in fact, but also in her own consciousness. She required that the same person should never be king both of France and Spain; that a barrier of fortified towns should be granted her allies, Holland and Germany, as a defensive line against France; that French conquests from her allies should be restored; and for herself she demanded the formal cession of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, whose strategic and maritime value has been pointed out, the destruction of the port of Dunkirk, the home-nest of the privateers that preyed on English commerce, the cession of the French colonies of Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay, and Nova Scotia, the last of which she held at that time, and

mistake — a mistake which Napoleon hoped to repair a century later with his dreams of Eastern empires. But it was too late. Instead of aspiring to the dominion of the outer world — the world of colour which had already been clearly mapped by the men of the Iberian peninsula, and which she could have easily wrested from Spaniard and Portuguese — France chose rather to grasp at the laurels of European conquest; and in so doing she missed her destiny. By this false policy she gave time to her historic rival — England — to gather strength and to enter successfully into a struggle in which little was really in the favour of the island-Power. One special advantage, and one only, did England possess, and this differentiated her sharply from all other European Powers. Secure in her own islands, she was able to issue forth suddenly, and by throwing her weight on the side which seemed to her the most reasonable, to adjust the balance of power so that it never weighed down too far. From the days of the War of the Spanish Succession, it is this priceless advantage which has given her the exceptional position she still enjoys. Unlike the Powers of the Continent, which must carry out their defensive policy by massing ever-ready land-armies, for England such armies are only for offence — the sea being her defence. It was therefore possible for her gradually to grow in power, because every augmentation in her defensive strength — her fleets — unconsciously impelled her to seek, not expansion in Europe, but expansion overseas. Thus the rise of England — the purely maritime Power

finally, treaties of commerce with France and Spain, and the concession of the monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America, known as the Asiento, which Spain had given to France in 1701.” — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. V.

— forced international politics along a different road. That road was the sea.

The ruin of France's imperial policy in Europe was therefore the signal for a most momentous change; and from now on, the struggle for real power, after having been confined to the narrow limits of a relatively small continent, peopled by the same races, was to be transferred to wider spheres; and under tropical suns, in lonely forests, on great rivers, and on every open sea, the nations seek for final mastery. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, European history, from being more or less provincial, becomes truly international history or world-history. Events follow each other in rapid succession; one nation displaces another in contested regions; new forces arise; and we pass from a

¹ "We have now reached the opening of a series of great wars, destined to last with short intervals of peace for nearly half a century, and having, amid many misleading details, one broad characteristic distinguishing them from previous and from many subsequent wars. This strife embraced the four quarters of the world, and that not only as side issues here and there, the main struggle being in Europe; for the great questions to be determined by it, concerning the world's history, were the dominion of the sea and the control of distant countries, the possession of colonies, and, dependent upon these, the increase of wealth. Singularly enough it is not till nearly the end of the long contest that great fleets are found engaging, and the struggle transferred to its proper field, the sea. The action of sea-power is evident enough, the issue plainly indicated from the beginning; but for a long time there is no naval warfare of any consequence, because the truth is not recognised by the French Government. The movement toward colonial extension by France is wholly popular, though illustrated by a few great names; the attitude of the rulers is cold and mistrustful; hence came neglect of the navy, a foregone conclusion of defeat on the main question, and the destruction for the time of her sea-power." — Mahan: *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. VII.

dreary old world, overcrowded with unimportant events, to a new world, in which nothing of the traditional provincialism of a dozen centuries is to be discerned.

It is quite certain that the ultimate consequences of those daring voyages, undertaken by the early navigators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were never dreamed of by their unsophisticated generations. The Turkish capture of Constantinople, and the virtual closing of those trade-routes to the East which had been in growing use ever since the days of the Crusades, urgently demanded some remedy; but from Columbus even down to the days of Cook, no single navigator clearly saw that the immense change which was thus wrought in European relations by the gradual transfer of power from the land to the sea must infallibly alter the whole course of European history. It was ocean-navigation — the issuing-out of Europe on to the vast waters of the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian oceans — which destroyed forever old relations and old conditions. Hitherto commercial contact, just as the great shocks of war, had been achieved on land or on land-locked seas; now the decisive factor had become the open sea — the ocean.¹ This is the reason, as Macaulay well

¹ It is well to insert here two extracts from Mahan to emphasise (a) the value of sea-power as a war-machine, (b) the position to which England was gradually rising.

(a) "The noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure with which sea-power acts, cutting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes where it does not appear itself, or appears only in the background, and striking open blows at rare intervals, though lost to most, is emphasised to the careful reader by the events of this war and of the half-century that followed. The overwhelming sea-power of England was the determining factor in European history during the period mentioned, maintaining war abroad while keeping its own people in pros-

remarks, why Napoleon, though he appeared mightier than any other man since the time of Charlemagne, possessed an empire truly less grand than that of Philip II. of Spain. His dominion was strictly limited to land; his empire a miraculous *tour de force* — an attempted revival of a state of affairs that was an evident anachronism. Even transcendent genius cannot efface the extraordinary results of three centuries of transoceanic endeavour; and at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, sea-power had already risen to be that dominant factor in European life which it still remains, because of the vital economic relations which it had established with so many distant regions of the world. Spain, because she had been the first Power to employ extra-European aids, had been the first Power in Europe to rise supreme. Spain could have remained great had she remained liberal. She it was who definitely upset the received

perity at home, and building up the great empire which is now seen; but from its very greatness its action, by escaping opposition, escapes attention."

(b) "The sea-power of England, therefore, was not merely in the great navy, with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it shrivelled away like a leaf in the fire. Neither was it in a prosperous commerce alone; a few years after the date at which we have arrived, the commerce of France took on fair proportions, but the first blast of war swept it off the seas as the navy of Cromwell had once swept that of Holland. It was in the union of the two, carefully fostered, that England made the gain of sea-power over and beyond all other States; and this gain is distinctly associated with and dates from the War of the Spanish Succession. Before that war England was one of the sea-powers; after it she was the sea-power, without any second. This power also she held alone, unshared by friend and unchecked by foe." — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. V.

opinion of the middle ages — that Europe was all in all; that the mediæval Papacy and the mediæval Empire were to remain permanent and all-embracing edifices, contrasted with which other European States were nothing but political *enclaves*.¹ France, having out-rivalled Spain and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs, had she followed her true path, could never have been rivalled and eclipsed by England in the rapid manner which now occurred.

It is important here to note that this new factor was introduced primarily by the development of the American Continent and the adjacent island-groups, and by nothing else. Without America and her islands that development would never have then occurred.²

¹ "The peace of Cateau-Cambrésis closed the long series of wars which had commenced with the accession of Charles V. to the empire in 1519. It marks an epoch in the international relations of the European States. France had succeeded in its task of resisting the formation of a Hapsburg monarchy which threatened the independence of Europe. Germany and Spain are henceforward separated. For some time after this religious rather than political differences divide Europe; and when something like the old rivalry re-commences at the close of the century, it takes the form of a national duel between Spain and France.

"For forty years the dominant personality in Europe had been Charles V. His disappearance necessarily effected a great change. European history loses its unity when it ceases to group itself round one central figure. With the great emperor vanished all prospect of a compromise between the two rival faiths. Henceforth Roman Catholicism hardens itself in its remaining strongholds, and prepares not only to repress all attempts at internal change, but also to carry on a determined war against the hostile Protestant separatists." — Lodge: *Modern Europe*, Chap. VI.

² If we take the single example of the island of San Domingo — only part of which belonged to France — records show that the French commerce of the eighteenth century with this island

Whilst the half-way houses on the coasts of Africa, and the trading-posts in the East Indies and in the archipelagoes of the Further East, soon furnished great sources of wealth to companies of traders who had established their dépôts from Cape Verde to Canton and now covered the seas with their fleets of merchantmen, that such a trade existed was not of supreme importance to Europe.

But with the two Americas it was different. Here was no question of trading-posts; of forts built to serve as bases from which to conduct politico-commercial intercourse; of slave-dépôts. Here was a question of real empire. In the Americas the white races took permanent root, and by so doing completely altered Europe's destinies. The contests on the Atlantic, waged because of this wide dispersal of these dominant races, and the fierce rivalries which sprang therefrom, soon profoundly

maintained no less than sixteen hundred French vessels manned by twenty-seven thousand sailors; while as late as 1789—the year of the French Revolution, when Colonial France was elsewhere in decay—French exports from this island amounted to no less than 250,000,000 francs and the imports to 189,000,000 francs, a total trade of £17,560,000 sterling. It is very doubtful if the entire trade of Great Britain at this period amounted to more than thrice this figure.

Here it is useful to call attention to the well-known fact that so little was political geography understood even one hundred and twenty years ago that it was generally held that the West Indies were really more important and more valuable than the vast undeveloped stretches of the Northern American continent. Thus did it happen that the evanescent riches of the West Indian Islands—the sugar, the spices, the rum—were confounded with real riches, which can only be free men. Even in the eighteenth century so little was political science understood that in the struggle between the nations the glitter of gold formed the main lure.

influenced the march of events from Lisbon to Moscow, and invested such contests with world-wide significance. The rest of the globe — the world of coloured men — was still asleep, save where there was fitful contact with the white world. And just because of this happy circumstance — because Asia and Africa were quiescent — Europe marched forward with the stride of a giant.

As early as the seventeenth century all the five great seafaring nations of Europe — Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and England — had important stakes in America, and all were therefore directly interested in this vital question. But Holland, ruined by European warfare, was already of little account; and Portugal, having been once made the vassal of Spain and being very small, was also negligible. Thus by the eighteenth century there were three rivals and only three; and the history of the wavering fortunes of these three becomes largely the history of Europe. The great struggle, which was to have such a lasting effect on the march of events everywhere, was fought in regions which are comprised in a map which need only include the waters of the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean. It was a sea-struggle, to which the extraordinary series of land-wars which raged in Europe from 1689 to 1763¹ was only

¹ These conflicts continued with very little intermission from the year of the expulsion of the House of Stuart in 1689 to the formal peace with France and the cession of Canada by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The first of these four wars — waged from 1689 to 1697 — was a contest in which the newly elected sovereign William III. vindicated British independence of foreign control against the king of France. The second — the war of the Spanish Succession, waged from 1702 to 1713 — settled the great effort of Louis XIV. to become predominant in Europe. The third — the war of the Austrian Succession, waged from 1739 to 1748 — was the one in which England was the least

an unimportant accompaniment, so far as the destinies of the New World were concerned. This struggle clearly proclaimed the rapid growth of a New Europe and of a new balance of power. For England the real struggle was never in Europe itself; for her it was a matter of life and death who was to be dominant beyond Europe. Her insular position permitted her to concentrate her strength on her true objective, which was to drive her rivals from all distant seas. And thus, very slowly and very painfully, in the face of the greatest odds, England definitely displaced France.¹

concerned, but which had necessitated her taking part because of her conflict with Spain in the New World, where British vessels were attempting to break down the old Spanish monopoly. The fourth and last contest — the Seven Years' War, waged from 1756 to 1763 — was one in which England assisted the efforts of Prussia against the most formidable coalition which had yet arisen in Europe, the coalition of France, Austria, and Russia.

¹ It is necessary to quote Mahan again, since he advances his arguments as few men can do: —

“Instead of concentrating against England, France began another continental war, this time with a new and extraordinary alliance. The Empress of Austria, working on the religious superstitions of the king and upon the anger of the king's mistress, who was piqued at sarcasms uttered against her by Frederick the Great, drew France into an alliance with Austria against Prussia. This alliance was further joined by Russia, Sweden, and Poland. The empress urged that the two Roman Catholic Powers should unite to take Silesia away from a Protestant king, and expressed her willingness to give to France a part of her possessions in the Netherlands, which France had always desired.

“Frederick the Great, learning the combination against him, instead of waiting for it to develop, put his armies in motion and invaded Saxony, whose ruler was also King of Poland. This movement, in October, 1756, began the Seven Years' War; which, like the War of the Austrian Succession, but not to the same extent, drew some of the contestants off from the original cause

The riches drawn by Spain from the New World have engaged at the hands of historians a far greater share of attention than they deserve, save from the strictly economic point of view; for though some mines in the hands of the Spaniards gave fabulous returns, as a matter of fact they only served to enrich temporarily the Spanish Court and a few grandes, whilst indirectly impoverishing for a long term not only Spain but all Europe by upsetting all the old standards of values. Spanish commerce was virtually a State enterprise; ordinary traders had no interest in those galleons which romance has filled with such inexhaustible supplies of gold and silver and which served only to sap the vitality of a brave people. Her empire was an empire based on false conceptions. But with the Atlantic possessions of both France and England it was very different; for the colonies of both these Powers had grown immensely wealthy from the trade of the plantations with which they were covered, and from the shipping which was nurtured in their ports. France, of difference. But while France, having already on hand one large quarrel with her neighbour across the Channel, was thus needlessly entering upon another struggle with the avowed end of building up that Austrian empire which a wiser policy had long striven to humble, England this time saw clearly where her true interests lay. Making the continental war subsidiary, she turned her efforts upon the sea and the colonies; at the same time supporting Frederick both with money and cordial sympathy in the war for the defence of his kingdom, which so seriously diverted and divided the efforts of France. England thus had really but one war on hand. In the same year the direction of the struggle was taken from the hands of a weak ministry and given to those of the bold and ardent William Pitt, who retained his office till 1761, by which time the ends of the war had practically been secured." — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. VIII.

having the richer islands, had perhaps drawn home greater wealth during the time when her commerce filled the ports of Europe; but in another important particular she was already beaten before the armed struggle began.

For although French commerce and French shipping filled the Atlantic, she had been completely outdistanced in the matter of implanting colonies of her own people. This vital factor in the continued success of the English race — the capacity of the people to emigrate in increasing numbers — has had the greatest historical influence. Because such colonies have become common-places, the immense significance of the first thriving English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard is to-day lost sight of. But it is a fact, surely worth remembering and emphasising, that these North American colonies were the first real colonies of white men — destined to make a nation — which had ever been founded on a true self-governing scale out of Europe. The Spanish colonies were more in the nature of military dominions maintained over subject races, and in most of these colonies a fusion between the white and the coloured peoples was in full progress. The French colonies were but little better although situated in New France or Canada, as they had but a scanty population which looked with aversion on the cultivation of the soil.

Very different was the case with the British. Though different motives had prompted the formation of the different settlements, a common race and a common pride united the men of New England with the men of Virginia and Maryland; and the soil which they held was tilled and tilled again. By the middle

of the eighteenth century these settlements possessed no less than two million inhabitants, and because they were so rich in men became the real key to the series of problems which were then unfolded.

Though France, like Spain, had been humbled in the contest for supreme power in Europe, the genius of her people was so utterly different from the genius of the Spanish, that owing also to her central and dominating geographical position and her great coastline, territorial losses at home soon served largely to increase her oceanic activities. In that rich land, first named New France and only later Canada, her clear-headed statesmen saw more than a compensation for contracted European frontiers. Had France been content to confine herself to territory which was clearly hers by right of pre-emption — had she remembered the valuable political maxim that he who goes slowly goes safely — it is not unwise to assume that the French flag would yet be waving above the waters of the St. Lawrence, and the French tongue spoken exclusively over a vast belt of country stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

But in America, as in India under Dupleix, France could not brook the idea of a rival: and so Frenchmen — than whom none have a clearer strategical outlook — believing that if they could only obtain possession of the sole roadways throughout this vast untamed New World, the waterways, they would soon become supreme, commenced at once that adventurous policy which, in view of the numerical superiority of the English in the contested hemisphere, could only lead to disaster. The hinterland of British North America was studded with lake and riverine forts; the banks of

the Mississippi and the Missouri resounded with the voices of French *voyageurs*, coming in advance of their soldiers; the hope was openly cherished that soon the great colony of New France would be linked to the great colony of Louisiana, and the British effectually confined to the coast regions. The West Indies lent their valuable aid; and all Frenchmen became suddenly confident that England, which in the wars of the Austrian and Spanish successions had shown them the same old implacable hatred, would be finally humbled.¹ The psychology of this bold movement must be sought for not so much in the actual conditions of the day

¹ Abroad, *i.e.* out of Europe, war was practically continuous, as this extract shows:—

“The urgency with which peace was desired by the principal parties to the War of the Austrian Succession may perhaps be inferred from the neglect to settle definitely and conclusively many of the questions outstanding between them, and notably the very disputes about which the war between England and Spain began. It seems as though the Powers feared to treat thoroughly matters that contained the germs of future quarrels, lest the discussion should prolong the war that then existed. England made peace because the fall of Holland was otherwise inevitable, not because she had enforced, or surrendered, her claims of 1739 against Spain. The right of uninterrupted navigation in West Indian seas, free from any search, was left undetermined, as were other kindred matters. Not only so, but the boundaries between the English and French colonies in the valley of the Ohio, toward Canada, and on the land side of the Nova Scotian peninsula, remained as vague as they had before been. It was plain that peace could not last; and by it, if she had saved Holland, England surrendered the control of the sea which she had won. The true character of the strife, shrouded for a moment by the continental war, was revealed by the so-called peace; though formally allayed, the contention continued in every part of the world.”—Mahan: *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. VIII.

as in the traditions which remained from other times.

As late as the middle of the eighteenth century England was still very generally looked upon as a minor Power which had gained exceptional renown mainly through the predatory instincts of her people, and their strange mastery over the sea. Such a Power, in the opinion of the statesmen of the Continent, was not to be spoken of in the same breath as France; England was merely a second Holland — a common carrier — the home of an adventurous sea-people. Even Macaulay admits that until Clive went to India the English “were despised as mere pedlars, while the French were revered as a people formed for victory and command.” In the view of the great kingdoms of Europe, neither the victories of Marlborough, nor the successes of adventurers and traders in most distant regions, entitled her to a higher place, because of two facts: England, compared to other great countries, was small in area, and weak in men.

These facts seemed to gain further emphasis from the internal condition of England, which, after having possessed, under the last Tudors and the Stuarts, a highly centralised and autocratic authority, had by the Revolution been surrendered for more than two generations to the control of an effete oligarchy — with no man, until a Chatham arose, who dared to revive the Cromwellian tradition.

Bearing this well in mind, it is not difficult to understand the ambitions of the French in America, though a census taken after the actual surrender of Canada showed that the total French population in that territory only numbered 76,000 people. At home they were so

populous that they refused to believe in any possibility of English overseas supremacy; and until Chatham assumed the sole direction of affairs, the fitful nature of the struggle in the New World seemed to endorse that view. But Chatham infused his own zeal into everyone under him; he preached the frank gospel that France was the only Power England need fear; the American militia, answering his call, soon ran into tens of thousands of men, owing to the enthusiasm which the policy of complete defiance to France aroused; and victory was assured. In 1759, with the surrender of Quebec and the entire chain of lake and riverine posts on which French strategy had been based, England suddenly became supreme in the New World; in India the victory of Plassey founded a yet vaster empire. By the treaty of Paris, signed in 1763, France admitted these stubborn facts. Suddenly, unexpectedly, a totally new situation had arisen. England had displaced France.¹

¹ "The one nation that gained in this war was that which used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe. Yet it must be observed that these bases themselves would have lost their value if their communications remained obstructed. Therefore the French lost Louisburg, Martinique, Pondicherry; so England herself lost Minorca. The service between the bases and the mobile force between the ports and the fleets is mutual. In this respect the navy is essentially a light corps; it keeps open the communications between its own ports, it obstructs those of the enemy; but it sweeps the sea for the service of the land, it controls the desert that man may live and thrive on the habitable globe. These remarks, always true, are doubly so now since the introduction of steam. The renewal of coal is a want more frequent, more urgent, more peremptory, than any known to the sailing-ship. It is vain to look for energetic

It is from this moment, and from this moment only, that the history of England becomes world-history, and that Englishmen became covered with a renown which remains to them to this day. From being a minor Power, with a major fleet but with only a small home territory, England, by her victory over France not only in America but in all parts of the Atlantic, in India and in Africa as well, became a great Power, and therefore the object of secret envy and hatred among European nations, which instinctively understood that the old balance had disappeared, never to return, and that a new pivot had been made on which to swing events. France had definitely given up her long contest for the mastery of the East, and left the British to establish their rule over scores of millions of people; in Africa, too, she had lost everything. France, the leading representative of European culture and civilisation, had been surprisingly vanquished.

But most startling fact of all to those whose inland homes left them in ignorance of the outer world, the sea, from being a mere highway on which to travel to distant lands, had been demonstrated as the controlling engine of war in the hands of an island-Power. Henceforth the sea acquired new terrors. France's friend and ally, Spain — still living on the tradition of her past greatness — had suffered throughout the Atlantic contest in the same cruel way; once almost mistress of the world, she

naval operations distant from coal stations. It is equally vain to acquire distant coaling stations without maintaining a powerful navy; they will but fall into the hands of the enemy. But the vainest of all delusions is the expectation of bringing down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling stations outside the national boundaries." — Mahan: *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. VIII.

had to deplore the loss of Cuba, the Philippines, and Minorca. Had it not been for the internal condition of England, the supremacy of the British Empire, so summarily established, would have long remained unchallenged. But democracy had yet to come to its own, and because of that one vital fact it needed fresh conflicts both to ensure permanency to the fabric which had been raised, and to secure the continued advance of mankind.

It was the Hanoverian connection—the fact that the first two sovereigns of the House of Brunswick cared more for their German Electorate than for their English throne—which had dragged the British Isles so often into Continental rivalries. This European entanglement, and the fact that in the last struggle England was waging war in company and in alliance with Prussia, introduced a factor which went far to rob her of the fruits which her independent action in the four quarters of the globe had gathered for her. Hence, too, sprang a train of consequences, the power of which is to be seen even to this day.

Since the settlement of modern Europe on its present basis dates from the days of the Seven Years' War, scant doubt can exist that had England's decision in the matter of making peace with France in the year 1763 been different, the whole course of the world's history might easily have been changed.¹ For it is clear that

¹ This is how Mahan cuttingly summarises the land-contest of the Seven Years' War:—

"The terms of the peace were simply the *status quo ante bellum*. By the estimate of the King of Prussia, one hundred and eighty thousand of his soldiers had fallen or died in this war,

had England followed Chatham's advice, and completely broken French maritime power by persisting in the French war until that "nursery of seamen," the Atlantic fisheries, had been destroyed and the West Indies totally annexed, French naval help would have been lacking less than twenty years later when the American colonies revolted; and without that naval help those colonies could never have obtained their independence, save by the free gift of the Mother Country. But peace was decided on — because of both internal and external complications — and thus England was left face to face with a great domestic problem of which the approaching American Revolution was to be but one phase.¹ It is out of a kingdom of five million souls; while the losses of Russia, Austria, and France aggregated four hundred and sixty thousand men. The result was simply that things remained as they were."

— *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. VIII.

¹ This is what Mahan says about this peace: —

"The nation at large and Pitt, the favourite of the nation, were bitterly opposed to the terms of the treaty. 'France,' said Pitt, 'is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime and commercial Power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us above all through the injury to her which results from it. You leave to France the possibility of reviving her navy.' In truth, from the point of view of sea-power and of the national jealousies which the spirit of that age sanctioned, these words, though illiberal, were strictly justifiable. The restoration to France of her colonies in the West Indies and her stations in India, together with the valuable right of fishery in her former American possessions, put before her the possibility and the inducement to restore her shipping, her commerce, and her navy, and thus tended to recall her from the path of continental ambition which had been so fatal to her interests, and in the same proportion favorable to the unprecedented growth of England's power upon the ocean. The opposition, and indeed some of the ministry, also thought that so commanding and important a position as Havana was poorly paid for by the cession of the yet desolate and unproductive region called Florida. Porto Rico was suggested, Florida accepted. There were other

astonishing to-day to reflect that only four generations after the people had executed one king they should applaud the tyranny of another.

From the moment George III. had ascended the throne, he had determined to emancipate himself from the restraint to which his ancestors had been forced to submit, and to regain the authority which had been the prerogative of the Stuarts. To this vital fact must be assigned the confusion in British foreign policy which so quickly followed, and the blind mixing of false objectives with the true. Under George I. and George II. the system of government by Parliament had been fully minor points of difference, into which it is unnecessary to enter. It would scarcely be denied that with the commanding military control of the sea held by England, grasping as she now did so many important positions, with her navy overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and her commerce and internal condition very thriving, more rigorous terms might easily have been exacted and would have been prudent. The ministry defended their eagerness and spirit of concession on the ground of the enormous growth of the debt, which then amounted to £122,000,000, a sum in every point of view much greater then than now; but while this draft upon the future was fully justified by the success of the war, it also imperatively demanded that the utmost advantages which the military situation made attainable should be exacted. This the ministry failed to do. As regards the debt, it is well observed by a French writer that ‘in this war, and for years afterward, England had in view nothing less than the conquest of America and the progress of her East India Company. By these two countries her manufactures and commerce acquired more than sufficient outlets, and repaid her for the numerous sacrifices she had made. Seeing the maritime decay of Europe — its commerce annihilated, its manufactures so little advanced — how could the English nation feel afraid of a future which offered so vast a perspective?’ Unfortunately the nation needed an exponent in the government; and its chosen mouthpiece, the only man, perhaps, able to rise to the level of the great opportunity, was out of favour at court.” — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. VIII.

established, and the House of Commons, though largely influenced by corruption, held the real power. George III. determined to break this system; his success in so doing helped largely to set in motion those sanguinary movements which were not stilled until two generations later. It is not necessary to consider these troublesome matters in detail; they are mentioned because they have to-day general political importance. If it were possible to see clearly where in those days the vital mistakes were committed, statesmen would possess an almost infallible guide to the handling of future problems in both Asia and Africa, which are to-day the final meeting-places of the world's rival forces. But though it is clear that a fierce and resolute use of gunpowder is still the sole means of securing the onward march of empires — that is, that a centralised authority is still necessary to secure any resolute course of action in the face of imminent danger — it is equally certain that restraints imposed upon the internal growth of liberalism and individual independence infallibly invite disaster by sowing within the seeds of future dissolution. It is the discovery of the happy medium between the conditions which make for external political success — that is, for success of foreign policy — and the conditions which produce internal content, which should engage the energies of those who would hasten the coming of a political millennium. Because the ancient barbarian principle of representation had not yet been adapted to meet the totally new conditions which had grown up overseas, England fought her own colonies and lost.¹

¹ In view of the curious ideas which still linger in certain quarters in England it may be held pertinent to insert here a brilliant passage from Dr. Goldwin Smith's *History of the United*

To the chastening of the national spirit which so quickly followed this unlawful attempt — unlawful in

States, which all who use English as their mother-tongue should ponder over:—

“Separation, again be it said, was inevitable. It was too likely that, the vision of statesmanship being clouded as it was respecting the relation of colonies to the mother-country, the separation would be angry and violent. Still it might conceivably have been amicable, and that dark page might possibly have been torn from the book of destiny. Woe, we must say, to them by whom the offence came and through whose immediate agency, culpable in itself, the two great families of our race were made and to a deplorable extent have remained enemies instead of being friends, brethren, and fellow-workers in the advancement of their common civilisation. Woe to the arbitrary and bigoted king whose best excuse is that he had not made himself a ruler instead of being what nature intended him to be, a ploughman. Woe to Grenville, who though not wicked or really bent on depriving the colonies of their rights, but on the contrary most anxious after his fashion to promote their interests, was narrow, pedantic, overbearing, possessed with extravagant ideas of the authority of Parliament, and unstatesmanlike enough to insist on doing because it was technically lawful that which the sagacity of Walpole had on the ground of practical expediency refused to do. Woe above all to Charles Townshend, who, with his vain brilliancy and his champagne speeches, repeated in the face of recent and decisive experience the perilous experiment and recklessly renewed the quarrel. Woe to Lord North, and all the more because in stooping to do the will of the king he was sinning against the light of good nature and good sense in himself. Woe even to Mansfield, whose supremely legal intellect too ably upheld the letter of the law against policy and the right. Woe to the Parliament — a Parliament be it ever remembered of rotten boroughs and of nominees not of the nation — which carelessly or insolently supported the evil resolution of the ministry and the court. Woe to the Tory squires who shouted for the war, to the Tory parsons who preached for it, and to the Tory bishops who voted for it in the House of Lords. Woe to the pamphleteers of prerogative, such as Johnson, whose vituperative violence added fuel to the flame. But woe also to the agitators at Boston, who with the design of in-

the highest sense because it was inexpedient — to coerce the North American colonies into slavish obedience, must be directly traced the adoption of those political and economic views which still so sharply differentiate the British polity from that of the rest of Europe, and which have secured for that polity much of its present vast renown. Had England been successful in imposing those strange views which found favour with a resolute but bigoted king, and had she at the same time vanquished her other enemies, it is not too much to suppose that the centralisation of power which would have speedily followed would in the end have been as disastrous to her as it had previously been in the cases of Spain and France. But because England failed where it was good for her to fail — because she found that Cromwell and his Ironsides are really eternal figures in the history of the English race no matter where that race may wander, figures which must reappear whenever conditions provoke a re-incarnation — it has been permitted her, instead of falling back in the race of nations, to retain and increase that mastery which Chatham and his disciples began to secure for her.

dependence unavowed and of which they themselves were perhaps but half conscious, did their utmost to push the quarrel to extremity and to quench the hope of reconciliation. Woe to the preachers of Boston, who whether from an exaggerated dread of prelacy or to win the favour of the people made themselves the trumpeters of discord and perverted the gospel into a message of civil war. Woe to contraband traders if there were any, who sought in fratricidal strife relief from trade restrictions; to debtors if there were any, who sought in it a sponge for debt. Woe to all on either side who under the influence of passion, interest, or selfish ambition fomented the quarrel which rent asunder the English race."

To treat of this great and eventful period — the revolutionary age ushered in by the American Revolution — is none of our present business, save in regard to those issues which were raised and left unsolved. It may be said here that while in one sense the revolt of the North American colonies was a purely internal problem for the newly-founded British Empire, the immediate mishandling of that problem made it a great and far-reaching international event. Foolish strategy led to sudden surrenders; sudden surrenders encouraged armed intervention; and thus France, still smarting under her displacement as the leading Power of Europe, and with Spain inevitably tied to her by the Family Compact, sullenly entered the fray. Assailed within the limits of her Empire and torn with doubt, England was everywhere on the defensive — reversing her well-known and well-feared policy of attack, and thereby inviting disaster.¹ The separation of the richest colonies

¹ These instructions, quoted by Mahan, were issued to the French navy by Louis XVI. when France decided to aid the North American colonies: —

“Your duty now is to restore to the French flag the lustre with which it once shone; past misfortunes and faults must be buried out of sight; only by the most illustrious actions can the navy hope to succeed in doing this. His Majesty has the right to expect the greatest efforts from his officers. Under whatever circumstances the King’s fleet may be placed, his Majesty’s orders, which he expressly charges me to impress upon you, as well as upon all officers in command, are that his ships attack with the greatest vigour, and defend themselves, on all occasions, to the last extremity.”

And Mahan adds the following luminous commentary on the attitude of France and Spain in this struggle: —

“Already despoiled of Canada, she (France) had every reason to believe that a renewal of war, with Europe neutral and the Americans friends instead of enemies, would not rob her of her

she ever had became assured; the unwisdom of her truce with France twenty years before became more clear; and forced to make peace on ignominious terms, silently she nursed her rage until the genius of Nelson was able to revive the traditions of Cromwell and Chatham, and the holocaust of Trafalgar not only repaid in full her debt but restored to her her honour. Imperially the American separation had been without effect; England had remained the leading Power; and more than that, Liberalism was born again, and grew stronger and stronger until the final victory of the Reform Acts.

The effect of the American Revolution, while highly favourable at once to the institutions of England, because the ground had been prepared more than a century before to profit by that lesson, was in the first instance disastrous to the rest of Europe, and led directly to a generation of terrible warfare. In England, the revolution in political and economic thought was accomplished by indirect means — it began by a disaster within the limits of the Empire but away from the heart of the Empire. In the rest of Europe

islands. Recognising that the Americans, who less than twenty years before had insisted upon the conquest of Canada, would not consent to her regaining it, she expressly stipulated that she would have no such hopes, but exacted that in the coming war she would retain any English West Indian possessions which she could seize. Spain was differently situated. Hating England, wanting to regain Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica — no mere jewels in her crown, but foundation-stones of her power — she nevertheless saw that the successful rebellion of the English colonists against the hitherto unrivalled sea-power of the mother-country would be a dangerous example to her own enormous colonial system, from which she yearly drew so great subsidies. If England with her navy should fall, what could Spain achieve? — *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Chap. IX.

it was only partially accomplished after a long lapse of time by direct means, in which cruel devastation everywhere played a most considerable part before the gospel of the ballot-box was accepted.

It has been well said that the French Revolution, precipitated by the American Revolution and the financial embarrassments which sprang therefrom, is not yet understood in its total effect, and that like those vast subterranean convulsions which disturb the tranquillity of the earth, only that manifestation which has been seen on the surface has been properly noted.

To the historical student, who avoids emotional judgments, the fact that such a convulsion should have taken place in France, instead of elsewhere, is the final proof that France, in spite of colonial defeats and in spite of all English efforts, continued to retain not only the intellectual leadership of Europe but something of the political leadership as well.¹ Hand in hand with

¹ It must not be forgotten that a factor in those days was England's weakness in men. Concerning England's weakness in men, it is a noteworthy fact that even a generation later — that is, at the time of the French Revolution — France possessed a population of twenty-five million people against Great Britain's nine million, to which may be added a thoroughly disaffected Irish population of three and a half million. It was this almost traditional weakness in men which, combined with the geographical fact that England is so small, had so large a political influence. The marvellous increase in the British population since the beginning of the nineteenth century, an increase of three hundred per cent. in a little more than one hundred years, tends to obscure the fact that in the eighteenth century England was too weak in men to exert a profound general influence in world-politics. Even in Napoleonic days the tradition — largely arising out of her narrow territory and her slender population, in spite of her maritime greatness — contributed to the idea that she might be eclipsed, as Holland had been eclipsed, if she were systematically opposed by the whole strength of Europe.

the enormous centralisation of power which had been established, there existed in France a greater sense of nationalism and a greater understanding of the meaning of liberty, than in all other countries of the Continent between the Atlantic and the Ural. This great explosive movement was the first real movement in continental Europe to discover how far centralisation of political power can co-exist with strong individual liberty: that is, whether a powerful executive and a true democracy can really co-exist. And as it is this problem which has nowhere yet been fully solved, it is a problem which remains perpetually interesting.

But from the international standpoint — the world standpoint — that such a convulsion should have come so suddenly and sharply, shows that the transoceanic and colonial activities of the various European States, which were still being conducted on almost mediæval principles, had made men blind to the fact that on the soil of Europe itself the breakdown of old barriers had been silently and magically proceeding through the direct influence of this commerce conducted with so many distant lands. Whole classes of people who had hitherto been content to remain undistinguished from the great masses of their countrymen, were rapidly enriched through colonial trade; and thus those who relied on hereditary rights and privileges handed down from feudal days, found themselves enormously outnumbered and their influence vanishing. Swamped in the new waves of prosperity which had been impelled from distant shores, they held up their hands weakly and attempted to stay irresistible forces with mere words. Thus it may be said that to the navigators of the earlier centuries — the discoverers of the Americas,

the African Continent, the India of the mainland and the India of countless isles, as well as the chart-makers of the five seas—directly belongs the proud honour of having found the hammer with which to strike away the iron fetters then still partially binding the common man. Out of Europe—and not in Europe—were gathered the materials necessary for making bonfires of the last of ancient privileges; just as out of Europe were taken Europe's religion, Europe's philosophy and much of Europe's arts. This is the immense debt which is owed by Europe to non-Europe.

Yet in spite of this debt to non-Europe, the student, surveying this vast movement which took more than two generations to run even a portion of its ever-interrupted course in Europe, notes that the concessions which in the end were unwillingly made by almost every Government in Europe to their peoples did not extend to their sphere of operation beyond Europe and America—that is, beyond the homes of the white man. So far indeed from any concessions being made, England became more than ever the chief and irresistible colonial Power, and marked her progress throughout the Napoleonic era by a series of conquests in the extra-European world as surprising as any the genius of Chatham had won for her: she remained as relentless in carrying out that peculiar doctrine—that the possession of the right of eminent domain by conquest or by inheritance implies government by force of arms—as George III. himself could have wished. Whilst the winged victories of Napoleon were modernising Europe, the Cape became British; Ceylon succumbed; the vast island of Java was torn from the Dutch and kept under military occupation for a decade; the Malay

Peninsula was marked down; India was more clearly made a close British preserve; no island, indeed, howsoever distant or howsoever insignificant, was safe from attack unless above it waved the Union Jack. Thus whilst that tremendous secular Palladium — “No Taxation without Representation” — which after having been enunciated in New England was being carried forcibly under disguised forms by Napoleon from Lisbon to Poland (in that he destroyed the ancient power), England was boldly adhering to the earlier creed of conquest and government by force of arms, wherever the pigment of the skin differentiated the autochthonous races from those who saw in themselves the heirs of Hellenic intellect and Roman military strength.

To this singular circumstance must be ascribed England’s present remarkable position — that is, that while she had been the first to admit through *force majeure* this new general principle among all white peoples wherever they may permanently implant themselves, she stubbornly delayed doing so elsewhere; and, tearing by force of arms wide territories both from the grasp of alien races and from other weaker European Powers, she made it amply clear that she was only prepared to modify her attitude when political expediency urgently bade her do so.

Those who would, in consequence, accuse the English of perfidiousness, would do well to pause and remember that such an assumption shows slight acquaintance with first causes. The leaden air of England provokes not that desire which Goethe has said can only live in the realms of dreams — happiness — but the desire for comfort and perfection, perfection in all that machinery of government and in all those

material things which ensure tranquillity. Therefore whilst more volatile and impressionable peoples were eager to shape their destinies by giving effect to the dreams of their wise men, made possible by the Revolutions in America and in France, the British alone, stolidly pursuing their course in the face of all difficulties, were winning for themselves a position in the extra-European world which, if the lessons of history are now taken to heart, nothing should ever be able to shake. Of all European peoples they thus stand confessed the most thoroughly European — that is the most frankly barbarian — a people seeing in action the only cure for ills, a people distrusting all doctrines as the devices of theorists enunciated for the purpose of misleading the ignorant.

Thus it happened that long before the Congress of Vienna had met, and that marvellous chapter of human activities summed up in one word “Napoleon” had been closed, England had practically completed the work which more than made up for the loss of the American colonies. She found herself in the possession of a new vast Empire. Whilst other European nations had been engaged in their meticulous and never-ending discussions regarding international leadership and the European balance of power, England found that she had won a wider and more powerful position than Rome. Europe awoke to find its political map settled perhaps for all time, and gradually realised with dismay the position of the Island Power.

Separated by the sea from the turmoil which long distracted Continental Europe, the irresistible impulse of the English race now turned men in ever-increasing numbers to regions which until then had been only

vaguely understood. Under the magic hands of stern and virile conquerors, Asia, Australasia and Africa swung the pendulum of British interests to the Indian and Pacific oceans and thus away from the narrower Atlantic, which, from being the touchstone of eighteenth century supremacy, had become only the commercial waterway of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹

Nothing in the history of the world is more interesting than those movements which, for want of a better term, must be designated in the language of physiology as reflex actions. That no such energy as has been actually witnessed would have been lavished by English hands on the Eastern Hemisphere had not the Western

¹ An interesting volume could be written showing how, with the loss of the original English empire in America and the fierce manner in which the British avenged themselves thereafter for this, America was effectively isolated. Americans to-day no doubt fondly imagine that it was the pronouncement of President Monroe, embodying in the form of a concrete doctrine what had previously been vaguely felt as a necessity, which has rendered the American Continent immune from fresh European interference. It is nothing of the sort, for natural movements are not arrested by words. It was the action of England itself, determined by politico-economic considerations, which had far more to do than anything else with segregating America in a political sense. Having at last most completely beaten her rivals, thanks to her sea-power, she suddenly found that her course of empire had turned eastward and not westward. Only half-believing what was manifestly true, it needed the entire first half of the nineteenth century to convince her. But as India became a mighty empire; as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the great chain of commercial entrepôts from Aden to Hong Kong arose, automatically the Western Hemisphere, and the classic West Indies, scenes of such immortal combats, dropped into a vague political backwater until to-day schoolboys can no longer understand the meaning of eighteenth century history. Strange indeed are the decrees of Providence!

Hemisphere been partially abandoned in acute despondency, must be undoubted. Possibly Australia and New Zealand would have been colonised no matter what other regions had attracted explorers, colonists and capitalists: Africa would have been encroached upon; India would have been steadily conquered; and other colonies implanted. Yet the assumption may be permitted that had not Washington succeeded in securing the separation of the old eighteenth century empire, the new empire of to-day would not have been what it actually is; and that British energies — finding full scope for their highest activity in a vast American Dominion — would have been largely engaged in making of the Atlantic Ocean a British lake.

But the American Revolution, more than any other movement in history, revealed the Asiatic destiny of England, and by diverting those endless streams of men from West to East has made the colour-question a supreme one for England. The dazzling panorama of events which is unfolded in British Asiatic history to-day makes men forget that rights were really acquired by the most primitive and unlawful methods, and that hardly a conquest in the East but has been stained with deeds such as those with which the memory of the Cæsars is reproached. The distance and variety of the continent of Asia, which endow it with such an infinite and inexhaustible charm, has in the past made the application of a sound public morality difficult; the task of raising the magnificent fabric of Western sovereignty upon the dying embers of the gorgeous empires of the East has been pursued with no regard save for considerations similar to those which influenced Charlemagne a thousand years ago.

But now a new era is at length at hand. The old conditions have disappeared. Europe and Asia — and later Europe and Africa — must inevitably return to something similar to the relationship once existing between West and East. The equality between the two which once existed will surely be re-established — the relationship which has now definitely existed for more than four centuries and which owes its origin to the white man's sudden conquest of the ocean and his abandonment of land-routes must give place to something which though it sounds very novel is really a revival of something very old. By his conquest of the sea, the white man gathered wealth from far and wide and shook off his provincialism. Knowledge naturally followed; with knowledge came power; and this power led to his world-dominion. Marvellous indeed is it, thus to follow out the long yet eminently simple chain of antecedents which brings us to the present day.

In the pages that follow some analysis is made of the tremendous new forces at work, and some opinions are ventured which in the light of experience seem sound, and in the highest sense politic. On England to-day hangs in all these questions an enormous and far-reaching responsibility; and on her decision truly rests the peace of the world.

CHAPTER I

HOW COLOUR DIVIDES THE WORLD TO-DAY

THERE should be to-day few more interesting studies in the world than the study of the map — providing that it is conducted with intelligence, and that the surface of this terrestrial globe presents itself to the eye as something more than a series of charts covered with fantastic blotches of colour and strangely spelt names. For never has there been any period of the world's history in which racial problems were invested with such consummate interest as they now are — never has there been a time when the home of every nation had acquired such peculiar importance in the estimation of every other nation. The map outlines clearly the limits of each and every such individual problem; to maps we must therefore inevitably turn. On all sides, in every quarter of the globe, new and disturbing elements are fast arising and invite the most serious consideration; and so rapid and complex is the development of this vast movement — so puzzling and so numerous are the cross-currents — that what is prognosticated one year is often falsified the very next, whilst yesterday's impossibility becomes, through some fortuitous occurrence, to-day's firm belief. In these

circumstances, it is small wonder that even the most patient brains become weary of such a political phantasmagoria; and that the most just statesmen are often inclined to seek relief by cutting, instead of untying, each Gordian knot. When such a variety of interests exists; when men's ideas and ambitions are so different; and when prejudices are still so powerful a political force throughout the world, this is perhaps only as it must be.

Yet, if the truth were known, in spite of all apparent contradictions, and in spite of much inevitable vagueness in many matters, there is small doubt that a big map of the world on Mercator's projection should to-day be to every really intelligent person something very like a horoscope of the human race — a horoscope, it is true, not cast as astrologers ordain, yet nevertheless one enabling men to know within certain definite limits what should and what should not happen to the various racial divisions and groups composing the human species. The reason for this is that the manner in which these divisions and groups are now distributed over the face of the earth has become virtually an index to much of the world's future history. Such a statement may sound, at the first blush, presumptuous; yet a little amplification will speedily show that it is nothing but a sober opinion.

For the chiefest and most important fact in modern political geography — the fact which has to be at once seized and insisted upon — is that the grand divisions and dwelling-grounds of the races are now more or less settled for all time. The era of vast migrations — and therefore of vast racial conflicts — has long since passed away, and wars can never again lead to those strange

displacements which twenty centuries ago were commonplaces. It is inconceivable, for instance, that Europe should ever succumb to a "black" invasion, or that America should ever become a yellow man's country; only miraculous and unbelievable events could bring about such things. And since it is no part of the business of the student to believe in miracles, a detailed inquiry cannot consider any of those many engaging theories which are so constantly advanced by alarmists. It may, then, be laid down as an axiom that, within certain limits, the future of all races is now fixed. That is equivalent to declaring that migrations *en masse* from one continent to another having become impossible — save where such migrations are nothing but the continuation of movements long in progress — it will in future only be possible for nations to win trifling expansions along their own borders. To this rule there are no exceptions.

The grand reason for the migrations of history — and therefore of the great conflicts which ensued in days gone-by — was very simple. The world was somewhat empty; there was an appalling difference between the narrow civilised centres and the barbarians; there existed a savage contempt for life and property, owing to the predominance of muscle over brain-power; and even in the well-settled countries of the classical world, so trifling was the number of inhabitants compared to modern populations, that they were generally confined to the more fertile plains and valleys and to a few dozen overgrown cities.

Nor must it be forgotten that, in ancient times, nearly all the artificial checks which now exist were entirely lacking; and just because those checks were lacking no

one felt any necessity to stay his hand. It was only natural, then, that men, as they increased greatly in numbers, should move here and there in vast irresistible hordes, impelled by an overpowering natural instinct to seek for better and broader lands in measure as their numbers and their belief in their own strength increased. This movement was accelerated because it was almost universal in Europe and Asia, as well as in parts of Africa. It was a huge, uncontrollable settlement which is among the greatest facts in history, and which is the foundation for the present position of the races. The almost universal pressure of those distant days produced universal movement. Behind every horde was some other horde, filled with equally predatory instincts; for one to advance another had to retreat; and for any single one to have stood still would have been as much against the laws of self-preservation as against the laws of nature. Thus—as a bold illustration—the fall of the Roman Empire was brought about as much by the Huns, who pressed on the Teutonic or Gothic Barbarians, as by anything else; and that is exactly why this period must be selected as the period when—racially—the foundations of Europe were laid. It was the time when Europe had received into her bosom the powerful race stocks which were destined to proclaim her supremacy. Though in Asia and Africa the movement was very different, and though many other forces were at work, in most regions of these continents, as in Europe, it is subsequent to the birth of Christ that a permanent settlement was commenced.

Conditions now are so entirely different that never again can it happen that the same laws operate. To-day, though the world is not yet full of the human

species, nations have in nearly every case been so very long settled in their present homes, and populations have grown so enormously great and are still growing so rapidly, that it is possible to calculate with more or less mathematical accuracy exactly when there should be one human being to every acre of arable soil in the world. This day is fast approaching.¹ Indeed so rapidly is this movement going on that numbers alone must make great displacements of men impossible in the near future. These facts, then, bury ancient history for ever; they mark the beginning of a new era, in which, though the place of might may not completely be taken by right, political expediency will with ever-growing voice

¹ Those pessimists who talk lightly about the over-population of the world should seek comfort from the philosophy of statistics. There seems little doubt that the world is not only capable of easily supporting 4,000 million souls—which should be the approximate population in the year 2000—but that, without taking into account what new scientific discoveries may bring about, the wheat area of the world is capable of supporting twice or thrice that number.

To take but the single example of the Canadian North-West. Arable land of the finest quality extends for 500 miles north of Edmonton, making the total area of the three Prairie Provinces available for cultivation 255 millions of acres. Assuming that only 100 million acres are sown in wheat, and remembering that the 7 million acres now under cultivation produce 115,000,000 bushels, at least 1,600,000,000 bushels could be produced by the Canadian North-West, a yield equal to half the present total production of the world! Similarly Argentina to-day has only little more than 10 per cent. of her 250,000,000 acres of arable land under cultivation, producing about 200,000,000 bushels of wheat, whilst two per cent. probably of Siberia is growing grain. Summing up, it is probable that these three wheat-growing regions, Canada, Argentina and Siberia, will one day produce sufficient grain to nourish a white population numbered in thousands of millions. More it is surely unnecessary to say.

counsel prudence and restraint, and forbid all great changes. Forms of government and rulers may change; races can no longer change their homes.¹

For real frontiers — real barriers to the swaying to and fro of peoples — are no longer rivers, or mountains, or seas, or any of those physical features still referred to in geography-books. These are only the frontiers of savages; the real frontiers of civilisation are formed by masses of men distributed in proper density, highly civilised, irrevocably locked to the soil by their history and their culture, and sufficiently warlike to make their physical boundaries respected should wanton aggression menace them. It is flesh and blood, then, that forms true modern barriers; and when that flesh and blood shows an indisputable title, no one will dare to dispute it.

Yet just because this is so, just because a new position is being reached throughout the world, with not merely one Monroe doctrine, but fifty of such doctrines, it is important to remember, before proceeding any further in this inquiry, that even in Europe a general rectification of frontiers undoubtedly has still to come. It is plain indeed that until that rectification has everywhere been carried out, all talk of arbitrating vital international differences must necessarily be illusory. A deep instinct will continue to push men to substitute for the purely political demarcations which have come down

¹ Though certain districts in India are commonly quoted as the most densely populated regions in the world, it is well to note that the island of Barbados supports a population which in 1901 worked out to 1,178 persons per square mile. To-day that figure must exceed 1,200 per square mile — which approaches the maximum number which even the most fertile soil in the world is capable of supporting.

from other days a new class which may well be called racial demarcations. That such demarcations are necessarily blurred is no matter; this only adds one more difficulty to a question which force may attempt to solve. It is this knowledge — that racial instinct and racial pride ignore political boundaries — which is the nightmare of statesmen.

Thus, though the forcible acquisition by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine is still looked upon by Frenchmen as an act of bare-faced territorial robbery, which some yet dream of avenging, it is important to remember that racially it was an act of restitution — that is, the restoration of an old frontier-line. Therefore, although it has been laid down as an axiom at the beginning of this argument that the era of migrations is long since past, none the less it is equally true that no race to-day, any more than yesterday, will be content permanently to accept an arbitrary frontier-line won by force of arms in more or less modern times, when across that frontier remain millions of men of the same blood. In geo-politics this is perhaps the most important minor question of the day. It is for this reason that Italian Irredentists dream of one day rescuing their brothers on the other side of the Adriatic. It is for this reason that Roumanians jealously eye the Austrian province of Transylvania; that Bulgarians gaze across the southern line of Eastern Roumelia and believe that the days are not far distant when the boundaries laid down in the inoperative Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano may be claimed by them. It is unnecessary to quote further cases: it is sufficient to say that Germans, Greeks, Russians, Servians, Italians, Austrians, and many others in Europe, believe that they have not yet gained their true and final frontiers —

because across their political boundaries are men of the same race and speech, surrendered to the rule of others by former conquests. When the balance of numbers was very different from what it is to-day; when nationality was still largely a provincial feeling, or a so-called regionalism; when men's horizons were bounded by the distance they could see with the naked eye; when the question of daily bread was the supreme question — then was it that such vital problems of high politics were abandoned to the care of rulers. To-day that is nowhere any longer true: all men — or nearly all — have risen from their low estate, and from now on the millions will make or mar their country. It may thus be laid down as a second axiom that every nation which has a definite sense of nationality and is virile — the Bulgars, for instance — will attempt sooner or later a forcible frontier-rectification: whilst, conversely, every nation that is deficient in a sense of nationality, and is not virile — that is, declines in numbers — will have its frontiers pushed back.¹ That is the second great point it is necessary here to emphasise. It greatly affects the

¹ In connection with the question of the possible overflow of Germans into other countries, a note on the numbers of foreigners domiciled in France and Germany is interesting as showing the probable natural future movements. In 1901 there were 1,033,871 foreigners in France — Belgians and Italians accounting for sixty-five per cent. But in 1905 Germany herself contained 1,028,560 subjects of foreign Powers — fifty per cent. being Austrians or men of the same ethnic stock. Austria has but a small number of foreigners — Italy and Spain scarcely any at all.

From this it seems probable that for many years Italy and Belgium rather than Germany will send their overflow into France; and that until Germany's density of population is twice as heavy as it is to-day, so-called over-population will not be a question of practical politics in that country.

first point, because it partially re-opens under a new form in Europe a question which seems at first sight closed — that is, racial expansion.

The reason why a proper study of population and races is as important to-day as that of the physical features of the world should now be amply clear. In the modern world it is in the debatable regions — where what may be called a permanent settlement of frontier-lines has not yet been brought about — that there will be a constant swaying to and fro, most probably accompanied by bloody wars, until density of population, and the consequent struggle for existence, either blots out nationality or makes its claims undeniable. In Europe there will be not so much of this, owing to the existence of many artificial checks and to the growth of that modern cosmopolitanism which, mixed with socialism, is rapidly tending to obliterate so many old differences. But in Asia — that is, along Asiatic frontiers — where the question of a different colour also intrudes, there are immense regions, such as the entire Amur country, the wastes of Central Asia, Eastern Turkestan, Persia, and Asia Minor, where nothing like permanent frontier-lines have yet been established; where nature cries aloud for the regulating hand of man; where, since modern civilisation and culture are practically non-existent, the people are only swayed by unreasoning passions; where, because the new voice of reason cannot be listened to, the old voice of force will still be heard.¹ It is self-evident that in these

¹ In this connection it is useful to point to the islands of the Malay archipelago, which cover an extent of land equal to half Europe, and which are at present most imperfectly peopled by a population numbering 40,000,000. It has been calculated that

regions fierce conflicts must occur again and again. And it is one of the most significant facts in modern political geography that Russia must be more involved in all these contests than any other white nation, because her frontier marches sheer across Asia to the Pacific, and forms the natural advance-guard of the white man.

In the other main regions of the world — in the American Continent, in Africa, in Australia, and in the remaining island groups — no great race-conflict, having for object the final mastery of the soil, should arise, unless Europe, and what it stands for, itself falls. The question of the mastery has already been decided.

Thus the future of the entire American Continent is now definitely settled, so far as human foresight can estimate, though the present settlement is less than 400 years old. America, when it was discovered, was well-named the New World: it was a world standing utterly cut off from Asia — save in the Polar zone — by thousands of miles of ocean, and sufficiently distant from Europe and Africa to have remained equally effectively isolated during long ages. When in the sixteenth century Fate willed that white men should begin to stream across the Atlantic, it became certain that, as has happened in other parts of the world, this race would colonise and, in the end, completely dominate the entire temperate zones both north and south of the equator. at least 200,000,000 people might settle on the four islands of Celebes, Sumatra, New Guinea and Borneo. These four islands have an area of 837,000 square miles and a population of not more than eight or nine millions. It is plain that some day this great and fertile chain of islands lying between Australia and Asia will have very great importance.

What was not certain in the first stages of this colonisation was what was to be the future of those vast regions which enjoyed a climate sufficiently tropical to have called forth a native civilisation reminiscent of that of the ancient Egyptians. The passage of four hundred years — or twelve generations — has been sufficient to prove beyond a doubt that the future of the races will be decided in the American Continent by climatic considerations, which here as elsewhere establish certain definite frontiers.

Thus North America to the Mexican frontier will be white, save for a dense belt extending mainly round the gulf of Florida, and comprising all the low-lying unhealthy land, which will be increasingly surrendered to the negro. From the neighbourhood of the Mexican frontier to the southern frontiers of Bolivia (that is, for some twenty-three degrees on each side of the equator), the bulk of the population must be coloured — that is, of mixed Indian blood — not forgetting that in Brazil, as in the United States, there will grow an ever more formidable black belt, consisting of the descendants of African slaves. It is an illuminating fact that the limits of this domination of coloured blood are set with strange exactitude by the boundaries of the so-called “torrid zone” — a zone about 47 degrees wide, which all the world over is in the nature of forbidden land to the white man. Save, then, for Argentine, the coast districts of Brazil, and the coastline of Chili, the pure-bred white man can only remain in so-called Latin America in a constantly decreasing minority.

In Australia, too, the future is quite decided. There — unless an unbelievable race suicide, of which some see signs to-day, takes place — it has been secured that a

white man's home shall exist — that is, a land ruled and controlled by white men. The one problem of Australia is the problem of the Northern Territory — a vast tropical region, which is suitable only for a dark-skinned race, but which is at present virtually uninhabited, because the white man can barely live there and yet forbids the infiltration of any other race, because he fears, with that instinctive fear which nothing can eradicate, that the very moment such a movement begins Australia will have a colour problem far more acute than the American problem and probably as insoluble as the South African problem, where the black menace must some day weld the white minority together in a manner not yet understood.

For Africa — with the exception of this region in the extreme south and a small portion of Algeria, where powerful minorities still act in such a way as to decide the destinies of the dormant majorities — is purely a coloured man's continent; a land where no other man may thrive; a land where climate is absolute master. Certain plateaux of East Africa may be healthy; other regions may seem attractive as colonising areas; yet nothing can really change the pregnant fact that Africa as a whole is a black man's country, which only certain Asiatic races, such as the Arabs, can really invade and conquer by that powerful levelling and assimilating influence, Islamism. Here, then, the contest of the future, save in two narrow regions, can only be political — the limits of racial conquest are already clearly marked. Thus it is not in America, or in Australia, or in Africa, that any great clash can occur.

The main racial contest — a contest which must be conducted not only along frontiers, but in the heart of

densely-populated countries as well — can only be between the old antagonists, Europe and Asia. That this is both natural and logical cannot be gainsaid, for two simple reasons — first, that Europe and Asia form really one continent containing more than three-quarters of the population of the world; and second, that contact between the two — as well as between both shores of the Mediterranean — has been continuous for thousands of years, it having been the action and reaction between the two which has produced all the world's great movements. It seems impossible for the real frontiers between the two to be delimited, or for their growing relations to be remodelled on a permanent basis, until populations grow much vaster than they are at present and completely fill up all empty places, and until the standard of living and the standard of strength approximate much more closely than they do at present. In the past Europe has dominated Asia: Asia cannot any longer permit that ancient state of affairs, but Asia is slow to decide and slower to act. With her, many disabilities exist which had never had place in the case of Europe. She for ever carries a burden which is the secret of much of her past immovability — the burden of climate — and no matter how greatly she may exert herself, she can only imitate Europe up to a certain point, and never beyond. On her weight of numbers and her cunning she must rely to offset a permanent inferiority in many vital things. All this is now well understood.¹

¹ In pondering over this subject the writer recalls to mind the melancholy sight of masses of Chinese slain in 1900. The essential difference between Europe and Asia is never made clearer than in the sight of dead men when lying in any number.

This struggle, however, will approach slowly and methodically, and not rapidly and dramatically as past struggles have done. Every day will bring nearer the inevitable settling day, but tens of thousands of days must elapse before even the true outlines are made clear. A hundred minor questions will engage the world's attention before the main problem rises like a mountain before all eyes; and according to the political wisdom which is now shown in dealing with these minor difficulties, so will the final settlement be consummated.

At the same time that there is this large clash of conflicting ideals looming up — this clash of two necessarily different civilisations, which is to be the mighty problem of the future — another racial struggle of a very different nature has already begun. This question is far more subtle and already considerably complicates the other problem. Briefly, a struggle has begun between the white man and all the other men of the world to decide whether non-white men — that is, yellow men, or brown men, or black men — may or may not invade the white man's countries in order there to gain their livelihood. The standard of living being low in the lands of coloured men and high in the lands of the white man, it has naturally followed that it has been in the highest degree attractive for men of colour during the past few decades to proceed to regions where

The vigorous white man even in death possesses a certain majesty of form — a certain resolution — which is totally lacking in the rice-fed Asiatic. When he leaves this world, the latter seems to shrink to a very small measure — to be far weaker than the white man, even when the frame is nothing but a shell from which the spirit has fled. Is not this in itself a lasting commentary on the history of the conflict between Europe and Asia ?

their labour is rewarded on a scale far above their actual requirements — that is, on the white man's scale. This simple economic truth creates the inevitable contest which has for years filled all the countries bordering on the Pacific with great dread; and which, in spite of the temporary truce which the so-called "Exclusion Policy" has now enforced, will go much farther than it has yet gone. This contest, being in the nature of an industrial struggle, is to a large extent an artificial one and can probably be successfully checked for a number of years by artificial means — that is, so long as great passions are not openly aroused.

But it is well to understand at once that it is made peculiarly hazardous for the white man, not because he is not able to fight it in the face of all difficulties, not because it is beyond his strength to check it, but because in almost every part of the Asiatic and African worlds, he is still playing his old-world rôle of conqueror, and ruling over vast masses of the world's coloured population virtually by force. That is the real reason why this struggle must in the end prove highly dangerous. On the one hand, the white man has begun to refuse to allow coloured men of any description to enter his countries in large numbers; on the other hand, he continues to rule as conqueror immense areas of the world, the soil of which nourishes autochthonous populations having little or nothing in common with him, and therefore regarding his dominion with a natural and growing aversion.

But there is more than this — more to complicate a confused condition of affairs; more to render forcible adjustment in the future more than likely. The right

of eminent domain which the European thus exercises in so many parts of the coloured world was in nearly every case forcibly acquired in times past, when his superiority in the arts of war was so marked that a few fierce fights with thousands beat down opposition and forced tens of millions permanently to acknowledge the rule of those who were opposed to them in all the essentials of life — that is, in colour and in creed, and therefore in ethics and in ideals. Nowhere can this truth be better seen than in India, where three hundred millions of people bow to a rule which was imposed on them as a result of a series of modest victories.

In this great work of implanting everywhere the standards of Christendom, nearly all the important countries of Europe have shared at one time or another; for since the days when Spain and Portugal claimed the right to divide the entire uncharted world by Papal Bull, the overspilling of white men as relentless conquerors has been a continuous movement. Holland, France, England, Germany, and even the United States, have carried on this overseas work in every direction; whilst, moving by land, like some strange relentless Behemoth, Russia has never ceased conquering and building in Asia since the days of the first little Czars.

Thus for four centuries it has happened that no sooner has one white Power lost the strength to make conquests in alien land than other white Powers — vigorous, audacious, ambitious — have arisen and carried the torch farther than anyone previously dreamed of doing. To-day the position is entirely illogical from the point of view of Asiatics as well as all other enlightened coloured peoples; for whilst the white man now proclaims the reign of justice and the equality of man, in

alien lands he still rigidly adheres, in everything that concerns his own interests, to results achieved under very different laws. And it is important to note that where logic ceases, brute force and passion are apt magically to appear. Inevitably must it follow that the world of non-whites will make the position of the white races beyond their own boundaries more and more precarious. For matters have vastly changed since the nineteenth century. In the main, continental Europe is no longer in the happy position it once occupied. Save for Russia, this narrow continent is almost entirely occupied with questions arising primarily from European frontier-contact — that is, with the question of so-called balance of power. So far as concerns the outer world — the world of coloured men — this European rivalry has but little meaning; the only two countries of Europe which to the men of East are World-Powers — Powers whose destinies are bound up with the destinies of Asia — are England and Russia. The first escapes from the European imbroglio by sea, the second by land; and because they can do this, their international value must be assessed in different terms from those which are employed in the case of all other European countries. Nowhere is this better understood than in Eastern Asia to-day.

When we come to consider figures and the numerical strength of these opposing elements, when we remember the sapient saying, that Providence is on the side of the big battalions, the feeling of apprehension as to the outcome of the ultimate struggle between Europe and Asia can only deepen. It is to-day a most disconcerting fact that the white world is far weaker than the coloured world; and not only weaker in numbers but far more

divided against itself — because of the historical influence of the European doctrine of force — than is the coloured world. The figures appended below, giving summaries of population based on the latest statistics, are in many ways startling, especially when it is remembered that to-day few white Powers are vitally interested in the colour problem. It is England, indeed, who bears the main burden.

EUROPE AND ASIA.

A COMPARISON OF POPULATIONS.

Europe.

White	1. Russia	150,000,000
	2. Germany	63,000,000
	3. Austria-Hungary	49,000,000
	4. Great Britain	45,000,000
	5. France	39,000,000
	6. Italy	36,000,000
	7. Spain	20,000,000
	8. Belgium	7,500,000
	9. Rumania	6,500,000
	10. Portugal	6,000,000
	11. Netherlands	6,500,000
	12. Sweden	5,500,000
	13. Bulgaria	4,000,000
	14. Switzerland	3,500,000
	15. Turkey (Non-Mohammedan pop.)	3,000,000
	16. Norway	2,500,000
	17. Denmark	2,500,000
	18. Servia	2,500,000
	19. Greece	2,500,000
	20. Montenegro	250,000
Total		<u>454,750,000</u>

Asia.

Coloured	1. China and Dependencies	450,000,000
	2. India and Dependencies	310,000,000
	3. Japan and Dependencies	65,000,000
	4. Dutch East Indies	38,000,000
	5. Turkey in Asia	25,000,000
	6. Persia	10,000,000
	7. Indo-China	20,000,000
	8. Siam	8,000,000
	9. Afghanistan and Himalayan States	10,000,000
	10. Philippines	8,000,000
	11. Malay States	1,000,000
	12. Borneo and other smaller island groups	2,000,000
Total		<u>947,000,000</u>

From these tables it will be apparent that, as nearly as can be calculated, the population of Europe — in which term Siberia is now ethnically included — is 455 millions, whilst the population of Asia is 947 millions. Asiatics, therefore, already outnumber Europeans by two to one; and since there is reason to believe that the population of Asia is now growing much more rapidly than the population of Europe, it seems clear that the passage of each decade will emphasise more and more this remarkable discrepancy between the two rivals.

There is another point. Of this great mass of 455 million highly-civilised Europeans, only half at the highest estimate is interested in any way whatsoever in Asiatic problems — that is, in the question of what is to be the political status in the near future of a thousand million human beings. For of the twenty countries of Europe, only four — Russia, Great Britain, France and Holland — have to-day valuable stakes in Asia; to these four Powers can be added, with a reservation, the United States, because of her possession of the Philippines. Other countries, such as Germany, cannot be placed in the same category; for their interests are still mainly commercial and not territorial, and the rise of modern Asia cannot mean so much to them as to the colonial Powers, no matter in what striking allegories the German Emperor's reputed solicitude for the fate of Europe may express itself. Unless, then, Germany takes the place Holland now occupies, Germany is not a vital factor. Europe will never match its strength with Asia under one banner as in the days of the Crusades: not only is Europe divided, but it must remain divided. Externally the position of Europe to-day is exactly similar to what it was when the Turkish conquest of

Constantinople seemed to threaten all Christendom. Then the attempts made to resuscitate the simultaneous efforts of the days of the Crusades were wholly nugatory; Europe had grown beyond such primitive racial methods, Europe had grown too old. And just as that was true in the fifteenth century, so in the twentieth century is it certain that no combination of white Powers will come to the succour of another white Power. It is well that these simple things should be remembered, not only in reference to Russia, but in reference to England; for even what was possible as recently as fifteen years ago, has to-day become impossible. Epoch-making history has been chronicled since then.

There is still another point which must be here emphasised, in view of the great nationalist movement now gathering ever greater strength from the shores of the Bosphorus to the shores of the Pacific. It is that Asia still remains largely independent of the white man, though the white man commands the ocean and all sea-approaches. Asia is really divided into almost two equal portions — the subjected portion and the non-subjected portion. Of the 947 millions living in the twelve different countries which have been enumerated, only some 400 millions actually acknowledge the sway of the white conqueror: the other 547 millions are completely free. And of these 400 millions who live in the subjected portions, some 310 millions have England as overlord. These are striking facts.

It will thus be seen that there is a strange dissimilarity existing between the political conditions in Asiatic countries — a dissimilarity which tends to increase the dangers arising from a state of affairs largely artificial, and which, indeed, makes the ferment

of the day one which cannot be easily dealt with, since there is no Asiatic country which is bound to its European masters by anything but fear. The idea that any kind of loyalty can be fostered under a system resembling the Roman system is only held by those who in the practical business of life have much to learn. It is fear — and largely traditional fear — which in Asia is the white man's chief safeguard; and on such an emotion no permanent edifice can be reared. The table which follows would seem to show that the attention of political students should be concentrated more on Eastern Asia than elsewhere, since the greatest mass of non-subjected Asiatics dwell on the shores of the Pacific — where they are ethnically more or less homogeneous, and where climatically they are submitted to what may be called non-divergent conditions.

NON-SUBJECTED ASIA.

Far East	1. China and Dependencies	450,000,000
	2. Japan and Dependencies	65,000,000
	3. Siam	8,000,000
Near and Middle East	4. Turkey in Asia	25,000,000
	5. Persia	10,000,000
	6. Afghanistan and Himalayan States . .	<u>10,000,000</u>
Total		<u>568,000,000</u>

Now, disregarding the three which can only have what may be called local political importance — Persia, because it has long fallen into that decay which presages absorption by a stronger Power; Afghanistan, because its people are politically and geographically bound to a policy of seclusion; Siam, because it is merely a political *enclave* — there remain three Asiatic countries which have great military potentiality beyond their own frontiers — China, Japan and Turkey; and all of these are free from Europe's dominion. It must

be counted a happy circumstance for the white man that the first two should be separated from the third by the breadth of all Asia: for were these three nations grouped together, they would form a combination more powerful than any European triplice.

For, of this non-subjected Asia, Japan and Turkey have within recent years developed an amount of military and political energy which has filled all observers with astonishment. Yet it is significant that Japan is the one country above all others on which the stigma of colour has pressed the most heavily of late years; and it is this stigma which must remain a spur to the greatest endeavours, long after purely political disabilities have been removed. The decisive steps which both Japan and Turkey have taken to safeguard their political independence have been startlingly reflected in the general unrest and dissatisfaction which has spread in a great wave from one end of Asia to the other; and now Asia is not only not content, but begins thoroughly to understand exactly what it is that gives predominance in the modern world. If China, the other great representative of the people of Asia who remain politically free, is quickly led or forced by other Asiatics to follow in the footsteps of the two who have already advanced so far, an entirely new era in the relations between Europe and Asia will commence. For the question — the discussion of which has only been temporarily adjourned — of the status of the Asiatic in America, in Australia and in South Africa — must one day be re-opened; and it is possible that its solution will be worked out in a peculiar yet natural way. It is only to be expected that, having borrowed the warlike weapons of the West, the East should

finally apply all those other fallacious means which are best summed up by the word Protection; and by erecting exactly the same artificial barriers as Europe has done, radically alter the entire politico-economical position throughout the world.

For, continuing the analysis of the world's population, further elements of weakness in the general position of the white man are to be found in other parts of the world. Taking the several continents one by one, and dividing up America as it should be divided, the figures which are now tabulated become invested with peculiar interest.

Africa.

1. Grand total of brown and black races in the African	} 140,000,000
Continent and adjacent islands (approximate)	
2. Whites in Africa	<u>1,500,000</u>
	<u>141,500,000</u>

Anglo-Saxon America.

1. Whites	85,000,000
2. Coloured (treated as a non-separate population) . .	<u>10,000,000</u>
	<u>95,000,000</u>

Latin America, Cuba and West Indies.¹

Whites and mixed population	<u>60,000,000</u>
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Australasia and Polynesia.

1. Whites	6,000,000
2. Browns	<u>1,000,000</u>
	<u>7,000,000</u>

¹ After several attempts to attain accuracy, the writer has had to abandon anything like a proper classification of the population of Latin America. In the first place it is never quite clear from the statistical returns what the real proportion is between pure whites and what may be euphoniously called mixed whites. It may be said roughly that save for Argentina, and certain regions in Brazil, mixed blood is the rule. Every year that passes must inevitably tend to give predominance to the mixed races; and as, in the opinion of the writer, the entire American Continent is effectively isolated, there is no need to drag into this discussion such a vexed question, since it does not possess world-importance.

Whilst the entire continent of America may be omitted from any general consideration at present, for reasons already stated, both the African Continent and the Australian Continent — for entirely different reasons — are more than mere potential danger-centres for the white man. In Africa fast-breeding races are dominated by handfuls of white men who have managed to attain a respectable numerical force only in the extreme south and in the extreme north, and who even there are enormously outnumbered by the coloured inhabitants. In Australia an isolated geographical situation is by no means entirely compensated for by the firm resolve to remain "All White," since Asia lies very near, and immense regions still remain uninhabited. The significant fact needs to be insisted upon that there is a regular, well-determined and most curious coloured belt, running round the world, which has tended to expand in the immediate past, and which may expand very much farther in the future, when all the coloured nations of the world have reached the modern industrial stage, and have adjusted themselves thoroughly to the effect of white contact. This belt, though most dense between those imaginary lines called the Tropics, extends, especially in Asia and Africa, many degrees south and north of it — though it is a fact that it gradually loses its strength where the sun's heat is lessened. In the past four centuries the pressure of the white man has in certain regions caused this belt to contract by the simple process of extermination.¹

¹ The area inhabited by the white race — that is the Aryan race — in the ancient classical world was very small compared with what it is now, not all Europe in those days being inhabited by white men. Of course it is true that climate and environment had

Thus America was really a coloured man's land, but the white man has virtually cleared three-quarters of that immense continent, and now coloured men—the Indian and the negro—can only claim the same belt as runs all the way round the world. Siberia once belonged to non-Caucasian races, and so did the whole of Australasia; but here again, as in America, the pressure of the white man has virtually changed for good and all the preponderating race. In Africa, in the extreme north and in the extreme south, the same process has been going on quickly ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, but the process has been far less successful than elsewhere. There are some who still believe that in the end the whites will win both South Africa and Algeria; but all the probabilities point the other way. As in the old slave States of America, the most the white race can hope for is to retain a parlous mastery.

For after having suffered economic death—and therefore virtual racial extinction in most of the regions referred to—it will be one day counted one of the most remarkable facts of the twentieth century that the man of colour has at last completely recovered himself, and is forcing the pendulum to stand still if not actually to swing back. In Latin America, save in the Argentine and in portions of Brazil, this is certainly so; in South Africa statistics seem to prove that the Bantu race is breeding faster than ever: Northern Queensland not yet been sufficiently long at work to differentiate the Aryans of Europe from, for instance, the Aryans of the north of India. But using the term European as the best equivalent for white man, it may be said that to-day the European inhabits a gross area at least ten times as large as he did at the birth of Christ.

may yet be regained by Polynesians; whilst the Pacific provinces of Siberia are already in real danger of being swamped by yellow-skinned men, in spite of the artificial restraints which are being imposed. The inevitable tendency of all divisions of the human race to adjust themselves to their environment, economic as well as natural, will arrest the dying-out process from now on; and where the white man has not absolutely cleared the ground of his coloured rival he may be bred down to a position of inferiority.

Thus on every side of the world to which one may turn — save in America, where the problem tends to adjust itself owing to geographical isolation and to regional influences to which special reference will later be made — the conflict of colour possesses ever new potentialities. And it is for this reason that it may be laid down as an axiom that no sooner will one part of the problem be temporarily solved, than another part will claim attention — and so must it continue until vast changes have been brought about in standards of thought, in standards of living, and in standards of morals. Changes in the standards of these things can alone diminish the present dangers; yet there is one thing which can never be altered, and that is colour.

For here is the real root of the racial difficulty throughout the world. There exists a widespread racial antipathy founded on colour — an animal-like instinct, if you will, but an instinct which must remain in existence until the world becomes Utopia. It is this instinct which seems to forbid really frank intercourse and equal treatment. How this is to be minimised in each separate region should be one of the first studies of statesmen, for the day is surely come

when common-sense demands that the line of least resistance should be sought for and gradually approached.

If, for the sake of clearness, one last table be given here, it will be seen at a glance how, when every living being in the world is counted, the odds against the white man may be said to remain roughly two to one.

TOTAL POPULATION OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO COLOUR.

Whites.

1. Europe	453,500,000
2. North America	85,000,000
3. Australasia	6,000,000
4. South America (Argentine, Brazil, &c.)	20,000,000
5. Africa	1,500,000
	<hr/>
	566,000,000

Mixed Whites.

(Including Indians) Mexico, Cuba, and West Indies, }	40,000,000
Central and South America	<hr/>

Absolute Yellow, Brown and Black.

1. Asia	947,000,000
2. Africa	140,000,000
3. Pacific	2,000,000
4. United States	10,000,000
	<hr/>
Grand total of the world's population	1,705,000,000

¹ These figures, while perhaps not absolutely accurate, must be very nearly so, as the writer has made it his business to investigate closely all doubtful figures. Africa is a case in point — Polynesia a smaller instance. No amount of care, however, can produce really reliable statistics where the data are incomplete; and in regard to Equatorial Africa the data are notoriously mostly guess-work. What, for instance, is the real population of the Congo Free State — 20 millions (the official estimate), 15½ millions (Sir H. H. Johnston's estimate), or 9 millions (a missionary estimate)? It is by no means necessary to suppose that the highest estimate is the least reliable, for Korea has recently furnished an interesting instance of the unreliability of all guess-

Of absolute whites there are thus only 566,000,000, compared with 1,099,000,000 absolute coloured; whilst between the two may be placed the 40,000,000, of Central and South America, and those islands which are inhabited mainly by mixed whites of Spanish-Indian descent — forty millions of people who will gradually fuse their differences and produce a definite type of American in which Indian blood will predominate.

Now, to maintain the present balance of power for very many years to come might not be such difficult work, were it not for the fact that Europe — using the word here not so much in its strict sense as in a racial sense — is a house divided against itself. It is perhaps this, rather than the actual problem of colour itself, which is the disconcerting factor in the present-day situation. For it is evident that if an absolute agreement among the white Powers, to preserve the *status quo*, could be really arrived at, no great breach of the peace could occur. But such an agreement among the white Powers is not only far-off but virtually impossible; and it is a significant fact that the one single reason which is held by Continental writers to have destroyed for ever all possibility of that agreement is the British alliance with Japan. It is noteworthy, however, that such

work estimates, official or unofficial. The census which has there been almost completed — the first in the history of the country — places the population at roughly 15 millions. Previous to this census the Japanese estimates were generally 8 or 9 millions and native estimates 20 millions. The native estimate has thus been shown nearer the truth than anyone would have supposed possible. Similarly, the Congo Free State, with its million square miles of territory, may have 30 millions of people for all we know. In such circumstances the only course open for the statistician is to strike an average.

writers, while they infer that this act has placed England outside the pale, do not grasp the fact that the whole history of British expansion has inevitably separated England for ever from pursuing a policy in common with the rest of Europe abroad.

For when England, at the beginning of the twentieth century, took the sensational step of allying herself with Japan, she was simply yielding to her natural political instinct, which told her clearly that it was necessary to proclaim, not only that she had no further ambitions in Asia or Africa, but that she held that with the end of the nineteenth century the era of forcible expansion had come to an end. Russia was then showing, in a very positive form, that her views were different. To her the twentieth century had opened as the nineteenth century had for England — that is, as a period of expansion and conquest. The bulk of Europe sympathised with Russia and applauded her. Manchuria, a fertile region as large as France and Germany, had been invaded and was in open danger of being annexed; beyond Manchuria lay a vast and absolutely defenceless empire, China. Undoubtedly it was primarily to arrest this movement that England took the step of allying herself with Japan. But it was not, as has so often been erroneously stated, a fundamental departure in her foreign policy as a whole, for England has constantly formed temporary alliances for precisely the same objects as the Japanese alliance; it was a fundamental departure in her Asiatic policy — that is, in her policy in dealing with coloured races. For the first time in her history she placed herself by formal treaty on an absolute equality with an Asiatic race. And by this act the power was given to Japan at once to attack Russia — the old cham-

pion of Europe against Asia, and to drive her back to her own frontiers.

Now, it is amply clear to those who have followed the problem in all its phases, that, taking this alliance as a starting-point, matters would not have become as involved as they are to-day, or the grand issues so dangerous, had not the well-known and narrow Indian traditions regarding the nature of the Russian menace in Asia quickly brought about the conclusion of a second alliance. It is necessary to emphasise in the strongest manner possible the remarkable general effect of this second alliance: for it is this harmful and ill-considered instrument which is largely responsible for the complex nature which the conflict of colour has now assumed throughout the world. By making this second alliance¹

¹ It is necessary, owing to the great racial influence it may have, to point out the fundamental difference between the two alliance treaties made by England with Japan. In the first treaty — which consisted of six articles, at the head of which stands a preamble stating that the chief objects are (*a*) the maintenance of the general peace and (*b*) the maintenance of the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea — the main argument is directed to assuring each signatory that war directed against either signatory by *more* than one Power will entail the armed assistance of the second signatory. In the second treaty, consisting of eight articles, the momentous change made is clear from the very preamble. No longer is the treaty concerned with territorial integrity (Korea being dropped entirely from the preamble), but merely with the frank preservation of the interests of the two signatories not only in Eastern Asia but in India as well. And in the body of the treaty the whole force of the eight articles is directed towards making a series of mutual assurances of the most far-reaching nature regarding the manner in which those interests are to be preserved. The main point simply is that any attack by one Power on either of the two signatories will promptly secure the armed assistance of the second signatory, thus making to all in-

far more binding than the first — by completely identifying her interests with the interests of Japan, before she understood what those interests might be — England deliberately sacrificed her liberty of action not only in Eastern Asia, but in every portion of the world of colour where men are able to think and act.

It was but natural that the idea should quickly spread that similar consideration and similar equality of treatment would at once be given, if sufficient determination and sufficient boldness were exhibited. Thus over-concentration on one phase of a really world-wide problem quickly produced precisely the results which should have been reasonably expected, had there been common prescience. It is useless to argue, as has been frequently argued, that in practical politics only the political to-morrow can be considered, and not any more remote period. Such an attitude may have been defensible a century ago, when real knowledge was very scantily diffused and when even statesmen of renown trifled with serious questions. To-day, when whole nations stand instructed, when destinies are definitely fixed within certain limits, it is unreasonable in the highest degree to

tents and purposes England and Japan one Power throughout all Asia.

Racially — the point which here merits special consideration — the treaty is a very bad one, inasmuch as it puts England in a most unfavourable light not only in Europe, America and Australia, but in Asia as well. For she not only endorses in this instrument the robbery of Korea, but she confesses to 300 million Asiatic subjects that she cannot protect them from European aggression save with the help of an Asiatic ally.

That Lord Lansdowne should have made such a hasty and ill-considered treaty is the last proof necessary that he was as ill-fitted to conduct the crucial business of England's foreign relations as he was her warlike operations.

cull from antiquated text-books maxims for the guidance of movements which cannot be guided, and even to embalm those maxims in treaty preambles.

For whilst it may be laid down as a fundamental principle that every civilised nation should be accorded the same equitable treatment, entirely irrespective of the questions of colour or creed, the sacrifice of certain fundamental political safeguards cannot be made without the very greatest danger.¹ It is precisely this that England has commenced to do, basing her action on that dangerous political excuse — expediency. The day is surely not far distant when a wiser generation will reprobate in unequivocal terms the rash and ill-considered haste with which much that is vital has already been surrendered; for no matter how great a change in treatment may later come, much has already been lost which can never be regained.

For it is important to note that the ill-effects of bad policy do not cease within a limited and easily calculated sphere: they spread far and wide like the strange waves flung up by some seismic disturbance — waves which run from one end of the world to the other. No longer may Europe say to the rest of the world, like those de-

¹ There is to be found a very startling instance of race-prejudice at the beginning of Professor Pearson's book *National Life and Character*:—

"Two centuries hence it may be a matter of serious concern to the world if Russia has been displayed by China on the Amur, if France has not been able to colonise North Africa, or if England is not holding India. For civilised men there can only be one Fatherland, and whatever extends the influence of those races that have taken their faith from Palestine, their laws of beauty from Greece, and their civil law from Rome, ought to be a matter of rejoicing to Russian, German, Anglo-Saxon and Frenchmen alike."

voted Tibetans who meet all travellers in the wastes of Central Asia on their way to sacred and forbidden Lhassa, "Thus far and no farther." The secrets of supremacy have been revealed; and other countries, led by what England has done, are beginning to accept in their extra-European affairs what may be called the same clumsy doctrine of *pis-aller*. Neither Germany nor Russia¹ have much to lose in conflicts which would ruin England; and so, as the years go by, instead of the altruism of common-sense being the guiding principle, a base and short-sighted self-interest may become increasingly evident in the extra-European world.

For in addition to the question of colour, it must never be forgotten that there is also the vital question of religion to be considered—perhaps not immediately but at some not very distant time. The white Power which, for instance, can really ally itself with Islam, as Napoleon dreamed of doing, may possibly dispose in Asia and Africa of an irresistible force. England can

¹ The peculiar conditions in Russia make it necessary to point out that instead of the great Muscovite Power sharing with England the responsibilities of Asia, she remains in many senses one of the real difficulties of Asia. Any Government which adheres to what may be called a Byzantine form cannot be entirely trusted; and Russia, in spite of the constitution of 1905 and the Duma, has still that peculiar Græco-Oriental form which all liberal-minded men must hate. It is interesting to reflect—from the practical example which Russia affords—how impossible European progress would have been had not those great waves of Barbarianism completely submerged Rome, and permitted the white man to escape partially from a bad tutelage. It is because a variety of circumstances made Russia look to the Byzantine Empire for her religion, her art, and her political ideals, that the Russian people have been so long enslaved, and that the real liberty which lies in the heart of the people, can find no adequate expression.

never become that ally; every feeling is against it; and if it is to be some other Power, there is no soldiery in Asia which could face it with any chance of success. That is perhaps why instinctively the great movement towards Christianising the coloured world is growing stronger and stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries, as a sort of forlorn hope launched to capture an almost impregnable position.

Yet even that hope is illusory, save in countries where no real civilisation and no real religion exist.

[Christianity, no matter what ardent evangelists may say to the contrary, can only really live and thrive in temperate climes; as it stands to-day it is the product of temperate climes, and only of temperate climes. Among either the warlike or the metaphysical-minded peoples of Asia and Africa, very different creeds will always hold sway. Let that be understood. In Europe Christianity has been for many centuries a strengthening force politically—a very great strengthening force. But in Asia, from the moment when it was first understood, Christianity—that is, the system of Christianity as taught by all the Churches—has everywhere been looked upon by rulers and scholars alike as a weakening force—a disintegrating force, a purely European thing, aiming at destroying the most essential parts of social fabrics which have been so slowly and painfully built up throughout the ages by a process exactly analogous to that process of life known as the process of natural selection. It is a strange fact, which has often attracted the attention of unbiased observers, that Asiatic converts to Christianity are not only partly denationalised but (save in rare cases) are not morally benefited, the very effort of breaking away from the support of

their natural environment being an unnatural one and therefore visited with bad effects.]

Still, though these facts are to-day beyond doubt, there are not lacking such leading lights of the western world as Bishops to proclaim the strangely mediæval belief that, as it will one day be impossible to bar out the hordes of Asia and Africa, the one and only safe guard for Europe and the white man still lies to-day as in the distant past in Christianity—as if a system of thought and a system of belief were enough to act as a complete economic and political protection. For religion has little to do with the standard of living; religion has still less to do with the balance of power; and it is these things alone which have to-day paramount racial importance. Education, material improvements, and the birth-rate are the modern touch-stones of success; and it is only in African forests that those who retain the ingenuousness of a departed age can hope to find any earthly reward.

[Religion to-day performs no miracles.] Asia and Africa must be met on their own terms;¹ and though

¹ "The day will come, and perhaps is not far distant, when the European observer will look round to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races, no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent, or practically so, in government, monopolising the trade of their own regions, and circumscribing the industry of the European; when Chinamen and the nations of Hindostan, the States of Central and South America, by that time predominantly Indian, and it may be African nations of the Congo and the Zambesi, under a dominant caste of foreign rulers, are represented by fleets in the European seas, invited to international conferences, and welcomed as allies in the quarrels of the civilised world. The citizens of these countries will then be taken up into the social relations of the white races, will throng the English turf, or the salons of Paris,

in the past the Cross may have triumphed over the Crescent, though elsewhere that European Palladium has become synonymous with the flag, to-day the mastery of the world belongs to those who best follow the laws of common-sense. Political justice, in place of abstract moral maxims; a real comprehension of the historical aspect of each problem, instead of traditional prejudice; a ceaseless determination to find permanent and not temporary solutions — these are the aims required of intelligent men.

In the chapters which follow there are considered, in the three divisions¹ into which they properly fall, three aspects of the conflict of colour throughout the world. The grand fact which stands out is that at bottom the complaint against the white man is everywhere the same, though it may be expressed in very different terms, and will be admitted to intermarriage. It is idle to say that if all this should come to pass our pride of place will not be humiliated. We were struggling among ourselves for supremacy in a world which we thought of as destined to belong to the Aryan races and to the Christian faith; to the letters and arts and charm of social manners which we have inherited from the best times of the past. We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile, and thought of as bound always to minister to our needs. The solitary consolation will be, that the changes have been inevitable. It has been our work to organise and create, to carry peace and law and order over the world, that others may enter in and enjoy. Yet in some of us the feeling of caste is so strong that we are not sorry to think we shall have passed away before that day arrives." — Pearson: *National Life and Character*, Chap. I.

¹ The older divisions, it is well to remark, are completely out of date; and it should be understood that, just as Eastern Asia is one whole, so do the Near East and the Middle East form part and parcel of the same problem, just as Africa is one whole. The best division is simply that of colour — yellow, brown and black.

sometimes, for reasons of expediency or for other reasons, still concealed. In the past Europe abroad — that is Europe in Asia, Europe in Africa, Europe in every region inhabited by coloured races which it was impossible to exterminate because they were too numerous — has been a most perfect illustration of Fortunatus; that man, who being on the brink of starvation and offered wisdom, strength, wealth, beauty, or life, chose the inexhaustible purse!

CHAPTER II

THE YELLOW WORLD OF EASTERN ASIA

As it is in the vast region of Eastern Asia, rather than in any other part of the world, that soon must be seen the making of further history eminently disconcerting for the white man, it is necessary to approach the subject carefully and to deal with it exhaustively. It is the fault of the subject, rather than of anything else, that a certain amount of tiresome repetition is necessary; for unless certain facts are insisted upon again and again they are in danger of being forgotten. And if such leading facts are forgotten, the whole of this study becomes valueless.

In the preceding chapter the strange conflict of colour proceeding to-day everywhere throughout the world, owing to the existence of certain grave first causes, was discussed in general terms, and certain basic facts were laid before the reader. The curious statistics of the world's population and its distribution showed us how the white races, in spite of their inferiority of numbers, and in spite also of the fact that all were not equally interested in the matter, not only still remained dominant in practically every region of the world, but that, owing to a variety of reasons, the growing move-

ment against them had not yet succeeded in stripping from them to an appreciable extent the proud title of arbiters of the world's destinies.

It was also established — it is to be hoped clearly, for these premises have much value — that the present-day conflict arose mainly owing to two vital facts being at last very generally understood throughout the non-European world: — first, that in the past the white man had acquired a firm mastery over a great portion of the coloured races of the world only because they were utterly inferior to him in the arts of war, and that this mastery was now held by the doubly doubtful right of conquest and prescription; and second, that, considering himself entitled to do so, the white man was beginning to deny in absolute terms the right of such alien races to enter his own lands and compete with his own people wherever he might consider such infiltration and competition dangerous. Not only, then, has it been noted that a large proportion of the world's coloured inhabitants are still held in bondage by the white man; but that certain other portions are virtually confined within certain limits — or at least prevented from migrating freely to lands formerly seized by the white man. So far, this prohibition has applied almost entirely to the various peoples of Eastern Asia; and, because of geographical considerations, that prohibition has at once become invested with a far-reaching and ominous political importance.

For if we include Siberia — as it should be now included — in the white man's portion of the world; and if we measure up every mile of this vast territory, it will be found that the white man, although he is today only half as numerous as the coloured man, is

settled on a gross area of land more than twice as extensive as that owned by his coloured brother. The white man therefore possesses sufficient land to support a population many times as numerous as it is to-day, and many centuries may elapse before the question of overcrowding arises for him in any acute form. That is a very important consideration.

Far less fortunate is the coloured man, for he is confined within relatively narrow limits.¹ As industrialism grows in his lands with giant strides, very few decades may make his position desperate; and the poverty and overcrowding from which he must increasingly suffer will in the end openly turn him against those who restrict him to certain regions. It is no longer possible to delude oneself on this score. Accurate and copious statistics exist to-day in the case of two great Asiatic countries—India and Japan—from which to draw endless conclusions. Those statistics disclose the fact that, in spite of the existence of many of the old Asiatic restraining influences on the growth of population, and in spite of the non-existence of widely-diffused industries such as obtain in all densely-populated European countries, vast regions already carry a population of more than 500 souls to the square mile; and, in more restricted areas, sometimes double that number.

It is because of this condition of affairs that the two basic facts, on which so much insistence has been laid, form the very head and front of the racial difficulties

¹ This is not so true of Africa as it is of Asia, since Africa is undoubtedly still underpopulated. Still the negro races in Africa do not possess more than half the total surface, and when they greatly grow in numbers—as they must grow—they will feel their confinement just as acutely as the Asiatic already does in certain countries.

which now face the white world; and unless there is a total reversal of certain well-accepted principles, it is impossible to see how any really permanent solution can be arrived at. The best that can be hoped for is a continuous state of armed neutrality, broken by periodic warfare; and it would be well, at a time when disarmament talk has not yet died away in Europe, if these facts were properly understood.

For, leaving aside the question of the excessive amount of territory which the white man not only possesses as his exclusive preserve, because of the energy which he displayed during the past four centuries, but is determined perpetually to reserve for himself, and confining ourselves to the other more tangible issues, it may be said in general terms that the white man will never willingly retreat from the stand he has taken as a world-conqueror; and as he cannot be forced just yet to retreat all along the line in Asia and Africa, seeing that he still possesses the world's great stocks of gold and the mastery of the ocean, war must constantly occur as the coloured races become stronger and stronger in modern offensive strength, and attempt to win back piecemeal what they have lost in the past.¹ That they must become at least masters in their own houses cannot any longer be doubted. It may be that such long intervals will elapse between successive attempts; such artifices used to disguise the real issues; such skill employed to sow dissension before delivering actual

¹ Of course this argument is based on the supposition that the only method of solving difficulties is by warfare. If, as the writer hopes to show clearly farther on, a policy of conciliation and common-sense is finally adopted by the leading colonial Power, England, the future may not be so troubled.

attacks, that it will be difficult to trace each movement back to its real causes. But if the premises which have been here advanced are correct (and there can be no reason to hold them incorrect), this solution will be natural, logical and in the highest sense lawful; and those who remain deliberately blind to such a probability will incur the punishment which inevitably falls to the lot of wilful persons. The policy of piecemeal recovery of lost rights is the common policy of all coloured peoples; and this is the policy to be apprehended.

It is in view of these far-reaching considerations that the position in the vital portion of non-subjected Asia — that is, in China and Japan — has just now such superlative interest; for it is on these countries that will undoubtedly be thrown the brunt of the work of changing once and for all the relations between East and West — those curiously involved and delicate relations which have imperceptibly grown up in the four hundred years during which the white man has so miraculously spread his influence over the four quarters of the globe. And since it is a fact that in the region of the world where these two races—the Chinese and the Japanese—are dominant, nearly one-third of the human race is actually cradled—that is, some 600 million souls live and have their being — it seems tolerably certain, as has so often been predicted, that the Pacific Ocean and its shores are really destined to play the part of the world's great battle-ground during coming times, at least until the pendulum swings back and a new action is born of the latest reaction. Everything is in favour of this supposition. Let us glance at the vital facts.

The first thing to note is that the area inhabited by the yellow races is not only immense, but that the

boundaries of all the yellow man's kingdoms are co-terminous, whilst his ideals and his languages are homologous.¹ This great region stretches from the Amur river in latitude 50° north almost to the equator line; it extends from longitude 90° east to longitude 160°; and it comprises a land-area of roughly 3,000,000 square miles. In this region there exists practically every variety of climate — from almost arctic cold to burning tropical heat; but though there are these extremes of climate, a large portion comprises what may be called the Temperate Zone of Asia, where the burden of climate does not greatly abase man or make him inherently inferior to other men in anything save mere physical strength. Considerably more than two million square miles of this territory, according to the best calculations, are already given over to the intensive activities of these yellow races; and in the south, in the west, and even in the north, their dominion is constantly extending at the cost of certain minor coloured races, and must very soon expand at a much faster rate. There are, for instance, millions of Chinese already in the islands of the Southern Seas; in fifty years there should be tens of millions. And just as they have every variety of climate and soil, so do these races possess within the limits of their territories all the mineral wealth that is necessary to secure their industrial welfare.

Yet though they have great vitality, great industriousness, and great determination — in brief, a great

¹ It is interesting to note that there is a powerful Japanese Linguistic Society already in existence to promote closer intercourse between the various groups of the yellow race — Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, Annamese, Siamese. Its work is attracting increasing attention.

hold on life—all these so-called yellow races (the Chinese, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indo-Chinese, the Siamese and the Mongols), are by nature peaceful and not warlike in any degree—in spite of what has lately been said of the Japanese, whose true characteristics are very different from what they are still commonly supposed to be. They have one and all an excellent moral and social system—founded in the main on the Confucian precepts—a system making for peace and contentment.¹ No matter how much the so-called sterilisation of these races during the past few centuries may be decried, they have undoubtedly managed, alone and unaided, to stand the test of

¹ Dr. Eliot, the Principal of Harvard University, has recently expressed a lofty thought so clearly that the writer ventures to quote him, for the benefit of missionaries:—

“Religion is not fixed but fluent—changing from century to century. A new religion is coming, not based on authority either spiritual or temporal; for the present generation, while willing to be led, will not be driven. In the new religion there will be no personification of natural objects or deification of remarkable human beings. A new thought of God will be characteristic of the new religion, which will be thoroughly monotheistic. God to His creature will be so immanent that no intermediary will be needed. God will be to every man the multiplication of infinities. With a human and worthy idea of God as the central thought of the new religion, creed, dogma, and mystery will disappear. Its priests will try to improve the social and industrial conditions. The new religion will not attempt to reconcile people to present ills by promising future compensations. I believe the advent of a just freedom for mankind has been delayed for centuries by such promises. Prevention will be the watchword of the new religion, and the skilful surgeon will be one of its ministers. It cannot supply consolation, as did the old religions, but it will reduce the need for consolation. It may be difficult to unite the world’s various religions under this new head, but I believe it can be accomplished on the basis of love of God and service to one’s fellow man.”

time; they have been happy in their lives, exact in their mutual observances, and have multiplied and fructified exceedingly. Their democratic feelings are in the main far above anything that western culture has yet evolved. The East is in many ways the home of pure democracy — the region where the cobbler may always magically become the great Minister. Their sense of mutual, or family, responsibility is so great that where no alien influences have been at work, millions of people still govern themselves without police or any of those artificial restraints which the West has been methodically adding to during the past centuries; and their individual reasonableness is such that they are not easily prompted to attempt a thousand stupid things which the white man is constantly doing.¹

Among all these millions there has never existed the necessity for a religion such as the Christian religion, which by a system of supernatural rewards and punishments, in the main plays on the baser feelings of common people and by alternately alluring and frightening them, seeks to lead them to Heaven — or,

¹ A remarkable instance of Chinese political tolerance is evidenced by the present treatment of the Imperial Ming Family — which was driven from the Dragon Throne by the Manchu Conquest. Every year, at the proper seasons, the lineal descendants sacrifice at the celebrated tombs of their ancestors which lie only a few miles from Peking, the capital; and they perform this ceremony under full protection of the Government. Not only this, but the fallen House is in receipt of liberal pensions.

It is interesting to remember that the Stuarts were driven from England at much the same time as the Mings were driven from Peking, and the peculiar difference in the treatment shows that in certain matters the Chinese have remained far ahead of Europe.

at least, to save them from Hell.¹ There has, therefore, been the marvellous spectacle of the mass of 600 millions of people, who — until the rise of modern Japan — because they had all these virtues, were an easy prey to aggressive and bigoted white races pressing eagerly forward to grasp the riches which tradition has always associated with the gilded East. Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, France, Russia, all these nations in the past have been morally responsible for the growth of many of the present difficulties. Stealing down in trading-ships, or coming boldly in men-of-war; crossing frontier-rivers on rafts, as did the old-time Cossack adventurers; riding into the country concealed in caravans — all these men of the West have in various ways, perhaps unconsciously and unwittingly, proclaimed Europe's real and only gospel — the gospel of force; a gospel inherently so stupid that for many decades the yellow men refused to believe it, until the Japanese, forced to do so, accepted it with sudden fervour, and by their acceptance definitely marked the beginning of a new era.

Now, it is commonly held that the great nationalist movement which has swept across Asia and spread broadcast the idea that Asia must wake up and copy the West, so as successfully to fight the West, is traceable simply to Japan's remarkable success in her recent war with Russia, and to nothing else; that is, to Japan's success in driving back to her own frontiers a

¹ It is true that Buddhism permits hideous gods and pictorial representations of Heaven and Hell in its temples, but these are only for the common people. The instructed man in Eastern Asia, for at least thirty centuries, has been so far civilised that he confines himself to a few observances, all of which are in the nature of honours paid to the Principle of Life.

very great but somewhat simple-minded white nation. Since nothing succeeds like success, and since this one small but densely-populated yellow man's country has dramatically proved beyond all doubt how much can be effected by boldly employing the arts of modern war against modern Europeans, it may be admitted that the apparent cause of this great movement in Asia is really Japan. But the real cause lies much deeper, and has, indeed, always been in existence. It is this which must now be dealt with.

Stated in simple language, this cause is simply the antipathy which must always exist between two unsympathetic elements, one of which has constantly proved itself superior to the other — an antipathy which now dares to show itself where before it did not dare. This antipathy is commonly supposed to be entirely a matter of colour. It is nothing of the sort. It arises simply because Europe has lorded it over Asia for so long; has so insisted to Asia that Europe is superior in all that concerns the mastery both of man and of the forces of nature, and in the scientific accumulation of wealth, that native races in the end perforce accepted the white man at his own valuation, and marked him down as a necessary evil which would have to be tolerated until it could be fought on its own terms and so cast aside. In this process of reasoning, on the Asiatic side there is little question of colour, no matter what there might be on the European side. The white man is not hateful because he is white, but because he is strong, confident and overbearing. The Asiatic is being therefore forced to adopt his new attitude in self-defence; and though of course, colour has admittedly become a barrier and also a great

irritant, it must be remembered that it is the white man who has largely taught the coloured man that this is so. Let us repeat it. It is because Europe's standard has been so much higher than Asia's standard during the past century or two, and her strength consequently so much greater, that Europe is still disliked and feared. This is nothing but the natural dislike of a weaker man for a stronger man, who has traded on his strength. From the Asiatic side the question of colour has always been a very minor one, because other things have been so much more vital. And here we pass to a new and still stronger consideration which must be insisted upon almost tediously.

No matter how much Asia may better herself, no matter how much she may succeed in the twentieth century in reversing the verdict of the nineteenth century, and in proving that she has an inherent right to be sole mistress in her own house, there exists for her one grand obstacle which nothing in the world can properly remove — an obstacle which is practically insurmountable. This obstacle is climate, the modifying and destructive effect of which has never been properly understood by the Western world, and which is the real reason why no such religion as the Christian religion is suited to Asia. The climate of the East is responsible for the peculiar philosophy and social atmosphere of the East — both of which are totally different from the philosophy and social atmosphere of the West, and neither of which can be really changed in their fundamentals, no matter what efforts are put forth. The changes will be in material, practical things — not in the web of life long ago woven to its final form. For though in certain portions of the Far East the climate approximates to that obtaining

at the other end of the hemisphere, nevertheless subtle differences exist which in a few generations would be sufficient to change the characteristics of any white race migrating to Eastern Asia and which would assimilate that race to the autochthonous race around them. So great a rôle does this question of climate play that the attention of statesmen should be concentrated on it as a very vital question in practical politics. For just as January and February have been the historic Russian allies, so in the future must climate be the white man's great ally in the lands of the coloured man. Many years ago Buckle, one of the first students properly to understand the inner meaning of this vital matter, correctly showed how and why it was possible for culture and civilisation to advance a certain distance in hot climates and no farther, simply because the internal incentive to progress ceased after a certain point had been reached. Here it may be parenthetically remarked that Europe is supplying the new incentive to all countries of the East; and because that incentive comes from without; because it is thus a "variable" and not a "constant," no man may yet say how much or how little it may everywhere accomplish.

Still it is a regrettable fact that in spite of such works as Buckle's *History of Civilisation*, little or no count is to-day taken of this fundamental obstacle, which possesses such immense socio-political value, and which should always be carefully studied in order to obtain the proper perspective in the case of sadly-involved problems. No one knows better than the Japanese leaders that the greatest danger for them is not really war, since they will never embark on any purely speculative campaign, but backsliding, largely from

climatic effect, in all matters where they have borrowed from the West.¹ This is equivalent to saying that they fear most of all no external foe, but simply the possibility of a natural failure to accumulate wealth and strength in that arithmetical progression which has

¹ It would be well if Japanese statesmen pondered over the following words, and understood their ultimate meaning. The capacity for planting healthy colonies is certainly not possessed by the Japanese.

"In yet another way does the national genius affect the growth of sea-power in its broadest sense; and that is in so far as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies. Of colonisation, as of all other growths, it is true that it is most healthy when it is most natural. Therefore colonies that spring from the felt wants and natural impulse of a whole people will have the most solid foundations; and their subsequent growth will be surest when they are least trammelled from home, if the people have the genius for independent action. Men of the past three centuries have keenly felt the value to the mother country of colonies as outlets for the home products and as a nursery for commerce and shipping; but efforts at colonisation have not had the same general origin, nor have different systems all had the same success. The efforts of statesmen, however far-seeing and careful, have not been able to supply the lack of strong natural impulse; nor can the most minute regulation from home produce as good results as a happier neglect, when the germ of self-development is found in the national character. There has been no greater display of wisdom in the national administration of successful colonies than in that of unsuccessful. Perhaps there has been even less. If elaborate system and supervision, careful adaptation of means to ends, diligent nursing, could avail for colonial growth, the genius of England has less of this systematising faculty than the genius of France; but England, not France, has been the greater coloniser of the world. Successful colonisation, with its consequent effect upon commerce and sea-power, depends essentially upon national character; because colonies grow best when they grow of themselves, naturally. The character of the colonist, not the care of the home government, is the principle of the colony's growth." — Mahan: *Influence of Sea Power upon History*.

become the order of the day among white races. Such a failure would be due not to any sin of omission in the matter of faithful copying, but would merely spring from the fact that the home motive-power is utterly different.

This is an important conclusion. The very complete and elaborate system of checks and counter-checks which has everywhere to be noted in modern Japan has no doubt been instinctively designed with the special object of fighting influences which are inherent in the East — corruption, laziness, postponement, inattention, unenthusiasm, slackness, sloth — influences which tend to bring things to the natural level at which they can be maintained with the minimum of physical and mental effort.¹ Though the Japanese have of late years been more successful than any other non-Aryan people in borrowing and adopting the civilisation and inventions of the West, they have not been so entirely successful as is popularly supposed. Conflict with the West — just as much as contact with the West — is the reviving force for them, the incentive on which they must rely, the very soul of their new life. It is safe to say that it will require hundreds of years, even with the aid of countless artificial means, before modern Japan can succeed in attaining a semblance of modern Europe. Japanese efficiency to-day is, therefore, only high when compared with the efficiency of the rest of the East, and not when compared with the efficiency of Europe or America. Yet so little is this understood that in a

¹ Even as soldiers and sailors there is no doubt that the Japanese are not the equals of Europeans. Though they have great fire and dash, they are easily discouraged and easily impressed with a sense of their own limitations. The Russian war proved nothing that has not been long known to students in the Far East.

recent political work a very eminent English statesman was found to write a preface, in which he called upon his countrymen to emulate the Japanese in their signal efficiency in all things!

Still, no matter how great may be the discrepancy between the ideal Japan, as conceived by those living many thousands of miles away, and the real Japan, there can be little doubt that in the world of Eastern Asia it is this one Island Empire which is by far the most important factor, the pivot on which the whole latter-day problem may turn. Though China be many times greater in area, riches and population, this must long remain as it is at present. And the second strange fact to-day is that though Japan is racially in the opposite camp to Europe — that is, of necessity entirely opposed to the white races — yet, owing to her astute diplomacy, she has ranged herself politically on the side of those who desire to maintain indefinitely the *status quo* throughout Asia, and therefore, inferentially, the domination of Europe in Asia. This further complicates any properly-balanced consideration of the question.

For though the Japanese may be considered the real head and front of the growing movement in Asia for winning that general equality which no white Power willingly concedes, they are still the political allies of England for the special purpose of holding in check undoubtedly the strongest of all white races — Russia — which because of its outlying geographical situation has always been Europe's great champion against Asia. At the same time the Japanese — more than any other Asiatic people, and despite their private and justifiable ambitions — desire for a number of years the goodwill of the whole world, so that their commerce may greatly

expand and drag them from the slough of debt in which they have been floundering ever since the great war with Russia. Japan's own problem is therefore more intricate and more beset by real and apparent contradictions than any other political problem in the world; and the training which Japanese statesmen are now receiving in the school of practical politics is of a very remarkable nature.

For this strong military Power, after having removed one great white peril, thanks to the covert help of two other white Powers, finds herself not only crippled by an immense debt of 2,500 million *yen*, but absolutely debarred from sending her surplus population to those opposite shores of the Pacific where their labour would be immediately remunerative, and where that labour would be economically in the nature of debt-repayment. And the countries which thus debar her are the very lands which only yesterday were affording her that valuable moral and financial help which allowed her to triumph in a gigantic war. Furthermore, as it is necessary for her to extract to the uttermost farthing everything of value from those regions where this war left her securely entrenched—that is, Korea and Southern Manchuria—the people of these regions, though they are of kindred races, are estranged and are sensibly contributing to the vague feeling of distrust which renders the peaceful winning of the hegemony of Eastern Asia more than doubtful. Nor must it be forgotten that commerce and industry have not flourished under the bureaucratic-monopolistic system which has found such favour in Japan. We have thus a discontented nation, a poor nation and a restricted nation, which is yet a powerful military nation, and which is

geographically so situated that as long as China remains weak, it will always be child's play for the statesmen of Tokyo to impose their will on the statesmen of Peking in such a way that Chinese autonomy will become less of a reality than it is now. Since the vital necessity of Japan's policy is to establish a community of interests between all the yellow races, that she will begin with the strongest of them all can scarcely be doubted.

For having been the very first of all Asiatic Powers to win political equality with the white Powers, Japan feels that to her belongs the proud privilege of leading that grand movement which has for object the re-establishment of a condition which undoubtedly existed at one period of the world's history — that is, the absolute equality of civilised men, irrespective of colour or creed. That this is a work of gigantic proportions Japanese statesmen will understand; but experience has long shown them that if the final objective is never lost sight of ; if work proceeds night and day; if all the national energies are devoted towards consummating the desired end, and all else is strictly subordinated to that end — the impossible becomes in the end possible, and is through persistence finally translated into undeniable reality.

Japan's whole history proves that. When Commodore Perry forced her fifty years ago to abandon her policy of seclusion, the humiliation of her relations with Western nations was just as great as Chinese humiliation has always been since the Canton wars of eighty years ago. In the middle of the nineteenth century certainly no one would have guessed that she would rise superior to all the many restrictions with which she was oppressed. Her commerce was virtually

regulated by the foreign Powers by means of a cast-iron tariff which she was not at liberty to revise without their consent; her laws and her officials had no control whatsoever over foreigners resident within the limits of her Empire; she had no military importance; she was closely watched and generally given to understand that she was rated as inferior. That she was actually inferior in many ways is shown by the fear in which she always held decadent China, until she beat China fifteen years ago. It required the efforts of forty years to recover her judicial and commercial autonomy; she had hardly done that and established her complete independence, when the Russian peril suddenly loomed up so large that it seemed possible that, after she had escaped from the moral thraldom of Europe, she was destined to be reduced to the position of vassal to one particular European Power.¹

¹ It is very necessary, when dealing with Asia and Asiatic problems, not to follow European methods of reasoning, but Asiatic methods, if a true understanding of actual conditions is really aimed at.

Thus in the matter of South Manchuria, it is of the highest importance to realise that the Japanese reasoning is as follows. In 1894-5, Japan fought China and beat her ignominiously—much as Turkey beat Greece in the campaign of 1897. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in 1895, China ceded to Japan the Liaotung Territory—a region which comprises nearly half the territory of South Manchuria now dominated by Japan. But immediately thereafter three Powers, Russia, France and Germany, intervened on China's behalf, and demanded the retrocession of this territory. Japan, forced to accede to this display of force, signed the Retrocession Agreement by which the Liaotung Territory was restored to China on the payment of an additional indemnity of thirty million Kuping silver taels (about five millions sterling in those days).

The Japanese attitude then really is that morally the Liaotung

Now this recent war, successful as it was from many points of view — and especially from the point of view first mentioned — was harmful to Japan in one important particular where she least expected it to be. It has proved to her beyond any shadow of doubt that no matter how much the world may applaud the spectacle of a David battling with a Goliath, when it comes to allowing an Eastern David the same privileges as the ordinary white man in other regions of the world, a universal shout forbids it. To put it plainly, Japan was permitted to push back Russia a step or two; but she has since been shown that the citizenship of the world belongs to the white man and to him alone. Common honesty, therefore, requires it to be generally acknowledged that if the Island Empire of the East soon develops an intensive policy in Eastern Asia — and succeeds in binding Eastern Asia into one political whole — one of the most powerful contributory causes must be sought in the uncompromising attitude of the white man on those shores of the Pacific where the proximity of enormous races of coloured men has filled even a race that believes itself to be unalterably dominant full of open fear.

For some years to come this welding of Eastern Asia into one whole will not become so clear as to arouse

Territory belongs to Japan by an actual treaty, which was temporarily rendered impotent owing to alien interference. She has but to return the Chinese indemnity to enter into full enjoyment of her rights — a further sum securing her tenure of the additional territory which she now dominates, thanks to the Russian war. The writer seriously invites attention to this point of view. It is not Asiatic casuistry — it is Asiatic reasoning, which abhors white man's reasoning, based as that reasoning mainly is on a logic which Asia does not accept.

universal concern and a new grouping of the Powers. Great financial difficulties have to be overcome by Japan ;¹ England must not be estranged; China —

¹ It is necessary to point out clearly that, however much Japan's relative poorness may be decried, she can — if necessity demands — still lay her hand on a source of revenue which would provide her with every facility for large national borrowings.

This source is the land-tax — which is still very light compared with the rest of Japanese taxation. In 1877, when the total revenue of the Government was *yen* 59,000,000, nearly two-thirds of this sum was derived from the land-tax. In 1907, when the total revenue was estimated at *yen* 616,000,000, less than 15 per cent., or *yen* 85,000,000, was contributed by the land-tax. Now these figures are especially significant in that until the Restoration in 1867 taxation rested entirely on the land. At one time, as much as seven-tenths of the produce was taken by the Government, and under the Tokugawa administration, which lasted from the close of the sixteenth century to the year 1867, the average rate of taxation was certainly never less than four-tenths of the gross produce. In 1868, the first year of Meiji, the land was virtually nationalised, the feudal barons restoring their estates to the Emperor. It was in turn bestowed by the Emperor upon the villages subject to an annual tax based upon a general assessment of the value obtained from the ruling prices of agricultural produce. The total official valuation at that time was about fifteen hundred million *yen* and the first tax was levied at the rate of a half per cent. The same valuation is in force to-day, but since the Russian war the rate of tax has been increased to 20 per cent. on City Building Land; 8 per cent. on Village Building Land; 5½ per cent. on Fields, Forests, &c. Large as these increases may appear in percentages they only double the revenue from the land-tax, and are trivial in comparison with the increased value of the land, its products or its rental. Taking the country as a whole, the official value upon which the land-tax is levied is only about one-eighth of the present market value, so that proportionately to the first levy the land-tax should yield *yen* 320,000,000 instead of *yen* 85,000,000. It is well-known that the Government of Japan is keeping this source of revenue untouched as a last reserve for war-purposes. Undoubtedly the land-tax in Japan could be made to provide the service of a fresh debt of one hundred millions sterling.

already suspicious, uneasy and openly restive — must be handled with care; and generally no false moves attempted from vainglorious motives. Japan's first business, then, must simply consist in placing herself in such an international position as to have the leadership of the Far East gradually and naturally fall to her, and so gradually and naturally be acknowledged by all. That is the first essential; and though it may still sound a little unbelievable, it is perceptibly more possible of belief than it was a few years ago.

Still, although the small yellow nations, such as Siam and Indo-China, are probably already quite willing secretly to concede to Japan such a leadership as has been outlined, in preference to Europe's open domination, and although Korea has already been forced to acknowledge Japan's sovereignty, the question of China is undoubtedly a very different matter. Though there are to-day voices endlessly whispering messages of hope and intrigue in the vernacular Press, in the schoolrooms, in the very Yamens of the highest, China still resolutely refuses to lend herself to designs which even in the minds of Tokyo statesmen are necessarily shadowy and ill-defined. For one of the most remarkable Chinese national characteristics is an unbounded belief in the vitality and genius of their race — a belief that political difficulties which seem at any given moment overwhelming are slowly removed by the unconscious efforts of a great and swarming population. History certainly proves to a large extent the correctness of this view; but history is sometimes a treacherous guide, and days are certainly drawing near which have an ugly look for those who pin their faith solely to the lessons of the past.

Still it is admittedly by no means certain that this state of affairs — this Chinese reluctance to side with Japan — will last indefinitely. For one or two decades more Chinese jealousy may actually provide a valuable counterpoise to the present disturbed balance of power in Eastern Asia, and thus complicate the problem Japan has ahead of her. But in the natural order of things, other conquests will be added to those Japan has made during the past fifteen years;¹ and these will

¹ Those who delude themselves into believing that there is no longer any basis for animadversions against Japanese militarism would do well to ponder over the following statements made by Japanese Ministers of War and Navy during the budget debates of the year 1910:—“The military undertakings in Manchuria and Korea were being pushed on in pursuance of the policy already adopted. As regarded national defence, a Bill had been introduced to the Diet some years ago providing for the strengthening of armaments. At that time the Government wished to increase the standing army to 25 divisions, this expansion being based on the necessity of keeping pace with Foreign Powers. The Government, however, was compelled to yield to financial considerations, and the force was increased to 19 divisions only. The Powers of the world were strenuously exerting their efforts towards the maintenance of peace, but the maintenance of peace depended on the balance of armaments being maintained. The Powers are accordingly steadily increasing the force of their armies and navies, as they desired peace. In these circumstances, Japan could not be content with the existing force of her armaments for long, and it would be necessary for Japan to increase them in due course.” From these statements, it is quite plain that what the writer has consistently affirmed — that no change of programme is contemplated by Japan and that she is determined to win the open hegemony of the East — is true. Her policy has been the clever policy of throwing dust in people’s eyes until she is ready to stand unmasked.

It may be added that, according to the best information, Japan has this year (1910), 1,200,000 fully-trained men, available on mobilisation; by 1916 this number will be increased to 1,637,000. Besides these fully-trained men there will be 846,000 partially-

enable her gradually to tighten her grip on Peking and force the adoption of Japanese views, for fear that something worse may happen. And it is well here to remember that this has always been the great bane of Chinese politics — the purchasing of temporary relief by far-reaching and little-understood concessions. There is the strongest likelihood that something of the sort may be seen again; it is the most probable outcome of an infinitely difficult situation.

For it must be remembered that just as the Anglo-Japanese alliance is a temporising measure for England, so it is a temporising measure for Japan. The British alliance may be necessary until the second or third decade of the present century; but it certainly will not be necessary for very much longer. And its termination may be the signal for the proclamation of a new and very different combination founded on colour and geography, and taking its rise from certain stubborn facts.

Already it may be said broadly that in certain ways

trained men who will be quite good enough to replace casualties in the field — thus giving a total mobilised strength in 1916 of 2,483,000 fighting men. Further, owing to Japan's increasing population, which has now reached nearly 53,000,000, and which multiplies at the rate of a million a year, and owing to the reduction of service with the colours from three to two years, the annual peace contingent of conscripts has been increased from 80,000 in 1905 to 120,000 in 1909. As about 520,000 young men reach the age of 20 every year, those who are not taken for the conscription, and who are physically fit, are held to military service up to the age of 40, and anticipatory arrangements have been made in the event of a prolonged war for calling them out by classes and training them at the dépôts. These men, about 3,000,000 in number, would have to be reckoned with as a final reserve of the armed strength of Japan.

the situation in the whole of Asia, though more especially in Eastern Asia, is not entirely unlike what it was in Europe when, after the French Revolution had overthrown the French Monarchy, the French Republic, rising out of the ashes left by that giant conflagration, began the deliberate policy of “revolutionising” or attempting to “revolutionise” all neighbouring countries by sending abroad emissaries who insistently preached the gospel of liberty, and gave the promise of armed help to all who desired to sweep away the abuses and intolerances of the old *régime*. The success of this French propaganda — after an initial period of doubt — was overwhelming in Europe; and, being encouraged to rise against their rulers, broken monarchies became the order of the day. The natural consequence of this great movement was that when the time was ripe — and the god of the machine had appeared in the person of a Napoleon — these “revolutionised” countries had to submit to an iron imperial sway, embracing practically all Europe.

Now though it may sound singularly exaggerated and improper to see in Japan a copyist in any way of the first Napoleonic Empire, it is a very remarkable fact that in a modified form many features are to be observed in the present situation in Asia which are similar to those obtaining in Europe a century ago. It can no longer be doubted that a very deliberate policy is certainly being quietly and cleverly pursued. Despite all denials, it is a fact that Japan has already a great hold in the schools and in the vernacular newspapers all over Eastern Asia, and that the gospel of “Asia for the Asiatics” is being steadily preached not only by her schoolmasters and her editors, but by her

merchants and pedlars and every other man who travels. It is also a fact surely worthy of special note, that wherever Japan sets her foot — no matter how she may have placed it there, and no matter what promises she may have given regarding evacuation — there she remains for good, making her tenure indisputable under specious forms such as the great Napoleon delighted in devising. In this there is nothing exceptional: it is merely the working of that universal law which causes strong bodies to overpower and absorb the weak.

Thus during the past fourteen years Japan has actually gained Formosa, Korea, the Liaotung Territory and Southern Saghalien — territories far greater than the Japanese isles themselves — and she is already the virtual arbiter of an immense region in Manchuria larger than Great Britain and Ireland. In both of the two wars which she fought to capture these various territories, she began by expressing the same disinterestedness and the same purity of motives — protestations which seemed so true that it has actually appeared as if *force majeure* in the end alone necessitated a reversal of the proclaimed policy. Yet no matter what mitigating circumstances apologists may find, it is certain that each of these two wars — one fought against China, the other against Russia — was virtually settled by a territorial indemnity.

Now admitting all this, and realising its significance, it is well to know that at the present moment the most urgent problem which, masked by many other forms of activity, engages the attention of the Tokyo Government is this: How can Japan ultimately best win for herself numbers?¹

¹ It is an extraordinary fact, perhaps worthy of mention, that this view has been unexpectedly confirmed in the very highest quarter

As a preliminary to the argument which follows and which establishes Japanese policy as the writer sees it, it is necessary thoroughly to understand that, in the eyes of Japanese statesmen, Japan has to-day no enemies: she has only rivals. To the cold and philosophic Japanese mind the sensationalism of the West, which confounds a race for power with the act of fighting enemies, is unworthy of serious men. Japan does not want war — she has never desired war like vainglorious European nations. The way the problem must be stated is this. From the Japanese view-point there exist on the shores of the Pacific nations feared by her because they possess greater wealth and greater numbers than she herself possesses — or can ever possess — within the territorial limits of her own Empire, unless she methodically extends those territorial limits — either by direct conquest or by some indirect acquirement of the rights of eminent domain which will place at her disposal, in industry and in war, the millions she needs. This may sound an ambiguous and peculiar method of stating a plain political ideal; but it is just such ambiguous and peculiar phrasing which best exposes to view the soul of

some time after the writer had set down his own argument. In the Budget Debate in Japan for the fiscal year 1910-1911, Count Komura, Foreign Minister, said that Japan had become a continental nation as a result of the late great war. There was China with 400,000,000 people close by, Russia with 160,000,000 on the west and America with 100,000,000 on the east. If the Japanese were to expand in the midst of these nations they must have a population of 100,000,000 at least. Therefore the Japanese who could only number 50,000,000 people should concentrate rather than scatter themselves. With this idea the Government intended to concentrate the emigrants in Manchuria and Korea. Surely no better proof could be adduced by the writer to show that he has correctly read the Japanese mind.

that diplomacy which is so disconcerting to Western minds. The Japanese mental attitude, therefore, is to-day one of great anxiety — anxiety lest a priceless opportunity be allowed to slip away and she misses in consequence a destiny which seems as manifest to her people as it was to the English people when they had beaten France in the old colonial days of the eighteenth century. In view of her abnormal armaments and her great striking power, some may refuse to believe that Japan is really so filled with anxiety; nevertheless that anxiety exists and is a very real force. For while Japan can be bold in action, she is timid when she is inactive; and, with all her armed strength, she appreciates thoroughly the fact that she possesses certain absolute limitations. Nor must it be forgotten that she is thoroughly imbued with that valuable political attribute, the habit of really taking long views whilst loudly talking short views.

Now, for the time being Japan undoubtedly still fears Russia most of all her rivals — because that fear is traditional; because of the relatively-speaking negative results achieved by the late war; and because, more obviously still, if she is to be the arbiter of the fate of China, she must guard first against a Power whose frontiers envelop the frontiers of China. Next to Russia she fears America, because of America's wealth and what that wealth is capable of rapidly accomplishing. Last of all, she fears China because of China's latent strength.

The Japanese problem is therefore a problem which constantly requires a threefold consideration; and it would be well if English statesmen realised once and for all that they stand completely outside that three-

fold consideration. The Japanese problem, to be understood, must be considered from the point of view which has been so clearly set down. For Japan knows that if China ever comes to her own—either of her own initiative or assisted by some foreign Power—the Chinese Empire, by reason of its enormous population, may become to the rest of Eastern Asia what the Roman Empire in the days of her glory was to the rest of Europe. China is immense: her population extraordinary. No amount of efficiency or cunning can destroy the fact that a nation outnumbered by eight to one is a nation hopelessly handicapped in any struggle *à l'outrance*. This Japan knows.

These things should, then, be properly considered. At this moment, Japan is not arming against Russia in particular, or against America, or against China. She is arming merely because of the facts that these three mighty countries exist in her immediate neighbourhood—that is, on the Pacific Ocean; that the strength of each of these three countries must mightily expand; but that by making immense pecuniary sacrifices it is still possible for her to keep sufficiently ahead of these three rivals for a few decades to enable her periodically to take advantage of any favourable circumstances which may arise and thus to offset by quickness and completed preparations what she may lack in inherent strength. That is what she did in her Chinese War; that is what she did in her Russian War; that is what she will do again. In these few paragraphs may be read Japan's real policy; for like all island Powers, she must gather strength by sudden and unexpected action.

Even in distant days Japanese statesmen have always

thoroughly understood that on basis of population, natural ability, or extent of territory, their country is really in a class far beneath the three rivals who have been named. To-day the statesmen of Tokyo realise that they can lay no permanent claim to the title of Great Power on the Pacific, when what may be called the "Dreadnought age" of Great Powers has arrived, unless the hope of creating a Greater Japan at some period before the present century is too far advanced is completely realised. Japan, having tasted the bitter-sweet of being the strongest military and naval Power in modern Asia, will never consent, without a desperate struggle, to be relegated to a more lowly place. Yet, if a new China really arises, Japan *must* be relegated to the relative position she occupied before the war of 1894-95 — that is to the position of a Minor Power. And she is determined that this will not occur.

Herein lies the real problem of Eastern Asia — herein the real difficulty, herein the tragedy of all recent history. Stripped of all useless verbiage, it may be said that Japan, by immense efforts and by foreign aid, has placed herself in a wrong class, and therefore in a permanently false position, which necessarily throws everything else out of proportion. Merely because of this strange fact, it is impossible to say what may or may not become either of her, or of the rest of the Far East, during the present century, supposing that her three real competitors continue to expand in point of population, and therefore in wealth and potential strength, just as they are expanding at present. There is really no end to the possibilities which exist. The problem is so urgent, so fraught with subtle dangers, that it is impossible to say too much.

Let us tabulate some figures and understand this thoroughly. Few people give enough consideration to simple statistics; yet it is by the aid of these statistics alone that the general position can be understood. Numbers are what Japan needs in the populous modern world. At the present moment the Japanese population is almost exactly 53,000,000. By 1925, that is, in fifteen years, however, assuming that the birth-rate remains what it is at present, the Japanese population will equal the present population of Germany — 63,000,000 people. But in that year the population of Japan's three rivals may be as follows:—

Russia	200,000,000
United States	120,000,000
China	475,000,000

The passage of another quarter of a century will find this discrepancy still more marked — unless Japan has conquered Manchuria and other parts of China. In 1950, Japan may have 80,000,000 or 85,000,000 people, but in that year the figures of her rivals certainly should be:—

Russia	275,000,000
United States	170,000,000
China	550,000,000

By the end of the present century, unless this phenomenal growth of populations is arrested by causes about which nothing can yet be written, Japan, though she may have 120,000,000 or even 140,000,000 people, will be faced by the following figures:—

Russia	400,000,000
United States	300,000,000
China	800,000,000 ¹

¹ The present writer is not prepared to accept entirely Professor Pearson's statement, which forms so important a part in his main

The imagination staggers at such figures; but to the student in China, who is accustomed to immense figures, and who knows how not millions or tens of millions, but hundreds of millions are toiling in a limitless land, there is nothing very startling in them. Fifty years ago, in the Taiping Rebellion, about 100 millions perished in two decades or so of savage warfare; yet already the ground where the greatest slaughter took place has been filled.

Now, bearing in mind the political rivalry which from now on should grow from year to year, in spite of all talk of peace, the great mass of this population will be so situated as to press on Japan and be a potential source of menace. Once they are educated and drilled, China's millions, with their extraordinary mental and physical activity, will man for man be more than a match for Japan in peaceful times: and in the event of war, since the superiority in numbers must remain at least six or seven to one, it would be hopeless for Japan to measure strength with the immense Dragon Empire — for all the courage of mythical St. George would be

argument, that Chinese numerical preponderance must be so overwhelming in the future. While no reliable statistics exist regarding the Chinese decennial increase, we know that one white nation — Russia — is now adding to her population at the rate of at least twenty-five millions every decade; that that rate is bound to increase; and that she has room within her present boundaries for a population of possibly a thousand millions — that is, a population of 150 persons per square mile in her seven million square miles of territory. Russia has a far greater feeding-capacity than the United States; and it is therefore this country rather than any other — because its boundaries are conterminous — which will ultimately act as a natural restraint on China, though for the moment other countries may be able to exercise a superior political influence.

of no avail against army corps which could be easily numbered by the hundred, if it were only a question of men. At the end of the present century Siberia alone will have a population greatly superior to the population of Japan; and this population, accustomed to the hard blows of climate and conscious of its lusty strength, will view with increasing disfavour any political effacement such as the Russian treaty-makers at Portsmouth were not ashamed to endorse. In these rapidly coming days America will be spilling its men and its products over the Pacific; and as this development grows, it will fill the broad waters of the Pacific with the signs of rival ambitions.

Surrounded thus by fully developed rivals, in place of the present undeveloped rivals, Japan, should nothing be done in the meantime, will be more unfortunately situated than Germany in Europe has ever been. The Japanese people have but little genius for trade or industry, neither have they commanding mentality. Germany, though she is admittedly surrounded, has now won for herself, apart from every other consideration, a numerical superiority — which nothing can strip from her — over her neighbours on all but one side. But in the case of Japan the essential point is different: her task is still ahead of her.

It has been stated that Japan's task is to win numbers for herself during the present century, and that to obtain those numbers she must annex territory; but at home there is for her an element of weakness which is seldom referred to. For even the supposition that the present relative position will be maintained is uncertain: that is, it is by no means beyond doubt that the Japanese birth-rate will remain at its present figure.

Japan may actually lose strength, because the free expansion of her population overseas is impeded; and this is what she fears may actually occur during the present century.

Let us look into this more closely. In the comparison just made, the rate of increase in the Japanese population during the past few decades, which has been very regular, was taken as a basis; and the conclusion reached was that by 1925 the population would number 63,000,000; by 1950, eighty or eighty-five millions; and by the end of the century one hundred and twenty millions, or even one hundred and forty millions. Bearing in mind, however, certain special economic conditions, now springing into ever greater prominence in modern Japan, and remembering that the growth of the Japanese population, like all other Asiatic populations, has often been restrained by special causes other than warfare, it is not impossible that this population may gradually assume the quasi-stationary condition of the population of France. There are certain historic facts which help one to believe this; and as such a consummation would, of course, at once change the entire outlook, it is well to be more explicit.

Anterior to the sixteenth century, there are few authentic data regarding the population of Japan. Japanese mediæval records only give the numbers of persons subject to the tax-roll; the enormous number of serfs and outcasts was never estimated, whilst children were likewise ignored. In the sixteenth century, however, it is tolerably certain that the population was probably some fifteen or sixteen millions — Japan being thus at least as populous as some of the great States of Europe, Austria then having sixteen,

France fourteen, Spain eight, and England five million people. But after that a change gradually took place, and European investigators have brought to light some remarkable facts.

From the beginning of what is known as the Great Peace in Japan (or the end of the great feudal wars), the population increased with rapidity, reaching its maximum in the year 1700. By 1721, the influence of the long calm had spent itself. It was in that year that the first regular census was taken, and henceforward it was seen that there was no real increase of population. Two reasons have been assigned for this: the first that no efforts were made to enlarge the area of tillable land or to stimulate the productivity of the soil; the second that the processions of the *daimios*, or nobles, journeying from their castles to the capital, spread everywhere terribly contagious diseases, such as small pox, dysentery and typhus-fever, which decimated the population. But in addition to disease, periodic famines made awful ravages. Thus, though in 1721 the population had been estimated at 26,061,830 souls, in 1792 it was reduced to 24,891,411 and in 1846 had only risen to 26,907,625. In a word the Japanese population for over a century was absolutely stationary. Now, in the course of some sixty-five years, it has almost exactly doubled, owing to the opening up of the country and the spread of other rejuvenating influences. Already new economic causes are beginning to appear which may once again check the growth, though not so severely as in olden times.

Briefly, the Japanese Government, by adopting at home the protective principle, in its severest forms, is virtually reducing the nation to an artificial condition as

dangerous to natural expansion as the economic and general isolation existing during the Tokugawa period. Foreign capital is virtually excluded from the country, being only admitted in the form of government, quasi-government, or municipal loans; the free import of food-stuffs is impeded by taxation and other restrictions; state monopolies have invaded fields which should have been left open to private enterprise; in every direction the free activities of the people are hampered; taxation has become so irritating in that the sense of being heavily taxed is continually impressed on rich and poor alike, whilst prices are rapidly rising and trade shows no signs of great expansion. Should the force of these various factors become intensified, there can be little doubt that the causes operative in France will slowly become operative in Japan, and small families will be the order of the day. Thus, whereas in the case of the great rivals on the Pacific, Russia, America, and China, there are no such crippling conditions, and men are adding to their numbers either through the operation of the birth-rate or by wholesale immigration at an unprecedented rate, in Japan the source of all wealth — human beings — is being tampered with in order to make a largely fictitious yearly balancing of the national account. Internationally this may one day have a most important and far-reaching influence.

For Japan the problem is immensely serious, since all the unity and energy in the world will avail nothing if the present disproportion between her numerical strength and the strength of her rivals increases. It is this which every day convinces thinking men in Japan more and more of the necessity of annulling those political boundaries which still separate the various

members of the yellow race. More than sufficient has already been said to demonstrate clearly the stand-point from which modern Japan must be always studied. It is as the nation which has started too late in the world's race, and which though isolated by sea has already acquired a firm foothold on the mainland of Asia — a foothold as disastrous for Asia, as was for all concerned England's foothold on the continent of Europe in days gone by. It is as the nation which has been placed in a false position, owing to fortuitous circumstances — a nation which has three other great nations, each on the threshold of a phenomenal population-expansion, openly watchful and openly nervous, since it has been due to their military under-development — that the success of the military over-development of Japan was rendered possible.

Now the situation in China is very favourable for the success of the Japanese policy which has been proclaimed in these pages. The passing of the last vestige of the old *régime* in the death of the masterful Empress Dowager, and the complete downfall of China's one strong man of action, Yuan Shih Kai — both of whom understood the value of force — finds the vast empire in the most curious of intermediary stages. The enthronement of an infant Emperor under the tutelage of a young and inexperienced but altruistic Regent — his father — signifies the beginning of a provisional *régime* which must last for nearly a generation, and during which no firm front can possibly be shown — without external help — to any bold enemy. The probabilities seem to point clearly to the fact that though many changes have been sanctioned and will soon be enforced by the Peking Government; though general progress

will gradually be made in such matters as railway building, education, taxation, and finance, internationally China will remain an unwieldy mass, unable to throw her great weight against any rival because of her enormous decentralisation, which has to be slowly amended. In other words, China must long remain totally unable to fight successfully against any first-class Power, no matter how many hundreds of thousands of troops she may arm and equip.

It therefore seems more than likely that the waging of one more successful war on the part of Japan will ensure for her the real hegemony of Eastern Asia, and render the position of all those white Powers possessing important stakes beyond the Straits of Malacca not only one of extreme embarrassment but one of open peril. The whole outer problem for Japan is to hold the white Powers grouped against one another more or less as they stand at present, whilst cautiously she tightens her hold on China.¹ It is not even necessary

¹ Owing to the methodical manner in which her step-by-step campaign of penetration and assimilation proceeds, it is possible to predict with great exactitude the manner in which Japan's programme on the continent of Asia will be developed.

This is what should happen during the next few years. The formal annexation of Korea and dethronement of the Korean Emperor — merely temporarily delayed for reasons of expediency — will come during the present term of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This will make Japan irrevocably a continental, as well as an island, Power: it will therefore be proclaimed suddenly necessary to safeguard the buffer State of Manchuria more adequately than is possible at present, by securing greater administrative as well as military control. The first tentative steps have already been taken (1) by making all Japanese consuls in Manchuria directly subject to the Governor-General of the Port Arthur Territory and thus establishing the web of an administration; (2) by extending policing rights, in the face of most active Chinese opposition,

for her to maintain the present political combination, since by boldly abandoning the Anglo-Saxon friendship — that friendship which is illusory, because of the white communities of the Pacific who despise all dealings with the yellow man — and by making a gradual Russian or Russo-German understanding, she might be better suited. Nothing then would prevent her from developing a new policy on the southern frontiers of China, and stripping from France her Indo-Chinese Colonies, as she could most easily do to-day. The Annamese, the weakest of all the yellow peoples, are yet beginning to show new possibilities in political development; and accustomed as they are to Chinese suzerainty, Japanese suzerainty would not be unwelcome to them in place of the present rule by conquest.

wherever new railway links go. This has already been done in the case of the new Yalu railway; but that is not very important, inasmuch as South-Eastern Manchuria, already traversed by Japanese armies, lies in the hollow of Japan's hand. What is of the highest political importance, however, is that as soon as the Changchun-Kirin railway in Central Manchuria is completed it will be suddenly extended into Korea, linking with another Japanese railway there, and the usual administrative police control enforced. The effect of this will be to draw a ruler-line through Manchuria and surrender to almost open Japanese dominion all Manchuria south of the Sungari river. When this is done it will be possible to throw off the mask, as Japan does not contemplate going farther north than this. Her strategic position on the continent will be so strong, that acting from the three points Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalien — she can so menace Russia as to put her on the defensive in twenty-four hours. Russia in the Far East is therefore in her hands. Secure, therefore, in Northern Asia, Japan will merely consolidate her position there, whilst she turns her activities elsewhere in China.

All this will be done before 1915 — Japan's future conduct being regulated by the developments which may come subsequent to the expiry of the present term of the British alliance.

Once Japan menaced China both from the north and the south, the statesmen of Peking might be forced to make some hard and fast arrangement which would place their growing armed strength at the disposal of Tokyo, to save them from worse reprisals. For it is an unfortunate fact that Eastern peoples are largely indifferent to outer political problems so long as it is not a question of interfering with their daily food, and so long as a loss of power does not present itself to their eyes in some tangible form — such as an armed occupation. They are therefore content to leave the supreme direction in the hands of a few, who are thus able to dispose of the destinies of the many by doing what may seem temporarily expedient, but which is really criminal. Japan's star will guide her and tell her when to act; and when she does act — if things are left as they are at present — she will be as successful as people always are who leave nothing to chance.

Now, inasmuch as the pronouncement which has just been made in regard to China's foreign policy may be misunderstood, it is necessary to be more explicit. In brief, we have to show how in the case of China, Japan, who is the present enemy, can really be metamorphosed, through European indifference, into Japan, the friend. We have already said that the millions of China are content to leave the supreme direction of affairs in the hands of a few men, so long as provincial interests — that is, interests connected with the daily lives of the millions — are not directly touched.

As is well known, the government of China embodies in a very pronounced and successful form that strange theocratic principle which, while it has been often attempted in Europe, has never been anything in

practice but an attempt. To the matter-of-fact and unimaginative European mind, the divine right of kings has always been something of an absurdity, in spite of the vigorous efforts which have been made from time to time in various countries to proclaim and enforce it. Not so in China, or in Japan, where, of course, it is only the Chinese model which has been copied. In China the Emperor has always been, in a very strict sense, the High Priest of the nation; living in seclusion; with five thousand years of reputed authority behind him; worshipping at the altars of Heaven as the proclaimed intermediary between the unseen powers and his innumerable subjects; and obeyed not by virtue of his armed forces but by virtue of his virtue. The numberless revolutions and rebellions of which Chinese history is full are all, from the Eastern point of view, exactly similar to the Satsuma Rebellion in Japan, which occurred exactly one generation ago (1877); they were all revolts against bad advisers, but not against the constituted imperial authority, which is always sacrosanct. By one of those ingenious fictions, which are the delight of the human mind when confronted by an insurmountable difficulty, to destroy an emperor in China is not to destroy his authority, which simply passes like a cloak from his shoulders to the shoulders of a more vigorous successor. The authority of the emperors is never weakened even by such violent acts.

The present dynasty in China is not so much a dynasty of usurpers, as a dynasty sprung from a small nation of conquerors who fought their way from Manchuria to Peking, and who succeeded in imposing their rule over the length and breadth of China only

after a century of intermittent warfare. To-day it is very important to note this fact:— that from the moment Nurhachu, the original founder of the Manchu Empire in Manchuria,¹ began his contest with the Ming sovereigns of China, to the time when all China openly acknowledged the Manchu sway, nearly a century was consumed.

The Manchu race, when they conquered China, were under no delusions regarding the nature of their prize. They knew that, as in the case of most political conquests in civilised times, their success sprang from a variety of causes besides their military prowess. They therefore took steps to cement their hold on China both by the threat of force and by a most extensive use of the principle of compromise. On the one hand the Manchu and Mongol hordes and their Chinese allies were reorganised into eight great Banners or corps — with Peking as their focal point — and strong garrisons were distributed strategically over the length and breadth of China; on the other hand the

¹ The Japanese have chosen an excellent means for familiarising their troops with Manchuria. The South Manchurian line is guarded by a division of field troops. Every year a change in the division is made. Not long ago the 10th Field Division was withdrawn and the 11th Division sent from Japan to guard the line. Three years after the war the 3rd Division appeared in South Manchuria for the purpose of becoming acquainted with the possible future of the theatre of war. Such a change of troops on the railway has an enormous educative significance. The troops familiarise themselves with the locality, the climatic conditions, the language, and the manners and customs of the inhabitants. All this is obtained gratuitously and does not infringe the international treaties; whilst, finally, the idea becomes generally accepted among a population knowing little of foreign affairs, that the destinies of Manchuria and Japan are inextricably mixed.

new Manchu dynasty reinstated all Chinese civil officials, and thus left the ancient system of government — save for a few necessary modifications — entirely untouched. What was therefore done which was different from anything which had been done before in China, was to superimpose on the old civil system a fully-organised military system which directly represented the new authority of the Throne.

Until the nineteenth century was well advanced — that is, during a period of some one hundred and fifty years — this new dual system worked well enough. The Chinese, with their vast knowledge of the weaknesses of human nature — a knowledge as great as that displayed in mediæval times by Macchiavelli, who lived under precisely the same political conditions — were able, by pandering to the purely human side of the Manchus, to regain much of the substance, whilst to their nominal masters was left the very complete shadow, of power. But no sooner had a new factor — the external or foreign factor — begun to exercise much influence, than the great decay which five generations of dominion had already brought about became very evident. The Manchus, confronted like the Japanese of the seventeenth century with a force which they despised and yet feared, made the most strenuous efforts to maintain the policy of splendid isolation which had stood them in such good stead — knowing well that the splendour sprang from the isolation and nothing else.

But their efforts were unavailing. Gradually but irresistibly the foreign factor became more and more important, as every armed collision showed its inherent strength. Passionate resistance and subtle diplomacy were alike useless; and so with the grand climax of the

Boxer year—occurring most appropriately in the very last year of the nineteenth century—it became clear that in the twentieth century some new *ausgleich* would have to be arranged between the people of China and the Manchu sovereigns and their supporting clans—if the semblance of an undivided empire was to be maintained.

Now, since all Eastern precedents and procedures had long been exhausted, since no formula could be devised to meet the situation, there was but one thing to do; to turn to the West, and to borrow from the West forms so well-tested by time that their very adoption would give to China a secular Palladium impervious to the rudest onslaughts. The coming of constitutional or parliamentary government in China was proclaimed by the late Empress-Dowager, and as a first step the organisation of Provincial Assemblies, designed to give organic unity to each province, was soon proceeded with. Already these bodies have met in each provincial capital and have debated the questions of the hour with much commonsense and skill. With constitutional government and provincial decentralisation no longer vague possibilities, but practical certainties, it has been too confidently expected by the Court of Peking that all outer difficulties would infallibly be smoothed away. That something more than mere socio-political reform is necessary to regain the ground lost by decades of indifference is, however, amply clear to impartial observers. The network of hampering treaties and protocols, with their accompanying indemnities, indeed so enmeshes modern China, that without active support from the interested Powers it is physically impossible for this great country to dream of standing erect, and

proudly resuming the position to which the genius of the people entitles her.¹

But there is another difficulty. The respect in which the present dynasty is held in China varies greatly geographically. It may be said, roughly, that the respect is at its maximum in Moukden, where the dynasty had its rise, and at its minimum in Canton, which was the last capital to surrender to the conquerors in the seventeenth century. That is to say, the respect is high in the north and low in the south. But this by no means covers the whole case. The respect is high in the more northerly latitudes of the Chinese Empire proper (that is, excluding for the moment so-called colonial dominions such as Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet), because this Northern Chinese population has long been associated with conquerors having a mixed Turanian origin, and is therefore more in sympathy with

¹ This argument is not as illogical as it may seem to those who do not know the inner aspects of the Chinese imbroglio. For it may be said, summarily, that the attempted Boxer Revolution of 1900 complicated the Chinese polity to an incredible extent by throwing huge indemnities on the country, whilst in the decade which has since elapsed no concerted attempt has been made by the Powers, who thus penalised a weak government for weak complicity, to widen the foundations of the authority of the central government—and thus to erect a safeguard against not only internal disorder but external complications. That authority can only be widened by giving to China the power of levying increased revenues, and those increased revenues can only be found in indirect taxation—*i.e.*, by an increase in the Customs Tariff. The series of treaties signed by some of the Powers, notably by England, America and Japan, known as the Shanghai Treaties, actually provided for such an increase; but these treaties remain dead letters until identical instruments have been signed by all the Powers. In other words, it is the direct inaction of Europe in China to which may be attributed much of the present grave menace in Eastern Asia.

men who, springing from approximately the same climatic zone, have the same outlook on life. But even in Peking it is a noticeable fact, owing to the necessary narrow nationalism, that there is much jealousy between Manchus and Chinese, largely because the former clans still form a favoured subnationality, enjoying special privileges and emoluments in all walks of life. Though numberless edicts have of recent years sought nominally to abolish the distinction between the ordinary Manchu and the ordinary Chinese, all Bannermen or clansmen still draw their monthly allowances in silver and rice; all are specially favoured in the matter of official employment; and the Manchu princes and Imperial clansmen, of whom there are many thousands, are landowners on a very large scale, and occupy indeed a position more irritating to the proletariat than the land-owning peers of Great Britain and Ireland.

This land-owning on a large scale, it is true, embraces only Northern China; but where it ceases another irritation takes its place. The rich Yangtze valley was laid under tribute by the first Manchu conquerors in a very practical and effective manner—the granary of China was called upon to contribute regular yearly quotas of rice and other grain sufficient to feed the entire corps of the Manchu Banners resident in Peking, as well as all their families and dependents, whilst the Tartar provincial garrisons scattered over the Empire were specially provided for by a species of matricular contributions. In addition, every district, having special fame in the production of some luxury or another, was burdened with an Imperial factory, the aim of the Manchus being to provide for themselves specially, so that they might live—by direct contribution,

and not by indirect taxation — on the best things in the great land which they had conquered. Finally, such a province as Kwangtung province, with its unruly provincial capital of Canton, because it was rich and possessed a highly-industrious and skilful population has always been more heavily taxed in proportion than any other province; it has always been harshly treated and looked upon with open suspicion; and Cantonese officials have been kept as much as possible from the highest offices.

It will thus be seen that certain regions in China have direct causes of complaint against the Manchus. Thus the Manchu conquest, although now as old as the Norman Conquest was in England at the time of Creçy and Poitiers, has not succeeded in effecting anything like that fusion of interests which existed between Normans and Saxons in the days of the Black Prince.

Nor does all this take into account the very peculiar regionalism which exists in China, and which is something more than the mere “provincial feeling” of which so much is written. Regionalism is carried to such lengths in South China — especially in Kwangtung province — that there villages are linked into clans, which are again subdivided against themselves into “family-names”; and the latter have preserved from ancient times the right of private war against one another, which the territorial officials are to-day still powerless to arrest. Thus whilst the whole population of China is united in its theocratic beliefs; in its love of the family life and family system; in its ethics, customs and precedents; in its dress and its symbols — that is to say, whilst in one sense nationality has never been better defined than it is in China, the feeling of

nationality is no more advanced than it was in Europe in the middle ages, when love of district or town — or at most province — took the place of the present feeling of race.

In these circumstances the peculiarity of the general problem of Eastern Asia becomes more than striking — it is unparalleled in the unique diversity of its component factors.

For what can the Manchu *régime* really oppose to this remarkable regionalism in China? Simply a prestige which is always careful to avail itself very bounteously of the principle of compromise, and the exercise of a remarkable political instinct. The handful of Manchus in Peking — the Manchu population in and around the capital is certainly under one million persons — fills a very large number of metropolitan posts; dominates the Grand Council; and is careful to send to the provinces not only the so-called Tartar Generals (who command Manchu provincial garrisons and rank with Viceroys) but a large proportion of other high functionaries. The highest Chinese officials, be they Grand Councillors, Grand Secretaries, or Viceroys, know not only that it is bad policy to oppose measures espoused by the Manchu party, but that such opposition at once marks their downfall. Manchu rings exist in Peking, both in the Palace and outside the Palace, which are largely dominated not only by Princes of the reigning House, but by the "Iron-capped" Princes and other high personages; whilst another important factor is the influence of the consorts of defunct sovereigns, all of whom are immured in the Forbidden City. So many things have to be considered, so many parties conciliated before any action is taken, that when

action finally comes, it is action which is by no means final, since everyone believes that it may be indefinitely postponed by astute lobbying. There are those who do not hesitate to say that the success of much of the recent Japanese diplomacy is due primarily to their appreciation of the old political principle of corruption.

Now the establishment of Provincial Assemblies which do not, strictly speaking, possess legislative powers, but are merely deliberative and advisory bodies, was primarily devised both as a concession to provincial feeling and to assist the work of the Central Government in reorganising the disordered finances of the country. It has been deemed necessary as the forerunner of so-called parliamentary government; and as a forerunner it has not been unsuccessful. Yet the financial part remains unsatisfactory. For although the Peking Ministry of Finance has been making very real attempts to discover what the revenue of China really is, and to draft a Budget, scant success has so far crowned these efforts. It is to-day very generally recognised in China by every class of people that without more money there can be no really effective army or navy, and no improvement of the general internal or international condition. The Provincial Assemblies, by carrying through provincial schemes of taxation, and by making their own independent estimates, may be able to check the illegal levies of territorial officials, and may possibly secure a general and regular audit of accounts. They should thus be of material assistance to the Central Government at Peking. But on the other hand, each body will have its own ideas; each will instinctively oppose Viceroys and Governors,

because they represent a different principle; each will strive for more power. And since, in strict conformity with that principle of equipoise which runs all through the government of China, provinces are linked together in nearly every case in pairs under a single Viceroy — so that he may be able to throw the weight of one province against the other — it will need very few complications to make the confusion worse confounded. And if the plan of summoning a general Parliament in 1917 is carried through, there will be yet one more discordant element added to the existing ones.

For at bottom, the Manchu House, like the House of Romanoff, must from its nature be intolerant of a reform that weakens and finally extinguishes the divine right of kings. The democratic character of the Chinese people will never tolerate a mock constitution such as the Japanese constitution, which has brought into being a pliant and corrupt Diet, the perfunctory sessions of which are simply attended by the members to endorse measures which they are neither willing nor powerful enough to oppose. And since the Chinese people are so radically different from the Japanese people, they will never be afraid to rise in tumultuous masses against their rulers, thus further weakening China internationally, and preparing developments which all instinctively dread.

This long digression into the real condition of China should establish clearly not only (1) that the country is not ripe for adopting that secular policy which alone secures the safety of a State when menaced from abroad — the policy which flows naturally from a belief in the doctrine of force and a capacity of enforcing it; but (2) that no matter how many divisions of land troops China

may succeed in organising and arming during the next decade or two, and no matter how many units of a coast-guard fleet she may slowly assemble at strategic points along her two thousand miles of vulnerability, the adoption of such a secular policy would be the very measure which Japan would welcome as an invitation to intervene.

For Japan, with her powerful battle-fleet to insure the safety of her transports, can concentrate her strength rapidly wherever she wills in Eastern Asia, and is thus in a position to dominate not only South Manchuria, as she does to-day, but any part of China which may be easily attacked by naval landings.

The effect of such strategy would be immediate and dramatic. As in olden days, provinces would care for their own safety before caring for the safety of Peking and the dynasty; and once more it would be amply demonstrated that the theocratic idea, even when tinctured with Western constitutionalism, is no secular safeguard. To give real political unity to China; to allow China to become a Power in the European sense of the word, requires other measures than those which are now being tentatively essayed. And the first condition which must be attained is that China shall find a real master — a man of iron, who from his very nature will know how to weld together the latent strength of a vast democracy and make it as of steel. Until that man can be found, China's only hope lies without — that is, in the international leverage she can exert by the employment of astute diplomacy. It is the Powers — the white Powers — who alone can save her; not because of any high altruistic motives on their part, but for reasons of expediency. No man of commonsense can doubt that

a further Japanese advance and a further Chinese decline would be an international calamity.

Now it is certain that, looking at matters broadly, the one white Power which during the first term of the present century will act as the greatest restraint on Japan will not be England, the friend, or even Russia, the old enemy — it will be the United States. The completion of the Panama Canal is destined to have the most far-reaching results on the future progress of the world, and especially on the progress of the Pacific; but the actual rôle which the United States shall play in the development of Eastern Asia, in spite of many prognostications, must for a long interval remain totally undecided. And, as this opinion may seem to clash with many ideas which have recently grown up, it becomes necessary here to make certain explanatory comments.

Three facts in regard to the United States have long been amply clear to all students of those cognate subjects, politics, statistics, and geography.

The first and most important is that the Pacific Ocean is really far too vast an ocean to be dominated by any Power, or any combination of Powers, acting from the coasts of North America.¹ Just as English

¹ With regard to this grave question — the geographical position of the United States — it is singularly unfortunate that only in such monumental works as Captain Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, are the true facts properly exhibited. This great American authority is never weary of telling his countrymen of the present immense maritime weakness of the United States. Such phrases as these abound in the work named: "The position of the United States upon the two oceans would be a source of great weakness or a cause of enormous expense,

naval experts know that the United States cannot wage a naval war in European waters against England, owing to the distance which separates American naval bases from attackable points — 3,000 miles — so should it to-day be as generally known that it is virtually a naval impossibility to protect the Philippines or to menace Japan by using America as a base. The Philippines are over 7,000 miles away from American waters, Japan 5,000 miles. Even the conversion of the Hawaiian Islands into naval *points d'appuis* only reduces these vast distances by some 2,000 miles. So far as the present maritime (naval) problem in Eastern Asia is concerned, America then is a negligible quantity, save within the steaming-radius of the Hawaii to San Francisco naval bases, unless she undertakes to make a second Vladivostock in some land-locked harbour of

had it a large commerce on both coasts." . . . "If a Central American Canal be made and fulfil the hopes of its builders, the Caribbean will be changed from a terminus . . . into one of the great highways of the world. Along this path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interest of the other great nations, the European nations, close along our shores, as they have never been before. With this it will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international complications." . . . "The United States has not that shield of defensive strength behind which time can be gained to develop its reserve of strength. As for a seafaring population adequate to her possible needs, where is it?"

Though the twenty years which have elapsed since these passages were written have brought changes in some sense beneficial to America, two new factors have entered into the problem which more than offset the advantages which have thus accrued. These two factors are, of course, the possession of the Philippines and the growth of Japan as a World-Power — rendering the position of the United States as a naval Power on the Pacific more parlous than ever.

the Philippines. And it is just this that her experts have cautiously decided against doing.

The second vital fact — the fact which duly impresses all close observers — is that at least during the present century American energies will be amply engaged in exploiting the astounding resources contained in a land having the great area of three and a half million square miles and capable of supporting, at a conservative estimate, six hundred million souls. From its very nature, then, a country such as the United States, which is really not one country but forty-five countries united in brotherly bonds, may well be temporarily excused from vigorous and direct overseas activities. It may even be excused from understanding the exact nature of the outer problems which lie across the broad waters of the Pacific, when the tremendous nature of home-problems is properly measured. For there is work for generations and generations, before intensive activities need really be supplemented by extensive activities. And even should later a real imperialism burst into flames in the United States, it will be far more likely to carry expansion southward than westward. In other words South America must inevitably be exploited more and more by North America; and though, for sentimental reasons, a vigorous Asiatic policy may remain a plank in every Presidential platform because of the possession of the Philippines, it is still possible that some day the Philippines and the necessity of playing a rôle in Eastern Asia may actually be looked upon as a drag and a hindrance, when set against the wondrous riches of South America.

The third fact — which is merely a reiteration in a new form of the second fact — is that the Pacific is

emphatically the back-door to the United States, because the Atlantic is so emphatically the front-door. It is not only the configuration of the coast, and the great barrier of the Rocky Mountains, which are responsible for this; history and the call of white man's blood must always keep it so. Therefore, no matter how much the population living in the States of the Pacific slope may increase, the strength of the American nation will always lie nearer the Atlantic frontage than the Pacific frontage; and consequently the political distance between extreme Eastern Asia and extreme Western America cannot be much diminished. The three facts just dealt with are nothing less than in the nature of three grave disabilities to the taking of any forceful action in the Far East.

How then, in these circumstances, comes it that the writer still holds America to be the greatest restraint on Japan? The answer is peculiar in that it is illogical. It rests, indeed, largely on those curious things which are justly termed the imponderables of politics.

The fact that the United States represents in the popular mind the supreme expression of a triumphant democracy — a free State totally detached from all European rivalries — is everywhere a very great factor in the movements of world-politics, but nowhere more so than in the politics of Eastern Asia, where this belief postulates a liberty of action such as no other predominant white Power, forced to give first and last attention to the European situation and to the European balance of power, can command. On America the right rests to pose as a truly disinterested party in all foreign politics, and thus to rally behind her not only the public opinion of other

countries, but the active support of a majority of the European Powers. For these Powers, however much they may disregard all so-called moral and ethical considerations in their own local European matters, are forced, when it comes to larger general issues, on which the limelight of the world's collective sense of responsibility is turned, to act in agreement with the principles of the higher morality, and to support, by word if not by deed, the call of international honour.

Furthermore, the United States, because of her kinship with England, can count in a very marked way on the tacit support of those English democracies of the Southern Pacific which some day will inevitably be called upon to play a rôle no less remarkable than that of the United States. For it is necessary to point out that Australia, and especially New Zealand, are fast becoming almost as much American in sentiment as they are English in appearance. Because of their geographical situation, their eyes are perforce directed not solely in one direction but in two: and where their hopes and fears are not realised by one country, instinctively they must turn to the other.

Herein lies one of those imponderables which are of such weight in the affairs of the world. For, being morally supported in this intangible manner, the Washington Government, though as a matter of fact it is strategically ill-placed to dominate the entire Pacific, can yet almost venture to dominate it by a sort of moral force, having its origin in the fact that to check the rise of an unjust hegemony in Eastern Asia, it silently calls into existence another hegemony based also on colour and blood. Furthermore, the influence which this

attitude at once exerts in China is so marked that it is equivalent to lessening by one-half the very great difficulties of the general geographical situation. Finally, it must never be forgotten that the immense and growing wealth of the United States — which in any just cause would permit the expenditure of an untold number of millions, without injury — has such an effect on national imaginations that though the transmutation of dollars into Dreadnoughts is no lightning alchemist's act but a slow and laborious working of system, the threat of effective military action looms up like some Gargantuan spectre, which may be materialised into a giant in the flesh by the united will of a sovereign people. The completion of the Panama Canal will accentuate these various factors, and may be counted upon to do for America what fifty years ago the cutting of the Suez Canal did for England. Thus against three stern facts can be set three modifying imponderables.

Of the four other World-Powers — England, Russia, Germany and France — no single one has anything like the same general liberty of action which America's priceless geographical situation confers on her. Germany and France are indeed of such minor importance in Eastern Asia that they need not be considered in any light save as possible allies and supporters of some given policy. Even Russia, which one day may be a supreme Power, is not only admittedly on the defensive in the Far East — the Japanese war having crippled her for a generation — but is troubled by a new complication which did not exist six years ago during her conflict with Japan.

Because she is first and last a land Power, Russia's European frontiers are more valuable to her than her

Asiatic frontiers; and this at last Japanese statesmen have fully and completely realised. It is impossible to disguise any longer the importance which the Austrian Government has suddenly assumed in the eyes of the Japanese Government; or to hide the fact that the *pourparlers* which have been carried on in Vienna for several years past, have finally ended in the tacit, if unwritten, agreement that in certain eventualities Japan may be able to count on a very serious Austrian concentration on Russia's western frontiers, which will effectively prevent the great massing of Russian troops in the Far East that the doubling of the Siberian railway would theoretically permit. In other words, Japan, having stripped from Russia all possibility of playing the rôle of a sea Power in any part of the world by her entire destruction of Russia's fleets, is now prepared to meet her as a purely land Power, and to check her land-hunger forcibly by securing that any serious Russian movement in the Far East will produce a reflex action of the most redoubtable kind in the Far West. So long as Japan can arrange that Russia's traditional foe in the Balkans — Austria — is prepared to regard any offensive Russian movement as part of a general policy which might gravely affect the general balance of power in the Near East, she is safe from any war of *revanche*, and safe even from any Russian interruption, no matter what her own policy in China may be. No better tribute than this could be paid to the far-sightedness of the statesmen of Tokyo.

This development, then, highly significant in itself, becomes even more significant when considered in relation to those other factors which have already been analysed. For the situation virtually comes to this:

that since neither Germany, nor France, nor yet Russia, are for the time being independent Powers in Asia, no barrier exists to hinder the execution of the widest ambitions of Japan in Eastern Asia, except the barrier formed by the English-speaking world of sea-peoples. This is so very remarkable, in view of the part which Anglo-Saxondom has consistently played towards Japan in the past, that it should be most seriously and deeply pondered over.

For from this proposition naturally flows another proposition: that the English-speaking peoples may one day have to secure the position over the length and breadth of the Pacific by combining their newly-formed naval strength on the Pacific, or they will cease to be a factor in Eastern Asia, and their destinies elsewhere be most seriously affected in consequence.

For it must be accepted as something very definite in the sphere of practical politics that Japan will have to declare her hand against China before 1923 — the year when the lease of the Port Arthur territory expires, and the whole Manchurian position begins theoretically to return to what it once was. If China is forced, owing to the short-sighted diplomacy of those for whom the question has really supreme importance, to make common cause with Japan as a *pis aller*, then it may be accepted as inevitable that in the course of time there will be created a *mare clausum*, which will extend from the island of Saghalien down to Cochin-China and Siam, including all the island groups, and the shores of which will be openly hostile to the white man. The world of Eastern Asia, with its vast population of 600 millions of men, should it ever be effectively controlled from one centre, Tokyo, may be counted on deliberately

to impose the same restrictions on the white man as the white man is beginning to impose on the yellow man wherever there is danger of close contact. That must be accepted as something absolute. And since there will be no danger from the competition of white workmen, but rather from the white man's ships, the white's man merchants, his inventions, his produce — it will be these which will be subjected to humiliating conditions, in order to restore to the Far East that old-time self-sufficiency which the white man's cannon blew away in the nineteenth century. This is, alas, no idle dream: it is the definite and ambitious goal of a far-seeing and ambitious nation. The pernicious doctrine of Protection having given to all modern States a pseudo-scientific weapon with which to deal with their competitors as tyrannically as the masters of the old world did with weapons of war, it is not a very far cry from tariffs on goods to tariffs and restrictions on foreign shipping, on foreign merchants, on everything foreign — restrictions which by imposing vast and unequal burdens on the activities of aliens will soon totally destroy such activities. Great, indeed, is the power of that principle, which to be rightly called is not protection but destruction.

With one last word we have done. It is one of the great political misfortunes of the day that numbers of people, who really know nothing about the question, are constantly prophesying one of two evils in regard to this pregnant yellow world — either that a great yellow horde will one day sweep across Asia and inundate Europe; or that the yellow man will finally swamp the markets of the world with his cheap products, and thus bring in another way the same ruin

to all. Neither of these two things can ever come about; they are merely the dreams of those who will never understand involved issues. But what can very easily happen is that the federation of Eastern Asia and the yellow races will be finally arranged in such a manner as to exclude the white man and his commerce more completely than anyone yet dreams of. This is equivalent to saying that the entire economic situation throughout the world is already in very real danger of being radically altered — and the present balance of power entirely upset — from the mere fact that Eastern Asia, led by Japan, may step by step erect barriers so as not only to restrain the white man, but to adopt a politico-commercial retaliatory policy of the severest character. This is the policy which Japan has already instituted in Formosa and Korea with such conspicuous success; this is the policy which she is beginning to carry out in hidden ways in Southern Manchuria. It is a hard and dangerous policy to fight, for it expresses itself in such pseudo-European terms as tariffs, police, preferential treatment, shipping and industrial monopolies, and many other ingenious devices which are covered by a specious phraseology borrowed from the West and invented by the West.

There is one means of combating this. That means lies in having it henceforth accepted as a general political maxim among all the Powers not only that China's complete independence must be secured, but that China must ultimately be made stronger than Japan.¹ Ever since the dawn of history in the Far East

¹ Lest the reader imagines that such suggestions are merely Utopian and impossible of realisation, it may be affirmed in absolute terms that if only the same fiscal consideration was shown to

China has been the dominant Power. Ever since the dawn of history she has used that power over tributary States not unfairly or harshly. But ever since Japan has taken her place there has been nothing but complication following complication, until it has become absolutely essential to secure a return to political conditions which lie rooted in what is sound because it is natural. The goal of "China stronger than Japan"

China as is shown to-day to Turkey for the most sordid political reasons, in a very few years China would be a vastly different country internationally. Whereas in Turkey, in order to give effect to the so-called kilometric guarantees in the new railway building programme, customs duties are to be increased, in China the old 5 per cent. tariff of the Treaty of Tientsin — drawn up more than half a century ago — is still insisted on by the Powers. Though she was the first to agree by negotiation to a change to a 12½ per cent. tariff, for obscure reasons England has left the Mackay Treaty a complete dead-letter for eight years, and in 1909 actually opposed China's demand for a general Treaty-Power Conference to deal with this and other matters. Similarly in the matter of the crushing Boxer Indemnities of 1900 — amounting to £65,000,000 sterling, but actually, owing to an archaic sinking fund system, calling for a net payment of over £200,000,000 in 39 years — China is being deliberately crippled, and not only her purchasing power greatly curtailed but her power of regeneration most seriously interfered with. Commonsense alone should suggest that a consolidation of all Chinese indebtedness to Europe, and a generous treatment, would be the cheapest form of avoiding fresh liabilities to Eastern Asia. But, save for the United States, which has remitted some of the Boxer indemnity, no attempt has been made to ameliorate Chinese finance in ways that are perfectly plain, easy and legitimate. This folly is nothing short of a direct invitation to the forces of disorder to mass and strike. British Liberalism, before it is too late, would do well to inquire closely into these matters, so as to realise finally how true British interests have been betrayed and the insolubility of the Asiatic problem increased — at a time when the utmost care should have been lavished upon creating real international safeguards.

should be kept in sight; expediency demands that that goal be now approached. For, if it is not, the writer ventures to prophesy that in less than two decades America will cease to own the Philippines, and Japan will obtain the acknowledged hegemony of the Yellow World.

CHAPTER III

THE BROWN WORLD OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE NEAR EAST

THE problem of the Middle East and the Near East is from every point of view very different indeed from the distant problem of Eastern Asia which has just been considered. This second great problem includes India, Afghanistan, Persia, Arabistan, Asia Minor, and last, but not least, Egypt.¹ It possesses such peculiar historical interest that merely to mention it brings uppermost in

¹ The whole question of the Middle East and the Near East is far too tangled to be intelligibly discussed in a few pages, and the writer therefore begs for the indulgence of his readers. The immense region stretching from the Hindu Kush to Palestine and the Mediterranean shores is politically one region — even more to-day than it has been in the past—in spite of the amazing racial diversity of its inhabitants, and in spite of the divisions into which it is academically divided. In Asia to-day there are only two problems — the problem of the Far East, by which is understood every problem from Singapore to Kamschatka, and the problem of the Nearer East, by which should be understood every problem from India to the Mediterranean. But whereas on the Far East there is a copious and accurate literature giving all possible information, on the Nearer East there is no good work dealing with these problems as one whole, and much misunderstanding consequently exists. Some book is urgently required which will make good this deficiency.

the minds of men a hundred prejudices which will not die. For this is the region which has always been in the popular mind "the East"; this is the region which has immemorial associations with Europe, since for twenty-five centuries it has been Europe's active rival; this is the region which long before the white man had dreamed of conquering the ocean — when the open-sea routes were unknown — had the most intimate relations with Europe. There is thus in this problem an entirely new set of factors — or perhaps it would be better to say, an entirely new marshalling of opposing forces — which are in themselves so complex that even the most optimistic arise from their analysis in some despondency.

For whereas in the Further East, because of the new nationalism which has so magically grown up, and also (let us frankly confess it) because of masterful Japan, the white man is now willing to admit that he must abandon his territorial ambitions and confine himself strictly to trade and industry and to preserving the vaguely-defined prestige which he acquired in a simpler age — in India, in Central Asia, and in all the regions adjacent to the Near East, he still boldly remains a conqueror in possession of vast stretches of valuable territory; a conqueror who has no intention of lightly surrendering his conquests, and who indeed sees in every attempt to modify the old order of things a most hateful and unjustifiable revolt which must at all costs be repressed. This is so absolutely true that no candid person will be inclined to dispute it.

The spirit of the Crusaders may thus be said still to linger in those latitudes which, to give geographical and political cohesion, are here broadly named the Middle and Near East; and, to use a somewhat

dangerous but illuminating figure of speech, it may even be maintained that to-day, as of old, the white man and the Cross remain as blindly opposed to the brown man and Islamism, Hinduism and what these creeds postulate, as the most uncompromising bigot could desire. The opposing forces, then, are ranged opposite one another, as of yore, in battle array; and though the present and future generations may not be as warlike as the valiant generations which have passed away, still, even in this era of enlightenment, many of the same old motives actuate both sides, and an ineradicable suspicion tinges their relations.

It is therefore only natural that among Englishmen, who are of necessity far more acutely interested in this special problem than other nations — because they command the Suez route, and are indeed the arbiters of the Near and Middle East — the newly-kindled national spirit in India and Egypt now expressing itself in various ways should be looked upon almost as a traitorous conspiracy to defraud a proud race of their rightful inheritance. These lands, in spite of all political fictions, are governed by right of conquest; they represent much brave blood and good treasure spent in the past; their tenure, indeed, is sanctified by a sort of holy decree acquired by the right of prescription. To dispute such a decree is a revolt. Yet, even whilst this is so, it has to be noted that in neighbouring regions, such as Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, a certain easy-going political cynicism, which the British often display in foreign affairs, permits the adoption of an entirely different attitude, because in these particular instances independence serves temporarily to adjust the balance of power, and to postpone the final day of reckoning.

Thus inconsistency is to-day as remarkable a feature in the treatment of the brown world as it is in the treatment of the yellow world; and here again, as in Eastern Asia, the English race stands confessed as the most inconsistent of all.

Now, seeing that the strength of a people resides more in their blind prejudices than in anything else — since prejudices are judgments formed without due examination, and must therefore be the judgments which the vast majority of men form and retain to their death — it should be frankly admitted that the individual who refuses to see things as they still appear to the mass of his countrymen, and who simply argues academically on all so-called colour questions without considering those vital prejudices, is not worthy of being read. The most important factor of the day in the regions under discussion is the white man's prejudice against new ideas — against the very ideas his presence has served to inculcate — as well as his firm determination to hold tightly to what his fathers acquired. It may be sad to confess, and yet it is true, that it is the figure of the ancient Crusader, striking down with his heavy mace, or great two-handed sword, the dark infidel who opposed his righteous progress, which is the proper and only figure to keep always before one, even in this enlightened twentieth century, when considering the conflict of colour in the Near East and Middle East. Too much insistence cannot be laid on this fact. This is still openly the English ideal, no matter what may be said to the contrary; it is the ideal which can be seen peeping out of all English literature, almost without exception, in a sort of deathless pride of race and colour; and though, of course, Russians, Frenchmen,

Spaniards, Italians, Germans and others, since they are far less interested, pretend to view it all in a detached and somewhat amused manner — pointing to the Englishman as a land and sea-pirate who affirms that he is a law unto himself — they have only to be badly scratched (that is, to be actively opposed by other men of colour) to express much the same ideas. That is the lesson of Turkestan, of Morocco, of Abyssinia, of Shantung — the one important difference, perhaps, being that whilst the Englishman at heart still believes that he is self-sufficient, the Continental nations of Europe are apt to proclaim the inherent solidarity of the white races and to insist that the day has come when all white men should openly unite.

It can therefore be stated in general terms that no matter how much it may be possible for Europeans, and especially for Americans, to view remoter Eastern Asia in a new way, and to admit that new ideals have become quite permissible in the case of the astute yellow man, in the older portions of Asia, which have for so many centuries been in contact with the white man, no such tolerance need be expected for years to come. In these regions the white man has been so long taught to believe that it is a question of everything or nothing, that he can believe nothing else. Either, then, he is to remain undisputed master where he now stands entrenched, or he is to be beaten into ignominious retreat. That is the present position.

In these peculiar circumstances it is with something of the start of the sleeper who wakes from grim nightmare that one turns to John Stuart Mill — that one passes from the eminently practical to the eminently philosophic point of view — and gazes blankly at one

of his most remarkable political pronouncements. For no matter how much it may be desirable to hold the contrary, it is self-evident that what is fundamentally true of one mass of human beings must be equally true of another mass, irrespective of colour or creed, or else it cannot be true at all. Fundamental political doctrines do not depend on geography for their accuracy; they are either universally true or universally false.¹ Now John Stuart Mill said: "The government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality — but such a thing as government of one people by another does not and cannot exist." It is well to ponder over this dictum before going any farther, since round it revolve all the really great present-day political and racial problems. Did the great intellect which compressed into this burning sentence the very essence of politics

¹ "The actions of bad men produce only temporary evil, the actions of good men only temporary good; and eventually the good and the evil altogether subside, are neutralised by subsequent generations, absorbed by the incessant movement of future ages. But the discoveries of great men never leave us; they are immortal, they contain those eternal truths which survive the shock of empires, outlive the struggles of rival creeds, and witness the decay of successive religions. All these have their different measures and their different standards; one set of opinions for one age, another set for another. They pass away like a dream; they are as the fabric of a vision, which leaves not a rack behind. The discoveries of genius alone remain; it is to them we owe all that we now have; they are for all ages and all things; never young, and never old, they bear the seeds of their own life; they flow on in a perennial and undying stream; they are essentially cumulative, and, giving birth to the additions which they subsequently receive, they thus influence the most distant posterity, and after the lapse of centuries produce more effect than they were able to do even at the moment of their promulgation." — Buckle: *History of Civilization*, Chap. IV.

imply that India has really no such a thing as a government—that Russia has been only a barbarous conqueror of the Khanates—that Egypt is only enslaved? Did he mean that it is mere insolence to prostitute a term which has an almost divine sound, and which should be as precious to every people as the altars of its religious faith? Did he mean that it is a foolish dream to conceive it possible for one people permanently to rule over another people? He did mean it, and he was quite right in meaning it; for no matter how flattering it may be to national pride to believe that the reverse is possible, it is really quite impossible. In the matter of government there is no such arcanum as obscurantists pretend. It is absolutely certain that either a people governs itself, or that people has no real government at all, but only a system of provisional administration which must instinctively be looked upon as hateful, and which because it exists encourages men to dream of what they call liberty. It would be well for nations who have proclaimed so often that death is preferable to loss of liberty, to know that in such sentiments there is no monopoly. They are common to all humanity; the meanest and least heroic people in the world instinctively realise that in the last analysis liberty is synonymous with life.

Now, admitting these things, it becomes clear that in the proper sense of the word neither India nor Egypt has any real government, but only a system of provisional administration backed up by alien bayonets and by a traditional fear; that the possessions of Russia in Central Asia are similarly situated; that France in North Africa is just as unhappily circumstanced; and that minor Powers, such as Spain and Italy, have actually

shown that this is so by drawing back, after attempting to copy their greater rivals. That a growing and perilous agitation is fast spreading among those who are so governed, is only logical.

For sufficient time has now elapsed since the great conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for the coloured man in these particular regions to realise that the domination which he was beginning to look upon as natural is in reality quite unnatural, and directly opposed to the laws of commonsense. The man of colour, therefore, now openly rejects the idea that he is the helot of the white man — that it is his endless fate to reap and sow, to buy and sell, to labour and sweat, but not to govern. All the scientific aids to the white man's dominion — steamships, railways, telegraphs, modern weapons, high explosives — once looked upon as miracles, have become unimportant trifles, because of this sudden new knowledge and this sudden new determination. Out of Asiatic brains spring ideas which must soon bind hand and foot these one-time ominous scientific things, and render them only laughable as governing instruments, since aids to government, like laws, are made for men, and not men made for them. It is only necessary, indeed, for a small percentage of India's vast population to understand thoroughly the inner meaning of Mill's dictum to be able to cripple for ever an administration which has endured for more than a century, and which, while no doubt one of the most lasting tributes to English genius that has ever been seen, is politically indefensible, save by invoking that old barbarian doctrine of force which in Europe has well-nigh vanished. And as numbers tell in the modern world as they did in the ancient, the outlook can only

be gloomy when nations possessing immense reserves of men are willing to call their full strength into play, unless something more than a vague spirit of compromise arises. India's past history is no index to India's future. A trial of strength in any part of the world is no longer an isolated circumstance, as it once was; and henceforth the waves of any racial conflict must spread across the entire globe. Loyalty is but a figment of the brain; for the loyalty of aliens is largely a matter of political expediency, and the call of race and blood is supreme. When education has advanced farther, when greater enlightenment has been won, this will no longer be doubted.

Since this remarkable state of affairs — the coming victory of mind over matter throughout all Asia, in the face of the greatest difficulties — is now generally admitted by the thoughtful, one may boldly inquire what is really to become of India and the rest of the Middle and Near East during the present century; or, in other words, how is the present conflict of colour and conflict of ideals to adjust itself? It is best to be quite frank and to face with open eyes the new dangers which have arisen. No amount of cheerful optimism, no amount of stern resolution, no amount of prejudice, can help in the solution, unless there is an accompanying admission of what are now undeniable facts. And since India is the real key to all Nearer Asia — just as Japan is the real key to all Farther Asia — it is India that must be most closely considered.

Now it must first be remarked, in order to clear the ground properly for this discussion, that one of the ideas which it is the hardest to get Europeans — be they Englishmen or Frenchmen, Germans or Dutch —

properly to understand, is that the Asiatic is not delighted with justice *per se*, as the white-skinned man pretends to be; and that, indeed, the Asiatic really cares but little about it if he can get *sympathy* in the sense in which he understands that misunderstood word. This is a matter of such vast importance that it is well to realise at once what a great factor it is at the present moment in the whole Asiatic agitation, and how little attention is paid to it by politicians, who waste weary hours devising what seems to them sound and just, whilst they are studiously ignoring what is far more vital. This is the real reason why every Asiatic in his heart of hearts prefers the rule of his own nationality, bad though it be, to the most ideal rule of aliens.

For, when he is ruled by his own countrymen, he is dealt with by people who understand his frailties, and who, though they may savagely punish him, are at least in sympathy with the motives which prompt his delinquencies. Such rulers will always carefully consider all motives, and such rulers would never dream of imposing, no matter how sound it might seem theoretically, a mechanical scheme of life conceived in other latitudes, and naturally only to those latitudes. It is the absence of thermometric charts in the offices of statesmen which is responsible for many of the present disasters. And when there is superadded this disconcerting lack of sympathy, the only wonder is that recent years have been so tranquil. Thus, to give a good example, only a maniac among Asiatics would have ordered that fatal step — the partition of Bengal — in the rude and harsh manner it was encompassed; for no matter how just and sensible the step might have been from an administrative point of view, from the sentimental point of view, which

is the supremely important point of view where tradition and custom hold absolute sway and are the very mainstays of life, it was a rough act of folly.

The grand plea, then, of the white man — that he is just; that he dispenses absolute justice wherever he rules; that he attends to all measures with scientific accuracy; that his presence should therefore be welcomed — this grand plea is looked upon as only stupid both by Asiatics and by those who really understand Asia, because it totally ignores the only really essential fact regarding Europe's mastery over a large portion of Asia, which simply is that the European is disliked because he is a European, and for no other reason. That is, because he is a man who, when set in authority over Asiatics, cannot understand their point of view or their aspirations, and who, moreover, is determined to act as if latitude and longitude were only geographical terms and not political terms of the highest importance. Mr. Meredith Townsend, a writer of great ability, who certainly understood the Middle and Near East as few writers have done, wrote on this subject so luminously that it is well to quote him here, in order still further to emphasise this vital point. This is what he said about the Englishman:¹ —

“It is very difficult, of course, for an Englishman, conscious of his own rectitude and benevolence of feeling, to believe that he will not be more liked when he is better known; but a good many facts seem to show that it is so. He is not seen and talked to anywhere

¹ *Asia and Europe: studies presenting the conclusions formed by the author in a long life devoted to the subject of the relations between Asia and Europe.* The quotation is from the study entitled: “Race-hatred in Asia.”

by men of a different race so much as he is in Ireland, and he is not hated quite so much anywhere else. He is decidedly much more disliked in Egypt since he appeared there in such numbers. He is more hated in the sea-coast towns of India, where he is prominent, busy, and consequently talked to, than he is in the interior where he is rarely seen; much more detested in the planter districts than in the districts where he is only a rare visitor. If there is contempt for him anywhere in India, it is in the great towns, not in the rural stations where he is nearly invisible; and contempt is of all forms of race-hatred the most dangerous. It may be said that the Englishman in the great cities is often a low fellow, but that is not a sufficient explanation. The officers of the old Army were not low fellows. The broadest of all facts bearing on this suggestion of more intercourse is the fate of that Army. No class of natives knew the European so well as the Sepoys knew their officers, and among no class was that knowledge in itself so irritating. They were notoriously better treated than the men of any army, the etiquette was always to listen to their complaints, there was a feeling in many regiments that the relations between men and officers should be filial and paternal, and everywhere the officers have been true leaders in battle — yet the Sepoys slaughtered the officers out, killing also their wives and children. Association had in that case only deepened race-hatred. It certainly does not extinguish it in the Southern States of America, the Northerners who do not live with the Blacks being far more disposed to do them justice, though when they emigrate southward they often display a harder and more bitter contempt. The Indian, who, of all the heroes of the

Mutiny, showed the most bitter enmity to the British race, as distinguished from the British Government, was Azimoollah Khan, who had lived years among them, and knew English perfectly; while no white dwellers in the tropics are quite so just and benevolent towards dark races as English Members of Parliament, who never saw them. *In truth, if we are to take facts as evidence, it might fairly be said that the less the white and the coloured races come into contact with each other the less is the development of race-hatred, which only tends to become dangerous when they are interspersed, and mutually comprehend one another's strength and weakness."*

If this remarkable pronouncement made by Mr. Meredith Townsend some years ago were accepted as absolutely final, nothing would remain for the white man but frankly to abandon all attempts at finding a *via media*, and, clinging to his inherited prejudices, simply to prepare, in that portion of Asia which he has conquered, to defend them to the death with something more than the blind fury of the Allah-inspired dervish. But fortunately this statement, like every broad generalisation from facts which are difficult for any single mind to grasp in their entirety, is already out-of-date, not so much in its substance as its inferences. Furthermore, it is confessedly the pronouncement of one who has grown old and grey, and can no longer find a place in any serious argument for youthful optimism.

For it is a great and illuminating fact that the changeless East is at last changing, just as the rest of the world is changing, though of course much more slowly; and one of the most remarkable developments which have come of recent years has been the widespread realisation that race-hatred in Asia is simply the hatred

of the "under-dog" for the powerful animal which stands growling over him. To this Mr. Meredith Townsend makes not the slightest reference. Yet just as sympathy is the supreme factor in the personal relationship between governors and governed in Asia, so politically must the kernel of race-hatred be to-day sought in the position held by white men in many regions belonging to the man of colour. So long as relations established in old and ignorant days are sedulously maintained, so long will pessimism, such as Mr. Townsend expresses, be justified. But release the under-dog from his ignominious position, and at once it will be seen that much of so-called race-hatred is really only the sullen and transitory anger which beaten animals necessarily indulge in. In other words, adjust matters as they should be adjusted and a change will magically come.¹

This is no idle talk. Europeans were probably never hated in Asia more than in Japan, where there is an immense and undying pride of race greater and more

¹ The treatment of India has one peculiar aspect, in that Northern India with its splendid Aryan races has as much claim to be considered magnanimously from a racial point of view as South-Eastern Europe, which is full of Mongolic elements. Not only are the Turks pure Asiatics, but so are the Bulgars, the Magyars, as well as other sub-races in this south-eastern corner. Similarly, all along the shores of the Mediterranean there are large traces, not only of Asiatic-African blood, but of black blood.

The instinctive attitude of Americans to-day on the question of the millions of emigrants flocking to their shores is instructive. Teutonic and Celtic emigrants—English, Irish, Scotch, German, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish—are welcomed; Latins are not so welcomed; whilst the heterogeneous elements from South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean sea-board are frankly disliked, and fears constantly expressed that they are a debasing element.

blind even than the English pride, before the treaties with the Powers had been revised, vexatious disabilities removed, and the international status of Japan afforded full recognition. To-day it may be true that the European is still disliked by some classes of Japanese; but he is certainly no longer blindly hated simply because he is a white man. Similarly, in China there has lately been an immense change of opinion — a change really miraculous, considering that the Chinese treaties have not yet been revised, and seeing that the European still often acts with the utmost harshness. When China has the privileges of equality which Japan has won, the term “anti-foreign” will have ceased to have meaning.

Now just as there have been these partial *volte face* in Japan and China, so it is certain that in India, according to competent observers, a very remarkable development is quickly being recognised as a sign of the times, telling more clearly than any language the nature of the underlying feeling. Briefly, the bureaucracy of India is fast becoming the sole enemy, leaving the army, the merchant and nondescript classes at most only disliked—because it is generally recognised that the bureaucracy stands for something which can only be intensely hurtful to the pride of educated men; that is, alien rule. In other words, the general hatred of the European in India is being rapidly narrowed down to a particular hatred for those who are held to have usurped the reins of government by the dangerous right of prescription. Thus to-day it has become a much more easy matter than it was fifty years ago to find the proper solution; for India of the twentieth century is not India of the nineteenth century.

What do educated Indians demand in the way of reforms? Nobody has stated the present-day needs more clearly than Mr. G. K. Gokhale, who, when he visited England some years ago, advocated the following reforms as the principal and immediate ones needed to re-establish confidence in England. It is well to quote these demands here, as evidently they represent first steps only; and once these first steps have been taken, others must necessarily follow:

- (1) Advance in self-government. The enlargement of the Legislative Council, both Imperial and Provincial, an increase in the proportion of their elected members, and a widening of their functions, including some sort of control, however limited, over public expenditure.
- (2) Admission of qualified Indians to the Secretary of State's Council and to the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and of the Governors of Madras and Bombay. The nomination of Indian members of the Secretary of State's Council to be made by an electoral college composed of the elected members of the various Legislative Councils in India.
- (3) A free and unfettered career in the public services, involving a large substitution of the economical and equally efficient Indian agency for the costly foreign agency in the higher ranks of all departments, and local competitive examinations.
- (4) Cautious but steady improvement of the position of Indians in the army.
- (5) Decentralisation of district administration and extension of municipal self-government.
- (6) Separation of judicial from executive functions, and reconstitution of the judicial service, by placing it

under the control of the High Courts instead of under the executive Governments, and by substituting legal practitioners as judges in place of members of the Civil Service.

(7) Reduction of military expenditure; also of the heavy cost of the civil administration, due to the higher branches of the public service being a virtual monopoly of Europeans, so as to set free funds to be devoted to the following objects:—

(a) Elementary education, which should be made free at once throughout India and gradually compulsory.

(b) Industrial education.

(c) Improved sanitation for the poor.

(d) Abolition of the salt tax and the opium tariff.

(e) Measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness, and the improvement of the cultivator's material condition generally.

A rapid perusal of these proposed reforms at once shows that the moderates in Indian politics do not yet aspire to anything more than a share in the administration of India — all that educated India now demands is to be given a real and practical share, no matter how small, in the administration, and thus to put an end to the present system, under which the opinion of a foreign official overrides and completely extinguishes that of the educated men of India.

To those who have some acquaintance with the practical work of government but who know nothing of Indian conditions, certain clauses in the list of the reforms just quoted should occasion great surprise — not because of the changes contemplated, but because of the strange state of affairs which has so long obtained in a

great Empire without provoking tremendous and widespread criticism and agitation. That judicial and executive functions should not have been separated before now is surely a blot on English administration, since the two functions are entirely incompatible. That no attempt should have been made until recently to improve the general lot of the people — that is, to educate them, to uplift them, to make them something better than mere helots, toiling under the heel of the usurer as they have toiled for endless centuries, is nothing short of a disgrace.¹ Whereas in a little country such as Japan, which according to Western ideas has only been "civilised" for fifty years — whatever that expression may mean — the development of local hypothec banks, local savings banks, and special land banks has been enormous, in India virtually nothing has yet been done in such a direction; and Indian statesmen are still content to look upon the mass of Indian people much in the same light as an unthinking shepherd-boy looks upon the sheep he cares for — that is, as silly creatures which must be driven in flocks hither and thither so that their stomachs may be satisfied, but which need no other form of attention save periodic clipping. The dirt, the disease, the squalor of India

¹ That this statement is not a whit too strong may be judged from the most superficial acquaintance with the subject. It is true that Suttee, infanticide, Thuggee, human sacrifices, and hook-swinging have been stamped out; but nearly one-fifth — or sixty millions — of the Indian population is sunk in the most miserable servitude and bestial ignorance, *i.e.*, the pariahs, the namahsudras and aborigines are all openly abandoned creatures. It is useless to accuse the caste system — a nation that has usurped the government of the country might have yielded before the use of bombs to the dictates of common-sense and justice, and have done something to uplift the whole great mass of the population.

are all directly traceable to this lack of education, this lack of proper financial development, this lack of proper stimulus to native energies. It is these things which have again and again attracted the most unfavourable foreign criticism; it is these things which have been left uncared for during a time when there was every incentive to care for them — the last half-century; and it cannot be doubted that if a careful and scientific-minded people such as the Japanese had occupied the position which the British have occupied in India for one hundred and fifty years, very different results would have been accomplished.

Still it cannot be denied that, largely owing to the liberalism of Lord Morley,¹ something has lately been

¹ The chief facts of Lord Morley's reform scheme are these: A native has been added for the first time to the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India. This Council was composed of six Departmental members and the Commander-in-Chief — all Englishmen — till the appointment in 1909 of Mr. S. Prasanna Sinha, an Indian, as head of the Law Department. Next, the Viceroy's Legislative Council, while retaining its official majority, has been increased to 62 members (instead of 24), of whom 28 are to be elected. The rest will be nominated. And in the new Councils there are to be 26 Indians instead of four as before. The new Indian members will have the right to move resolutions on administrative and financial matters, which will be put to the vote.

Lord Morley's other proposals concern the Provincial Legislative Councils. The Governors of Madras and Bombay are to have their Councils doubled in number — that is to say, to consist of four instead of two, and one of these is to be an Indian in each case.

The Legislative Councils of all the seven provinces of India are to be doubled in number, and here again Indians are to have places. These Councils are to be given power to discuss matters of public and general importance. It is also intended that in time the other five provinces — Bengal, E. Bengal and Assam,

done in several directions sensibly to improve matters; and it may be even taken for granted that during the

United Provinces, Punjab, and Burmah — shall have executive Councils (of two members) similar to Bombay and Madras.

The Executive Councils are the cabinets of the provinces, and the Legislative Councils are their Parliaments. On the latter native Indians have long served. The innovation is in their admission to the Executive Councils.

In these new Councils the representation is to be by classes and interests, and election through electoral colleges, as this is regarded as the "only practical method of embodying the elective principle" in the constitution of these Councils.

Lord Morley thus describes his scheme for electoral colleges: —

"I will briefly describe the scheme that at present commends itself to me, and in order to make the method of working clear, I will assume hypothetical figures for a given province. Let it be supposed that the total population of the province is 20 millions, of whom 15 millions are Hindus and 5 millions Mohammedans, and the number of members to be elected 12. Then, since the Hindus are to Mohammedans as three to one, nine Hindus should be elected to three Mohammedans. In order to obtain these members, divide the province into three electoral areas, in each of which three Hindus and one Mohammedan are to be returned. Then in each of these areas constitute an electoral college, consisting of, let us say, a hundred members. In order to preserve the proportion between the two religions, 75 of these should be Hindus, and 25 Mohammedans.

"This electoral college should be obtained by calling upon the various electorates, which might be substantial landowners paying not less than a fixed amount of land revenue, the members of rural or sub-divisional boards, the members of district boards, and the members of municipal corporations, to return to it such candidates as they desired, a definite number being allotted to each electorate. Out of those offering themselves and obtaining votes, the 75 Hindus who obtained the majority of votes should be declared members of the college, and the 25 Mohammedans who obtained the majority should similarly be declared elected. If the Mussulmans returned did not provide 25 members for the electoral college the deficiency would be made good by nomination. Having thus obtained an electoral college containing 75 Hin-

next two or three decades, as the moral sense of the English people is more and more aroused and they gradually understand a difficult question, Mr. Gokhale's programme will gradually be realised in entirety. Indians have at last been admitted to a small yet substantial representation in both the central and provincial administrative systems; and it cannot be doubted not only that from year to year their influence will increase, but that an extension of this same policy will be demanded and obtained in many other directions.

For this programme is admittedly only a first step; the next step will undoubtedly come not many years hence in the form of a new and wide-spread demand for the substitution of some *bona fide* decentralised system of representative government for the present administrative system. In other words, it will one day be a question of practical politics whether the federation of all India under some pseudo-European form is to be worked out, or whether the granting of autonomy to the various provinces, which will make India assume something of the political appearance of South America — a South America united by a sort of general *concordat* — is the more practical scheme. It is useless scoffing at such ideas; it is already quite impossible to believe that the present system has any elements of permanency. History may be searched in vain for a precedent of any country — however mighty and successful — permanently enslaving any other country, and what Mill has erected into a great axiom in practical politics is nothing

dus and 25 Mohammedans, that body would be called upon to elect three representatives for the Hindus, and one for the Mohammedans."

but a simple statement of an undeniable historical fact. The next few years should therefore afford a valuable breathing-space, during which political England will have to make up its mind whether it is worth while attempting to retain India as an integral portion of the British Empire, on much the same terms as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; or whether the highest political ideal which can be found for India, because it is an Asiatic country and not a white man's country, is a somewhat modified fief of the British Crown, to secure which, in case of necessity, mediæval prejudices will be aroused and mediæval precedents fully followed.

Should a cruel Nemesis will the latter, there is not the slightest doubt in the writer's mind that some day—it may be fifty years off, but not a hundred years off—India will be lost to England, and one of the most splendid experiments ever made in the political history of man will end in nothing. But surely it is permissible to hope that the latter alternative is the more unlikely of the two, since the spirit of compromise is already in the air, and the *via media* can gradually be found. Swadeshi, boycott, bomb-throwing—these rebellious movements of the brown man under the yoke of the white man—are only the temporary symptoms of a very grieved complaint; to employ again the eloquent language of the kennel, they are simply the howls of the under-dog still securely pinned down by the British bulldog, and still rudely shaken by him if he stirs. That such a condition cannot permanently last is self-evident to every enlightened man.

Now, if the second alternative is to be finally realised, if India is to become some day a self-governing

dominion — it is essential not only that there should be a remarkable change in the general attitude adopted towards the natives of the country, but that there should be an equally remarkable change in the quality of the instruments used to carry on the English part of the governance. It is a fact which has of late years become more and more evident to those who concern themselves with such problems, that much of the education which is still comprised in the higher studies of Europeans to-day utterly unfits them to grasp Orientalism, and indeed trains them almost directly to be in open opposition to Orientalism and to hate it. A plain soldier or sailor — or better a scientist — is a hundred times more suitable a man to deal with the problems arising out of a close contact with Orientalism, than the classical student who is the chief instrument in consummating what a writer such as the Rev. W. H. Fitchett is pleased to call “the miracle of the Government of India.” It may be a miracle, but the days of miracles are past.¹ If the East is ever to be the ally of England, it is absolutely necessary that the training and ideals of those who are called upon to act in any official capacity throughout Asia be radically altered. The hateful priggism which no open-minded man can doubt is inseparable from a too fervid study and worship of the literature and laws of Greece and Rome — with their rigid and unbending formalism, their narrow traditions and all the illiberalism with which

¹ The main part of the miracle apparently consists in the fact that young men such as District Officers are entrusted with the supreme control over half a million, or even a million of people — a state of affairs in the modern world which instead of being tolerable is intolerable. It is also forgotten that were it not for the fact that every eastern rule of life is the real policeman, even such a questionable miracle as this would not be possible.

they are saturated — this priggism is no stuff with which to build a permanent empire. The haughty and insolent distrust of other men; the singular lack of sympathy; the ingenuous belief in the perpetual efficacy of methods which can only be sound under certain conditions and in certain environments — all these things and many others form part and parcel of the mass of reasons why the success of England will be one day turned into grim failure, unless the rising tide of English democracy completely submerges and extinguishes such meretriciousness. The detachment and simplicity of mind with which the problems of Asia need to be approached, if they are to be solved, can never be attained by those who have encased themselves in an unmeaning formalism, suitable only for monasteries and monks; and until English Liberalism lays it down that the presence of pro-consuls and their lieutenants, such as have been recently known, is not only a direct invitation to revolt, but an actual incitement to do so, so long will there be open danger of the very worst sort.

For it is quite clear not only that the time has come when Liberalism demands an improvement in Indian conditions, but that the day has dawned when India should be permitted to cherish the same aspirations as every other great region of the world of which geography makes a definite unit. India indeed should be encouraged and urged to have aspirations, which are legitimate and natural, and which are perhaps best here expressed in amphibolic terms. All the world over the rights of eminent domain carry with them, by virtue of an unwritten law, certain assumptions which are not only beneficent for the welfare of States but necessary for the continued prosperity of those States. Thus America

has created the so-called Monroe doctrine; England, the doctrine of her predominant sea-power; South America, the Drago doctrine; Australia, the "All White" doctrine — not to speak of many less known. So imbedded are these doctrines in the rock of commonsense that no thoughtful person thinks of disputing them; the time has come when India should be allowed to enunciate a new doctrine.

The peculiar and commanding geographical position of India in the world of Asia has attracted attention from the earliest times. To go back no farther than the days of Peter the Great — since it is peculiarly apposite to insert here a Russian view — we find in that much disputed, yet always interesting document, the reputed will of a far-seeing sovereign, the following sentence: —

"Bear in mind that the commerce of India is the commerce of the world, and that he who can exclusively control it is the master of Europe: no occasion should therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its decay, to advance to the Persian gulf, and then to endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade of the Levant through Syria."

Now apart from the fact that this pronouncement is invested with a special interest in an age when railways change the face of a country and re-model distances and conditions — when deserts mean nothing and mountains are no barriers — it is curious to reflect that although the British tenure of India is one hundred and fifty years old, English statesmen have never really got beyond the ancient Chinese-Japanese idea which has now been abandoned by these two peoples — the policy of seclusion, the policy of sedulously shutting off India

from all contact by land and relying on the command of the sea for all intercourse. That this is a very singular reflection to have to make in an age such as the twentieth century, when in every branch of human activity the military advice of a Clausewitz has become a cardinal principle—that a vigorous offensive is the best defensive, and that to stand still is to languish—no one will deny. Possibly the explanation of the fact that no higher ideal has been found than merely to administer the country on the principles of the Japanese Shogunate or the Manchu Son of Heaven, is to be sought in the lamentable confession that as a race the English are strategically stupid—if such an expression is permissible. In spite of what is to-day so constantly said to the contrary, and probably believed by a good many who have neither the time nor the inclination to think, it remains abundantly true of the Englishman that his foreign politics are in the main of the bull-headed order, and that his great strength is still best described in that happy phrase of Mr. Kipling's regarding the British soldier—"that he understands that he must not understand." It is not only that the great forward steps made in the nineteenth century—steps such as the introduction of ironclads and the cutting of the Suez Canal, which, though they have done much to secure British predominance, were most bitterly opposed—it is not only, we say, that he did not wish to understand these things, but that even when he did understand them he could not bring himself to think beyond them. In a word, not having the swift and accurate strategical glance of the Frenchman, he has been quite content to allow the greatest possibilities to stand before him unheeded; and has strictly confined himself,

because of the timidity of his imagination, to plain straight-forward administrative work which, politically, amounts to marking time and nothing more.

For it must be undoubted that long ago the advisability of interesting India as a World-Power, would have been apparent if the future had been properly studied; if men could have looked boldly over little internal complications, and seen the relations which India really bore to the chaotic regions reaching straight to the Mediterranean.¹ It has been too long held that amphiscians, together with those whose colour causes them to be wrongly classified as such, are different from other men insomuch as they possess no political

¹ General Sir Ian Hamilton wrote this inspired statement in his book on the Russo-Japanese War (*A Staff-officer's Scrap-Book*, Vol. I). "There is material in the north of India, sufficient and fit, under good leadership, to shake the artificial society of Europe to its foundations if once it dares to tamper with that militarism which now alone supplies it with any higher ideal than money and the luxury which that money can purchase. It is heroism, self-sacrifice and chivalry which redeem war and build up national character. What part do these heroic qualities find in the ignoble struggle between the nations for commercial supremacy, with stock exchanges and wheat-pits for their battle-fields?" If then it is merely a question of finding leaders, a gradual diffusion of knowledge will produce those leaders, and, once they have been found, how can England hope to retain under the British Crown this vast Empire permanently — unless Indians are exactly in the same position of independence as Canadians and Australians to-day occupy?

It is a fact which is but little known, but which throws a lurid light on the whole future of England in Asia, that during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese military officer attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of India, offered formally, but confidentially, to Lord Kitchener one Japanese Division of reserve troops for service in India should Russia show any activity on the North-Western frontier. And this to the masters of tens of millions of fighting-men!

ambitions beyond their own borders. Now while this doctrine may have been true in the old days when practically every region in Asia was self-sufficient; when, moreover, each region was governed in the way which best suited it, without any regard for external factors; when each region raised within its own borders all that was needed in food and clothing — circumstances have so remarkably altered during the past generation or two, that it has become abundantly clear that, given the necessary incentives, all men possess the same ambitions. That the men of India should to-day, in spite of the discouragement which they have received, look beyond their own frontiers and talk of the condition of other nations is a most healthy and reassuring sign; and it is not too much to say that should this new phenomenon be properly met, it will become of the greatest assistance in world-politics. Here it is essential to be more explicit.

The transference of the British wardenship of the Pacific to the people of the three great commonwealths — Canada, Australia and New Zealand — has already commenced in a tentative fashion, and this seems to mark the beginning of an era when the sea-power of England will be entirely concentrated in the waters of Europe. So far only a beginning has been made; so far nothing much more has been done than to enunciate a new principle, since until the two other great dominions — South Africa and India — are effectively joined in some similar scheme, enormous lines of communications must be kept open by the mother country, and the value of this policy of naval devolution will not be as manifest as it should be. But has not the time already arrived when India should be entitled

to create a navy which, as the country grows in political understanding, should steadily grow in strength? Let us boldly ask, would not the flying of an Indian naval flag in the Persian Gulf, in the Arabian Sea, in the Red Sea, and even in the Mediterranean, not only animate the breasts of Indian patriots, but convince all Europe and Asia that a new giant was growing up — a giant no longer the helot of England, but England's real ally?¹ Would not the politics of Afghanistan, of Persia, of Arabistan, and of Turkey — not to speak of that strategically-important north-eastern angle of Africa, of which Egypt is the principal part — be enormously influenced, sooner or later, by such a tremendous factor? Is it not too much still to maintain that men who in hundreds of thousands wear the uniform of the King-Emperor in one service, have no right to wear it in thousands in another service?² In these days, when

¹ An interesting sidelight on the natural inter-communication between the western coasts of India and Arabistan is thrown by the regular enlistment of Arabs in the irregular forces of the native State of Hyderabad, which has gone on for a very long time. The distance which Arabs still penetrate in all directions on the Indian Ocean is remarkable in many ways — considering that, unlike the Japanese, they have not adopted steam-navigation. Save for the Japanese and the Chinese, they are the most maritime of all Asiatics.

² It is perhaps worthy of being specially mentioned that the number of Indian seamen employed in the British mercantile fleet is steadily increasing. In 1894 there were 26,175 lascars on British ships: in 1908 the figure had risen to 44,152. It seems plain that this growth will be continuous and that in a few decades a very large portion of the mercantile marine will be dependent on Indian labour. Attention is continually drawn to the numbers of foreigners employed on British ships — 34,735 aliens against 196,834 British — but this other point is surely equally significant.

events march so rapidly, when negligence or rebuff are so widely reflected, every means of political insurance should be adopted by those who should foresee the future and not merely sit waiting, prepared to make concessions only when the rude voice of revolt is heard.

Far more important to India, both nationally and imperially, than any question of the adjacent seas is the question of adjacent lands. Whilst it is a fact that vast mountain barriers theoretically completely enclose the sub-continent, both to the north-west and to the north-east there is good escapement. And further, there is not only good escapement, but good entrance into the country. Whilst Baluchistan may be held the counterpart of Burmah, it is a poor counterpart — for beyond lies no other Asiatic power of latent strength. Persia, a land three times as large as the German Empire, is admittedly in a state of solution, and the rule of the Kajars is doomed. The sparse population of the country, amounting to less than fifteen persons per square mile, remains stationary, and not the slightest evidence is to be seen that the people have any desire or power to arouse themselves from their lethargy. Since it is an axiom in Indian politics that no power can be allowed to advance to the head of the Persian Gulf, it is high time that the future of the great Plateau of Iran were considered. Why cannot a stream of Indian emigration be directed to this region — why cannot some policy more intelligent than the present one be attempted? Irrigation and the hand of the Indian cultivator could regain vast regions which to-day are virtually desert; schemes are feasible which would bring not only profit but honour; and by interesting

the Indian people in great schemes beyond their own borders, by giving them an inkling of what their future may be as a colonising race—instead of organised outrage being an ideal, there would come a speedy appreciation of the fact that a new era had dawned in which bombs had no legitimate place at all. It has been a too slavish belief in exploded doctrines—a clinging to what is nothing but a “mumpsimus” which has been so provocative of disorder and disgust: to sweep all this away should be, not only the business of the hour, but the business of the entire century.

For, abandoning all ambiguity, it is abundantly clear that India's real future lies not only in industrialism—in factory-servitude—as some preach, but in territorial expansion; that is to say, racial expansion. That this will inevitably come some day is quite clear; but whether there will be in the political to-morrow English statesmen able and fit to direct that expansion in such a manner that it partakes of the nature of a natural migratory movement, such as the movement of the English race to Canada, seems to-day doubtful. Yet, that India's horizon must be broadened; that some compensation must be found for the restriction of Indian immigration to Africa and to America; in a word, that new fields for an overspill of a swarming population must be marked down, so that virtual sterilisation and stagnation do not at last become a new political menace — this admits no longer of any doubt. In the last analysis, only by such a policy will it be possible to secure not only the shores and hinterland of the Persian Gulf, but the future balance of power in Asia. And this is precisely what must always be kept in view.

For, when we progress further to the westward in our

study of the map and of the conditions which that map discloses, we find at once that the situation is even more complex in Egypt than in India—the fate of master and servant being involved in a still more curious manner. In India, England can at least try what experiments she may choose for the time being, or try no experiments at all, knowing that her title is not only clear but that the greatest mountain-barrier in the world virtually shuts in the country on the north, whilst the broad ocean surrounds it elsewhere; to which can be added the cold comfort that, in case of necessity, the might of a whole prejudiced Empire may possibly still be summoned to rush to the rescue.¹ India thus still lies securely in England's hands, no matter how reactionary her policy may be; for whilst reformers talk and argue and insist, well do they know that the black shadow of an English revenge still hangs like a pall over them.

But in Egypt geography is not so kind; neither is the dominant race so convinced of possessing there any holy right. Nor, again, is Egypt a real country; neither is the new nationalism so firmly bottomed. For Egypt is only a province—a province exposed to the menace of the desert—a province temporarily dominated by men of one race whilst it really belongs by older right of conquest to men of another race and colour, who are even now being assisted to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of Europe by so-called constitutionalism, and who

¹ In this connection it is necessary to remark that in view of the recent declarations in the Canadian Parliament on the question of Imperial responsibilities, it is doubtful if Canada would class an Indian revolt as a justifiable reason for demanding her armed co-operation with the other forces of the British Crown to repress such a revolt; and if Canada declined to co-operate, the other overseas Dominions might follow her example.

may yet make demands regarding their old province which are not yet whispered. Virtually Egypt has no frontiers at all—Egypt's frontiers are merely made by England's battleships and by England's watch over the desert. Egypt is therefore surrounded by outer perils which are not shut off as are the outer perils which menace India: Egypt's perils are undefined. Arab, Soudanese and Turk perhaps wait only for a disturbance of the present balance of naval power to leap forward; and thus every step in Egypt may be for England a real step in retreat. For since it can be no longer doubted that a subtle connection exists between each portion of modern Asia—whilst the religion of Islam makes Western Asia and Northern Africa openly united against the white man—it is amply clear that the situation in Egypt is more delicate and more confused than in any other part of the world of colour, making it largely a question of political cunning of how properly to postpone, rather than to solve, the problem that waits on India.

Yet, even when this is admitted to be so—when Egypt is confessedly no schoolroom—it may be said that in the past British policy, in all matters of internal administration requiring tact and discrimination, has been bad from start to finish. Where British officials have had technical or straightforward work to do—ruler-like work fit for unimaginative men—such as work in the Army, in the Finance Ministry, or in the Irrigation Service, they have done it in a manner deserving of the highest praise. But just as in India, so in Egypt has the work in the Ministry of Justice and in the Ministry of Education been worse than faulty, because questions of policy have been inextricably

involved in questions of law and justice and education; whilst the yet more strange failure in the Ministry of the Interior has been mainly due to a policy not so much of deceit as of stupidity. To declare that the internal administration of a country is to be left untouched, and then to attempt a more active interference than in any other branch of government, is not very clever or politically sound; in the end such a policy is ruinous, since the work of alien officials, whose position can only be covertly or partially recognised, is exactly similar to that class of work against which the Bible gives warning — the building of houses on sand.

For this lack of sympathy, this lack of confidence, in Egypt, heavy payment will some day be exacted. The justice of the native contention that, whilst intelligent men are willing to accept guidance and instruction from men qualified to give it, it is unreasonable to make the country a school for ignorant young Englishmen, is only being tardily admitted here as elsewhere; and once again is it proved that in the detail work of foreign affairs England is clumsy. The constant assertion that the total unfitness of the Egyptians for self-government is evident to every practised eye, has no meaning to those who, knowing both the limitations of the European mind and the meaning of Orientalism, recognise in that statement the blind clinging to a point of view which, just as has happened in the case of Japan, will inevitably have to be abandoned whenever a modicum of Europe's sole elixir, force, has been accumulated.

Nor is it wise or expedient to accentuate, in the manner which is still the fashion of the day, the so-called low level of intelligence of the *fellahin* —

pointing to the dense population of cultivators gathered on the banks of the Nile as a mass to be led or driven blindly by superior intelligence. If this be an accurate description of ten millions of men in this year of grace, the deeper is the shame that it remains so after a generation of so-called political guidance. That here, as elsewhere in the Orient, there is a backbone and a brain, only waiting to be strengthened and encouraged, is amply clear; and that here as elsewhere only blows and bombs should bring reason is something which should give not only students and sociologists but every democracy of the world much to ponder over. Thus we see that the internal position in Egypt will one day inevitably re-act on the whole of what may be called the Nearer East. And this is an unhappy circumstance.

For, whilst it is still permissible to speak of India as the brightest jewel in the British Crown, Egypt is only valuable just as Malta and Gibraltar and Aden are valuable — that is, because it dominates lines of communication which are as precious as the possessions themselves because of the peculiar tenure on which those possessions are held. For the possessions, without these lines of communication are properly dominated and secured, are of no lasting value so long as they are held simply by the sword and not by affection and devotion; so long as they do not consider themselves as integral parts of a far-flung Empire. Therefore, so long as India is administered as it still is to-day, so long as new ideals have not been officially sanctioned and enshrined, so long must Egypt be retained in its present anomalous condition. The reformers, taking fresh courage with every bomb that explodes abroad, may clamour all they will; their clamour will not

affect the political issue in the slightest. Though Egypt were as ripe for self-government as United South Africa, though Egyptians could adduce ten thousand arguments with which to fortify their demand for an English evacuation, all such arguments fall to ground because of that one condition — that Egypt is in the last analysis an Indian question, is bound to the Indian question by a hundred ties, and cannot be radically touched until India has been radically dealt with.

For it is a remarkable and little appreciated fact that the greatest possible menace to this province, and to the rest of the priceless canal route to the East, now comes not so much from the old Egyptian rivals as from Asia and Africa themselves.¹ It is well to look at things for a while telescopically, instead of microscopically, and to understand how, owing to that vast double movement now going on in the East — the growth of numbers and the growth of knowledge — different factors are to-day supreme.

During past centuries it has always been European rivalry, and not really Asiatic or African resistance, which has been the chief danger menacing distant overseas possessions of European Powers; because the white man, being vastly superior in the arts of war to

¹ It is plain that the whole question of the Suez Canal will have to be frankly considered one day — and a good many documents and agreements torn up, no matter how great the outcry may be. There is no doubt that the only sensible plan for holding a canal — and securing its neutrality — is the method adopted by America in the case of the Panama Canal. The fortification of the Suez Canal and the garrisoning of a ceded canal zone by Indian troops would be as great a *coup d'état* as giving Home Rule to the Irish.

all other men, could not be opposed with success unless fought by other white men. The man of colour, beaten in small conflicts, readily joined his fortunes with some white master or other, so that from this fighting alliance might come personal advantage. Thus there was the spectacle of England and France fighting one another with the utmost bitterness in India so as to draw automatically from victory, not only European prestige, but Asiatic empires. Napoleon so well understood this, that he always dreamed great dreams of founding an Eastern Empire, which would serve to adjust the balance of power in Europe by affording endless reservoirs of strength out of Europe—strength which, had it been won, would undoubtedly have been used in ways few men to-day even dare to imagine. Had this great conqueror been successful in Egypt and Syria — had his Persian plans been brought to maturity, and the heart of India laid bare — he would have truly won the sceptre of the world; for with the countless millions of these regions at his beck and call, the fate of the world would have lain in his hands.

To defeat these plans, England attacked and attacked with a desperation which was never before equalled. Victory brought the only long peace which has been enjoyed for many decades. Yet, though there was this long peace, though as far as this peculiar European rivalry was concerned, these Asiatic-African questions were apparently dead, they soon were shown to be only slumbering. Briefly, so long as Europe remained in the matter of offensive strength far ahead of the rest of the world, so long was it impossible for peace to be founded on any permanent basis.

The Crimean War re-opened Eastern questions

formally; and by the close of the Russo-Turkish war of '78, Russia had so far taken the place once occupied by France that Disraeli thought it necessary to acquire a new outpost — Cyprus — so that a new guarantee should exist for the inviolability of British-Asiatic communications.

For though the Crimean campaign had demonstrated once again that Russia's strength was defensive strength and not offensive strength, the Turkish war, in spite of a hundred mistakes, showed that against unorganised Asiatics the white man's weight and persistence were still the same factor they had always been; in a word, that, out of Europe, Russia was an offensive Power. The slow but continuous Russian advance in Central Asia, until the frontiers of Afghanistan had been reached, sounded the same note. In other words, the day had not yet come for the Asiatic to assert himself; it was therefore left, as before, mainly a European question as to who should control this part or that part of Asia. Had Russia been well advised; had she understood the enormous responsibilities she was shouldering alone and unaided, by acting in the twentieth century as England had acted in the eighteenth, disaster would not have overtaken her. But she was ill-advised and disaster did overtake her — and the new situation was born.

Thus, through this chain of facts we return to Eastern Asia once more and see how everything is closely linked. For the reflex-action of the dramatic Japanese victories over Russia by land and sea has been to make every Asiatic nation suddenly conscious, not only of its present condition, but of its past condition, and to allow every such nation finally to understand that real salvation no longer lies in provoking European

rivalries, but in self-assertion. That is a very important point. So, as Asia turns back to the history of the past few centuries, Asia sees at last how in spite of an immeasurable inferiority to the European in the arts of war, a little more resistance would have secured very different results. And since then Asia has counted its numbers and knows them; henceforth this great continent will always proceed to work on a very different basis.

Now since this is so, since old methods of rivalry must be abandoned, it has become essential for the only two great European suzerain Powers in Asia — England and Russia — not merely to enter into vague agreements concerning spheres of influence, but properly to go out towards one another, and meet each other honestly on the footing of honest men. This can be the only permanent solution. Russia, because of her geography, her peculiar political system, her long mixing with Asia, her imaginative powers, and the slight extent to which the question of race-prejudice intrudes itself, is already many steps ahead of England in the great work of properly obliterating political boundaries in such a manner as to turn her Asiatic peoples into real allies. Yet there is no reason why, in a somewhat different manner, England cannot do exactly the same thing. The methods may be different, but the results can still be identical. To establish a proper equipoise in each given region, which will effectively release the controlling country from the present attitude, is the question of the hour; and it is round this question that revolve all other questions of the Middle and Near East, from the confines of Tibet to the waters of the Mediterranean.

For though it may seem too soon, as a question of practical politics, to consider whether regenerated

Turkey is capable of founding, with the aid of constitutionalism, a great Moslem Empire which will be nearer the confines of India than the slopes of the Balkans, it is by no means too soon to view this as a factor of the very highest importance in the racial possibilities of the future. The Austrian advance in the Balkans is of much greater future significance than of present significance; for it heralds a movement which can only be continuous. It cannot be doubted that in the end Europe will regain possession of St. Sophia and the Bosphorus — thus giving to Asia Minor and the whole land-route to India the importance it had before the year 1453. Let there be no doubt about this; for the racial pressure which has commenced anew can only produce profound results. The plain fact being that the Turk is the most militant of Asiatics, the fate of his race largely depends, not so much on the spread of constitutionalism, which is a pure exotic, as on the regeneration of his militarism. And if the European capital of Turkey is lost, as infallibly it must one day be lost, the Turk must seek new provinces wherein to find his centre of gravity.

Thus one automatically returns to points that have already been considered. Persia being a second Korea, it is only a question of time for that country to be absorbed, and one of the buffers which keep Russia and England apart removed. If Afghanistan goes the same way, as it must go when Persia goes, the Russian Empire and the British Empire will at last be face to face, and they will be forced to solve their differences in a final manner or be overwhelmed by a common fate. It would certainly serve the true interests of

both countries if an Asiatic empire, at least as strong as Japan now is, were to arise in Western Asia—for such an empire would serve to fix things, to change them from their present fluid state, and to render impossible the advent of any new white conqueror in Asia Minor.¹ It would also undoubtedly hasten the movement towards placing Asiatic dependencies on a proper footing; and, by giving them a sense of citizenship which they now lack, would invite them to share properly the burden of defence and offence. If, for instance, India could become a State in the true sense of the word, she alone could amply secure that peace would permanently reign in a region as great as Europe. Though the rise of a new Turkish Empire might bind Mahomedans very closely together, and give birth to a new species of Asiatic Irredentism, political freedom would prove superior, as it always has done, to any religious call; and a free people would arrest the progress of a mediæval cry.

It is the possibility that no strong independent Asiatic State may arise in Nearer Asia, as it has in

¹ The question of properly linking India to the Mediterranean is no new one. As early as 1835 General Chesney was despatched to Asia Minor to survey the projected route to the Persian Gulf. The cost of this railway was then estimated at £10,000,000 sterling—the distance from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf being some 900 miles. It is impossible to exaggerate the enormous value of a railway which would keep to the right bank of the Euphrates during the whole of its course—such a railway would completely neutralise the ill-effects of the Bagdad Railway, and later it would be possible to extend it through Persia and Baluchistan to India itself. One has only to travel on the Siberian railway or on the new Chinese railway leading from Peking into Mongolia to understand the enormous changes which such constructions at once produce.

Further Asia, which is disconcerting; for whilst things remain in solution there can be but little doubt that sporadic disturbance and general unrest will tend to increase. Some menace of Asia by Asia is needed to make Asiatics properly conscious of the needs of the hour — to make them willing to turn their eyes inwards and seek salvation themselves, as the Chinese are now willing to do because of the Japanese menace which so heavily hangs over them. That is the true salvation; the only real salvation. The salvation of Europe in Asia lies in creating an internal Asiatic balance of power similar to the European balance of power; a balance of power having fundamentally little or nothing to do with European domination and existing entirely independent of it. The growth of vast Asiatic empires, which may come if there is no prescience shown, is as menacing, economically and politically, to Europe as it is to Asia; and surely no permanent peace is secured, no racial happiness insured, by such unions as the present Anglo-Japanese alliance, which deliberately pits one European State against another in Asia. Such a course is only a *pis aller*, a quibbling with the great future question, the using of an antiquated method. The time has arrived when, without passion or prejudice, not only should this be admitted, but a more far-seeing, a more noble, and a more stable policy put into practice.

Only two white races are supremely interested in Asia and what it stands for — the Anglo-Saxon and the Slav. Only these two races can solve the Asiatic problem. For though France has important stakes, the loss of those stakes would not mean to the world what a general British retreat or a general Russian

retreat would mean. And for England, on other grounds, it is not politic to lose time. For to-morrow, when England will have shrunk to a very small measure, because of the growth of the new Englands in Canada, in Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa; when the Empire — if it still exists — will mean an Empire of many hundreds of millions of white men, the majority possessing definite and unalterable opinions on the question of colour — in that historical to-morrow either unembarrassing and consistent arrangements will have been made regarding possessions still regarded in the light of mediæval fiefs, or there will be no such possessions.

The hour has rung when old views must be entirely abandoned. Just as the only sound and enduring ideal in Eastern Asia is the creation of reasonable balance of power between two Asiatic Powers — a balance which may yet never come about, because of the false policy now being pursued — so in Nearer and Middle Asia should something resembling the same counterpoise be aimed at, entirely independent of Europe. It will never be possible to arrange the minor questions of what may be called the sociological relations between East and West which are now so often discussed — the confining of working men to certain zones; the question of international policing and tariffs; the definition of many things now carefully left undefined — until these main matters have been attended to.

Is it possible to hope for such a reasonable solution? If expert opinion remains expert prejudice and nothing else, one might well end with the words used by General Gordon regarding India a quarter of a century ago: "You may do what you will. It will be no use.

India will never be reformed until there has been a new revolt." But that was said a quarter of a century ago, when the free democracies were not properly conscious of their strength. It is through the free democracies that the final solution can alone be worked out. Let them use their strength before it is too late.

CHAPTER IV

THE BLACK PROBLEM

THERE is perhaps nothing quite so cruel in the whole world as the strange law which has given to so many scores of millions of human beings coal-black faces and bodies, thus so distinguishing them from the rest of the human family that this singular colour — together with the unalterable odour which accompanies it, and the simian features which accentuate it — is held to be the mark of the beast.

In European climes, where the black man — the African native — is generally only a creature imagined and not seen or understood, and where, if he does happen to wander, he is so submerged in the flood of whites that he cannot possibly count, it may sound like a grievous and foolish overstatement to speak of the negro in such harsh and uncompromising terms. But in the two Americas, in Africa and along the vast Asiatic coast-line, as well as in the world of island outposts along each of these continents, the coal-black native is almost universally considered as a man utterly separated from the rest of the world's inhabitants, and therefore not far removed from being accursed.

This is not at all strange to those who know the full story of the colour conflict, and how that conflict has raged far back in days now shrouded in the impenetrable mists of antiquity.

The whole history of India, for instance, from the earliest time has been one long story of colour prejudice, and more cruelty has probably been displayed there than in all the rest of the world put together. The aboriginal tribes who still form a not inconsiderable portion of the population were black, though, of course, they were not negroes; and there can be no doubt that the Aryan races, which in the dim past migrated into India in regular waves as they did into Europe, because they were white, simply devised the iron system of castes which has stood the test of thousands of years, so as to prevent the undue mixing of a dominant race with an inferior people. Miscegenation — a term only in general use in the United States to-day — was therefore as much feared in the East Indies in the pre-Christian era as it is to-day in those Southern States where the Black Belt has grown thickest. It is a fact certainly well worth always remembering that *castes* in Sanskrit are called *colours*, thus proving that race-prejudice is absolutely ingrained in human beings, no matter in what part of the world they may live, whenever two conflicting races struggle not so much for racial supremacy as for racial existence.

Yet though this is so, many people are so ignorant to-day as to imagine that the whites of the Southern States of the American Union are cruel to despair in their treatment of the black man — in the way they segregate him and then lynch him if he shows the slightest signs of the great lust with which he is

popularly credited.¹ But people in Europe think this only because they do not understand those primitive impulses which are indissolubly mixed with all racial questions. The anxiety to preserve racial purity is a natural and commendable one; it is common to all the higher peoples of the world; and since it is one of nature's most jealously-guarded laws that purity means life, to descend to the level of those pulpit orators who blindly advocate the removal of barriers which can never be properly removed, is really to descend to a level which even brute beasts do not understand. Those who advocate wholesale cross-breeding as a sensible method of solving racial antagonism undoubtedly talk of things about which they are not

¹ The publication of much of the subject-matter of this chapter in article form in America has called forth a voluminous and somewhat pathetic correspondence from coloured people in the Southern States—a correspondence in which the strongest exception is taken to the phrase that the black race is a perfect type of arrested development, and that consequently the ill-treatment of the negro at the hands of the higher races is nothing much more than can be expected. It is argued by the writer's correspondents that in all States where the negro population is considerable, the white population deliberately keeps coloured folk from being educated—relying on this ignorance as a great politico-economic factor. Moreover, negro correspondents allege that so far from their people being the principal offenders in the most heinous crime of the South, the raping of girls, it is the low-grade white who everywhere takes advantage of his colour and forces coloured women to abandon themselves to his will. The intense feeling displayed by the writer's correspondents shows how insoluble the problem really is—it is a true conflict of colour, and a conflict which can never terminate. The writer himself, having had a life-long and practical acquaintance with colour problems, is unable to see how anything different could be expected. In the last analysis, where races commingle, where their interests clash, it is force alone—or the threat of force—which secures control.

qualified to speak. Such a movement, if it could be started, would destroy the world. And this is exactly what all who have some practical acquaintance with the problem but too well know.

Thus the whites of the Southern States, as everyone who has lived in Asia or Africa understands, when they do everything they can to prevent all mixing of blood, are simply obeying natural laws, which, if they ignored, would quickly lead to their own undoing. In these Southern States miscegenation is rightly held to be an offence far worse than manslaughter, and when the guilty couple have gone through the formality of marriage it is punished by life-imprisonment. It is felt that unless the greatest restraints are imposed, the position of the whites, who are too often in the minority, would speedily become intolerable from an inter-breeding which would perforce drag all down to the mixed white level of certain parts of South America, notably Brazil — where the black man has bred not only with whites, but with Indians, thus producing dreadful hybrids.

The black man is something apart — something untouchable — and this was so deeply felt even by the great crowds of Chinese miners who thronged the mining camps of South Africa during the five years of the yellow labour experiment, that few readily stooped to having any relations with Kaffir women — in sharp contrast to the behaviour of the emigrants in the Straits Settlements, in Siam, in Burmah, in Java, and in Sumatra, where the men of China readily mate with many varieties of brown women, and are, indeed, proud of their mixed offspring. Therefore, that there exists some law forbidding the mixing with black blood is

as fully realised by the yellow man as by the white man; and though in Western Asia and Northern Africa some races, the Arabs for example, seem to have partially overcome this strangely persistent prejudice, the Soudanese and other cross-breeds which are now so numerous are considered very inferior to pure-bred brown men, and at best only just a little better than the coal-blacks.

Furthermore, it is well that arm-chair critics should know once and for all that men are not alone in this aversion. In North China, for instance, where the breeding of mules is conducted on a vast scale for transport purposes, every villager knows that the animals themselves intensely dislike the mating which produces the curious hybrid called the mule, and that this dislike can only be overcome by ruse. This is well known to every breeder; that nature herself has been outraged is proved in the perpetual impotence of the offspring of this forbidden union; and though it is possible to point to undoubted cross-breeding in certain lower animals, it is an unquestionable fact that all animals, like all men, feel the influence of definite laws which forbid, under ordinary conditions, all promiscuous mixing of blood.

Nor must it be forgotten that in the case of man there is good reason for this profound aversion on other grounds. The black man has given nothing to the world. He has never made a nation — he belongs to nothing but a subject race. He has no architecture of his own, no art, no history, no real religion, unless animism be a religion. His hands have reared no enduring monuments, save when they have been forcibly directed by the energies of other races.

The black man — the negro — is indeed the world's common slave; he has been a slave in Asia far more than he has ever been a slave in America, for his slavery in plantations lasted but a few short decades, whereas in Asia it has certainly endured for three thousand years, if not twice or thrice as long, and even now openly lasts in such countries as Turkey, where the Ethiopian, after having been emasculated, plays the part of harem watch-dog.

Fate thus seems to have marked the African down. No matter how much one may animadvert against the Asiatic, no matter how much one may dislike him, it is a fact that, though he may never have been scientific, he has contributed immensely to the civilisation of the world; has founded every great religion that exists; has built enduring monuments and temples; and possesses withal in many ways a more reasonable, a more subtle, and a more speculative brain than the European. In poetry, in art, the debt Europe owes Asia is immense — far greater than is commonly supposed; for no one knows, nor will ever know, how much the Greeks really borrowed from Indo-Persian civilisation, and how little they themselves originated. Hebrew, Chinese, Japanese, Arab, Hindu, Persian — and many others — have contributed their ordered quota in this sum total; all have had, and will continue to have, a profound influence on the world's progress. Not so the black man. He is the child of nature — the one untutored man who was a helot in the days of Solomon, as he is still a virtual slave, though his manumission throughout the world is one of the great landmarks in the history of the nineteenth century. Save in

rare cases, it seems that he cannot rise in the scale beyond a certain point. The originating power of the European or of the Asiatic are not in him; and, though he can imitate well enough, as is strangely enough the case also with the Japanese, it is the woman and not the man who has the greater industry, the greater fidelity, and the greater capacity for the gentler virtues.

It is not strange, then, that the negro should always have been held to be a perfect example of arrested development. He has never yet made a nation — he has never dreamed of anything greater than a tribe. Though he has for three thousand years been in contact with other peoples, he has never learnt much — in any case he forgets more quickly than he learns — and consequently he has very naturally remained where he still is, despised, rejected, and ill-treated, whenever possible. Such, in a few words, is his tragic and featureless history.

Now, if this is still so, if it is true that the black man, in spite of what his apologists may allege and Mr. Booker Washington may passionately preach, is the object of a common hatred among all the higher races in the world, then the Black Problem must finally become the world's greatest racial problem, though not, of course, until much time has elapsed and the negroes have immensely multiplied. This problem will be as troublesome for the rulers of the British Empire as it will be for those who control the destinies of the great American Republic; in fact it may be broadly maintained that it will be a mighty problem for all European Powers who have acquired the rights of eminent domain in any of the black man's lands.

For the black man is a great breeder of men, and in a few scores of years, when he has in the whole of the Dark Continent the same ease and security of life as, for instance, he has to-day in the Southern States of America or in South Africa, he will be multiplying prodigiously. How to keep races pure from his contact will then certainly be an acute problem: for as he scatters far and wide he will leave — in spite of all precautions — some traces of his blood. Nobody really knows how many negroes there are already in the world; it is roughly calculated that with the cross-breeds there are about one hundred millions. Accepting this figure as correct, and accepting also the calculation that White doubles in eighty years, Yellow or Brown in sixty years, but Black in forty years, then it is evident that even by the close of the present century the Blacks will have so greatly multiplied that, like the Japanese of the present day, who maintain that emigration has become a vital necessity for their continued existence, they may attempt to force themselves where they are not wanted. For that there will be some day an overflow, an overspilling of black men, seems tolerably certain. By the end of the present century there should certainly be three hundred million negroes in the world — a number terrifying in its possibilities, in view of certain special and very peculiar considerations. Little as it has been admitted, there can be no doubt that in the greater part of Africa, and in by no means a small portion of the Americas, there exists great potential breeding grounds for the black man, where he can multiply indefinitely and live in happiness, as soon as there is greater security. From

these centres he will slowly overspill into the surrounding country as soon as close packing pushes him to such a course of action; and thus, wherever the negro populates a region densely, there will the nerve-centres of the problem lie.¹

Now taking first the case of the Dark Continent, let us glance at the future. In less than a hundred years it may be assumed that should Europe's overlordship of Africa remain much as it now is, the black man will be superficially civilised and either Christianised or Islamized *en masse*. The whole of this vast continent will then be intersected by tens of thousands of miles of railway—if not hundreds of thousands of miles—and there will have grown up many other material improvements, bringing this great region into very different relations with the rest of the world from those which exist at present. Though, of course, it is impossible to predict how the white colonies at each extremity of this great continent will influence and shape such developments, it seems probable that they will be fully occupied in grappling with their own domestic problems—that is, with problems which fall within the limits of their own particular spheres—leaving in the future, as they do to-day, to mere handfuls of white administrators and pioneers, the task of civilisation elsewhere.

Now it is a noteworthy fact that in Africa the densest masses of population are found in the equatorial zone—a zone entirely separated from the rest of the

¹ It is worthy of mention that already there is the beginning of a movement from the country north of the Zambesi River to the country to the south. In some not distant time we may see the strange spectacle of United South Africa barring the further ingress of the autochthonous race by the sternest statutes.

continent by natural boundaries. It is the western regions of this zone, watered by the two great river-systems of the west coast, the Congo and Niger systems, which contain probably far more than half the total population of Africa. No statistics, which can be called in any way reliable, exist to prove what is the actual population in the Congo State, in the French Congo, and in Nigeria — provinces of which Belgium, France, and England are the respective suzerains; but the highest estimates will certainly allow that there are sixty or seventy million negroes in this zone. Though such estimates are by no means generally accepted, an actual enumeration might prove them not far wrong. It is, in any case, on the coasts of this great region that the slave-dealers in days gone by began to collect their cargoes of "black ivory," giving to the Gulf of Guinea a grim reputation which yet remains; and it is reasonable to suppose that the region attracted this gloomy activity just because of the surplus of human flesh and blood which even then existed.¹ Though the scramble

¹ Some light is thrown on the manner in which the eighteenth century viewed world-commerce and traffic by looking at the figures of the West African slave-trade. This trade, brought into being and stimulated to an ever greater degree by the extraordinary value of American and West Indian plantations, grew so rapidly from the seventeenth century that at the beginning of the eighteenth the annual number of slaves carried into the plantations in British ships alone was estimated at 25,000. Later in the century — to be precise, in 1768, 1787, and 1798 — it was three times estimated at 100,000 slaves per annum, British ships carrying a proportion varying from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent. of the total. The West Coast of Africa, though geographically a part of Africa, was then, as far as Europeans were concerned, wholly unconnected with the main body of the African continent and regarded rather as an outlying part of America.

This immense traffic from the eastern shores of the Atlantic

for Africa, precipitated by the Berlin Conference of 1878, and Bismarck's cynical advice to Europe to seek territorial compensation where no conflict among the Powers would be forthcoming, saw these immense regions openly invaded by a new and more humane authority than that which for two centuries and more had spread terror from the coast forts, the autochthonous races, crouching in their river-swamps and forests, could not be expected to believe that the white man advancing with a rifle in one hand and a gin-bottle in the other was really only a symbol of civilisation, and that the keynote to his new policy was the hidden Bible. The fearful scenes of the slave days, though long since banished, have found their counterparts in the more methodical, but equally brutal methods of exploitation sometimes adopted by those who, because they are suzerains, have had no bowels of compassion for men they denounce as savages.

Now the progress made in the past two or three decades in locking a European administrative system on to these vast regions of Equatorial Africa, marvellous as it has been in many parts of the country, has not changed — nor could it be expected to change — certain fundamental considerations. The chiefest fact of these fundamentals simply is that while the white man's civilisation may enforce a moral dread which will both greatly diminish cruelty and greatly improve economic conditions, it can do nothing to change conditions which

was vastly exceeded by the enormous trade with Europe from the plantations, which gave continuous employment to thousands of sail. When the fisheries off Newfoundland, together with the steady flow of precious metals from the mines of Mexico and South America, are added, the picture of the great Atlantic traffic is complete.

are rooted in the climate and in the environment, and also in that vast chain of causation reaching back to the remotest past. All the curious limitations of the negro, both mental and physical, which have been exhaustively analysed and laid bare in a region where he is an exotic — *i.e.*, the Southern States of the American Union — are a hundred times more manifest to the eye of the observer, not only in Equatorial Africa, but indeed all over Africa. That he will progress up to a certain point is quite certain; but beyond that point he will not go. And as a recognition of his peculiar nature is forced on himself, as he understands what he really is, instinctively he will increasingly segregate himself against the white man, and only welcome as friends and allies those of the same ebony hue. That is how the negro will and must act. And as it is quite certain that his numbers are enormously increasing now, the very deadweight of all these countless hostile millions will be an incubus which no white nation — or combination of nations — will willingly carry. That is to say, though certain things have changed, fundamentally matters remain where they were in the slave-dealing days.

This may lead some day to the most important results. For as this feeling of colour increases, and the racial solidarity of the black man becomes more marked, it is not unreasonable to suggest that some day an entirely different connection may exist between the western coasts of Africa, and the eastern coasts of America,¹ since the coasts of these two continents are not

¹ It is curious to remember that in the days of the slave-trade the West Coast of Africa was regarded by white men as an out-lying part of America. There is therefore no good reason why some day a new era of intercommunication may not exist between

far distant from one another, and communication between the two is easily and quickly made. Brazil, which is only a thousand miles away from West Africa, will most certainly be forced to put up Exclusion Laws such as would satisfy the most rabid Californian of to-day — that is, if Brazil is anxious to do so: for the racial hold the negro has on the immense regions south of the Amazon is not yet appreciated.¹ In Brazil there are already three million negroes and great numbers of negro-Indians; and though emigration from southern Europe has of late years been very large, so bad is the climate in large parts of the country that the colour future of immense regions remains very uncertain. Nor must it be forgotten that the ten million negroes of the Southern States of America may, in a hundred years, have grown to forty millions, and the so-called Black Belt of to-day will then be truly black. And as it may be further assumed that the tension between whites and blacks will everywhere tend to increase, rather than to decrease, as close-packing grows more marked and mutual weaknesses are better understood, the blacks in the American Continent may have taken cognisance of the fact that hundreds of millions of their brethren in the African Continent are rapidly going through a process of civilisation which will enable them

the coloured belt in the American Continent and this region. Stranger things have happened before now.

¹ This is one of the most interesting phases of the black problem, for in Brazil to-day there is practically no race feeling or hatred for the black. The Portuguese, always the most indifferent of all white men about cross-breeding, have mingled their blood more freely with dark-skinned races than even the Spaniards have done; and even in the Brazil of to-day, to have a black family is nothing of a disgrace for a white man.

to know their true relations to the rest of the world. The community of interests, which is bound to arise when racial distinctions have necessarily become much sharper than at present, will give rise to strange movements which no one can now even foretell; for the black man, with his veneer of civilisation, his sense of inferiority, and his racial strength, all working to produce in him a feeling of animosity and suspicion towards other men, must combine with men of his own colour and try to become free.

Previous experience does not count for much, as some would like to think, when grappling with the menace underlying the great negro problem throughout the world. The experiment of Liberia, for instance, came far too soon to mean anything at all; it was attempted in an age when philanthropy thought that vague abstract principles could be applied to racial questions irrespective of the particular nature of those problems. It attempted to do by kindness (which is only a fleeting emotion) that which can only be performed by brute movements grounded in human nature — that is, by the use of force called into action by an imperative demand, such as the necessity to find elbow-room, to find food. To beat aside those who would stay such natural movements by mere arguments is a very natural corollary.

Following this line of thought, it is somehow not impossible to believe that one day the West Indies may be invaded by great swarms of black men, unless they are stopped by force. It is also quite conceivable that a general intercourse such as to-day exists between England and Canada, and England and Australia, may one day exist between the blacks of America and

the blacks of Africa. There will be societies and unions and churches and other bonds — all tending to accentuate the solidarity of the negro race — all tending to range the race in a rival camp. Undoubtedly, in these future days, fresh efforts will have to be made to hold the negro in check and to confine him in such a manner that he will not be able to drag down the white races. Humanity has hitherto only concerned itself with such debatable themes as the ill-treatment of blacks by whites. The day may not be far distant when men will pause, and openly wonder whether in the past they have been well advised to interfere at all with solutions which, though barbarous, are only so because men, when they are face to face with elementary facts, can only use elementary methods.

In the near future, however, it is not so much in such possible trans-oceanic activity that the negro is to be feared, as in his activity in Africa and Arabistan in combination with other races. In other words the political activity of the negro where he is at home is a far greater cause for anxiety than his infiltration into regions from which he can easily be excluded for a very long time by artificial measures. It is, indeed, where the negro stands entrenched on his own soil that he is really to be feared.

Already, it is well to note, South Africa has its own ominous colour problem, arising from the fact that in this newest of nations in the making, though there are many whites, there are far more blacks, who will retain strong tribal organisations and a strong sense of kinship. And furthermore it is necessary to note once again that while this problem is not yet as vexatious as the problem in the Southern States of America, it is

bound to become more and more complicated from year to year, and be in the end a very different menace from the American menace. In North America, come what may, the whites will always have a large numerical superiority; in South Africa the position will always be exactly the reverse. To-day, in South Africa, there are but one million whites settled among six or seven millions of the Bantu race — a race which, because it is of mixed origin, is far superior to the pure negro of the tropics, if there remain to-day any really pure negroes. The probabilities are that this proportion of seven to one in South Africa will be steadily maintained in spite of all white emigration, since the Bantu race breeds very much faster than any white race and should actually increase its fecundity as the ravages of disease are steadily lessened. That there is much latent anxiety regarding the future is conclusively proved by the frank and whole-hearted discrimination against the native in the newly-consummated Union of South Africa. Where it has been possible, the ascendancy of the white race has been secured in the most uncompromising terms, whilst the proper native policy has been defined as the policy of segregation. And yet, as will shortly be shown, South Africa, with all its difficulties, will be far more able to handle the black problem than will the more northerly latitudes of the Dark Continent. The white man, where he is entrenched in strong communities, can only be conquered by other races by total extermination — that has been often clearly proved. But in regions where he is merely an administrator and leader, as he is in Central Africa, in Northern Africa, and in the coast regions, the problem is quite different. Here, then, is the greatest danger of the future.

For it must not be forgotten that, whilst it is an undoubted fact that, racially considered, the black man is a type of arrested development, it is also a fact that political pressure and the example of civilisation around him do slowly force him to a great simulated improvement, if nothing else. This is the case in South Africa as in America; and even along the coasts of Africa a definite advance has already been made. It may be that once the European lever is removed — as it was at the time of the French Revolution in Hayti by the successes of the formidable guerilla chief Toussaint L'Ouverture — the negro relapses into his semi-barbarous state; but that does not detract from the fact that so long as he feels the pressure around him and sees the example of a higher civilisation, he inevitably improves. In America, so great has been the progress, that negroes fully believe that were it only possible for them to do away with the white man's discrimination and the white man's contempt, in a very short while they would earn for their race a totally new title. Coloured professional men of all sorts are becoming so numerous, coloured labourers have so improved where they have been educated, that it seems that there is good ground for this optimism. And though America is of course an exceptional case, what is proved true there will be proved true elsewhere. In the past it has been possible for the negro to slip back; in the future it will become less easy for him to do so, since the vast growth in the world's population, with those new phenomena, close-packing, close-inter-communication and modern industrialism, will tend to hold him tight in a manner which has not occurred before.

But though a steady cultural improvement is increasingly the order of the day, it must not be supposed that this means any diminution of the dangers of the black problem. On the contrary, as in certain regions of the world the negro becomes increasingly intelligent and his veneer of civilisation more evident, he must have an increasing influence on his fellow-men — an influence which cannot be for the good of the white races. At first this influence may be counted on to show itself in ways which will only occasion comment from the far-seeing; but as this man of colour becomes increasingly aware of his unalterable racial or colour solidarity — as well as so numerous that for political reasons his opinion will have to be paid attention to — he will be recognized as a real danger. For he will finally constitute himself, or try to constitute himself, an *imperium in imperio*, wherever he lives among large communities of other men; and he may even demand as his right that just as he is restricted in many ways by the white man, so shall he restrict the white man in certain other ways. For just as surely as men get tired of being led like sheep, so do they as inevitably demand that the penalties which are enforced against them shall be enforced against others. In other words, the negro will not only demand his own reservations, his own lands, his own communities; but he will clamour for a policy of retaliation.

Fortunately, such black dangers are far off rather than near; they cannot possibly have much importance for the white races until the negro race is far more numerous, far better educated, and far better organised than it can become at any time during the present century. But in Africa itself there is another more dread possi-

bility which is quite a different question; and to a consideration of this grave matter, in which the faith of Islam bulks so large, we must now pass.

It has been well said that nothing really improves the negro except one of the two causes — cross-breeding, or catching hold of some foreign but superior creed. In America it is largely due to a primitive form of Christianity that successes have been won which would never have been possible had the negro simply retained his own horrible and debasing rites. In certain favoured parts of Africa — notably in Uganda — this same Christianising process is going on apace, though curiously enough it appears to make little advance in South Africa, the reason possibly being that the Bantu race is not a pure breed of negro, but a cross-breed, and that a more combative, a more militant, religion is better suited to him. In this respect the Kaffir is exactly similar to the cross-breeds of the Soudan, who must always embrace Islamism in preference to Christianity, and who have some fine qualities similar to the Zulu — matchless courage and superb physique.

Now, it is precisely with such races that the greatest black danger lies — especially if Islam shows renewed vitality and begins once more its triumphant march across the waste places of the world.¹ For it is a well-proved fact that those negroes who have embraced Islam at once show greater manliness and greater aspirations,

¹ Mr. Meredith Townsend, in his book *Asia and Europe*, has many excellent remarks on this subject which the writer would like to reproduce, were there only space for them. As it is, the writer has not hesitated to use certain of his conclusions, as he knows that they are true; and none of these are truer than the one in which this gifted writer declares that Islam gives the negro more independence and a better welcome than Christianity.

and could no doubt form strong States and organise armies and obey laws, if the proper incentives existed and the proper leaders arose. These are admittedly the first steps towards winning a higher and more abiding civilisation — a civilisation which would be very different from the artificial culture of Europe; and the taking of these first steps would automatically give birth to a black problem very different from that which exists in the United States, where the black man is simply a copyist of the white man, and where, in the last resort, he can not only be crushed into subservience by weight of numbers and superior skill, but be confined to low-lying swampy regions, where the white man will not readily go. In Africa alone is the negro fearful.

For when the black man has won a real sense of nationality — the nationality of colour — a sense which he could very easily acquire in Africa in an entirely different form from any he could acquire in white man's lands, he will undoubtedly commence organising himself on a basis he has hitherto not dreamed of. And should a single strong Black State ever arise in Africa — allied to Arab tribal organisations — it requires no stretch of imagination to believe that all Africa could soon be induced to join such a holy colour-bond, of which the watchword would be: "Independence from the White Master." That there already exists a curious and little understood colour union, uniting all Africa, is a fact which has from time to time seriously disconcerted those who seek to pierce below the surface and view matters in the limelight of primitive facts. It is now nearly a decade since the news of a great British reverse was mysteriously transmitted over the length and breadth of Africa with a speed almost rivalling that of the telegraph,

by a method which is as common to all Africa as the telegraph is to all Europe, and which is nevertheless very imperfectly understood.¹ All Africa trembled violently at the news of the British reverse; and thinking men throughout the world, no matter what their politics were, suddenly dimly understood what England's *débâcle* might really mean. In that forecast of a greater issue, for a moment the petty rivalries of the hour were obscured.

For the European Powers, having virtually put an end to the great tribal wars of Africa, which for countless centuries restrained all great increase in the population; having prohibited the slave-trade and virtually made that prohibition effective; having taught far and wide the prevention and cure of disease — having done these and many other things, may soon find that they have only prepared the ground for another sowing. It is a remarkable fact that to-day, in many parts of Africa that are generally classed as heathen, Moslem influence — always an anti-European influence — is strong and is rapidly gaining in strength. In Southern Nigeria, for instance, where Christian missionaries have for some time been at work, nearly all the native rulers are under Moslem influence. The improvement which the teaching of Islam brings is so remarkable that English officialdom, here as in India, instinctively protects the Arab creed; and American missionaries have lately bitterly complained not only that they are now pro-

¹ This is believed to be the system of the big-drum signals. Telegraphing on the *lokoli* (native drum) is possible up to a distance of 15 miles, and messages can be repeated so rapidly when a region is on the *qui vive*, that a signal has been sent 200 miles in a single hour!

hibited from entering towns that are distinctly Mahomedan, but that the native rulers themselves refuse to allow them to acquire land in their principalities or in any way exercise influence.¹ There can be little doubt that latter-day Mahomedanism is steadily flowing southwards in Africa; and there can also be little doubt that when the shock of inevitable events pushes Islamism out of Europe, and perhaps out of Asia Minor, it will be reinvigorated in regions where it now tends to languish, and this reinvigoration will affect all Africa.

For this should be well noted. Though the negro may revolt more or less successfully in the many different parts of the world where he has been transplanted, with a very good chance of temporary success, it is certain that it is only in his own country, and in combination with Islamism and its great representatives, the Arabs, that any permanent advantage can accrue to him. Omdurman may seem like the last word on this subject; but Omdurman was in reality only a first word, and a very small first word — the tentative expression of something which may be one day attempted on a colossal scale. The time must come in Africa as in Asia, when the autochthonous races will force a new settlement, no matter how much the white

¹ It is curious to remember that Islam has travelled long ago across the Indian Ocean and formed a stronghold in the island of Java; and not only that, but is well entrenched in the Philippine Islands, where the Moros are entirely Mahomedan. The present writer has recently had many remarkable conversations with high Chinese Moslems — conversations which have shown not only that there is much intercommunication between co-religionists in the Far East, but that regular communication is kept up with Arabistan and Turkey.

man — looking at the present miserable position of Africans — may argue that that is not only absurd, but wholly impossible. Abyssinia — which is not Moslem — has conclusively proved that, within certain limits, the white man is already prepared to stay his hand in Africa and avoid conflicts the results of which are out of all proportion to their cost. And, similarly, the experience of both France and Spain in Morocco, in spite of all that has been misrepresented about the success of these two Powers, is in another way equally ominous.

Yet in this there is nothing which is really unexpected. The manner in which people used to speak a decade or two ago of the holy man, Senoussi, shows that this dread of an all-Mahomedan movement — this linking of blacks and browns — has long been present in the minds of the prescient. It is quite beside the question to argue that Italy abandoned her Abyssinian campaign, after being crushingly defeated, not from fear, but from motives of economy, and that the same thing is true of both France and Spain in Morocco; for this does not detract one whit from the force of the argument not only that one day it may not be worth while to oppose the African in Africa, but that such a policy would be so suicidal that no electorate would endorse it.

Undoubtedly to-day the real barrier to such African uprisings has simply become: England in Egypt, and what that occupation stands for.¹ For though France

¹ It is well to remember that so far as Africa has been leavened from without, the leaven has come from Asia rather than Europe — European culture even in modern times has only affected the surface of things, whilst Asiatic-Semitic culture has profoundly affected

in North Africa is a far greater power than England — though her great colonies have vast importance — the peculiar geography of the Black Continent confines French possessions in such a manner as to render them far less susceptible to great colour-shocks than is the case with those regions where Britain stands as the suzerain Power. It is the Arab — the roving Arab — who is France's especial enemy, and the great desert to the south of the more valuable French possessions is a more effective bar than millions of soldiery. But further to the east the great roadway of the Nile communicates with the heart of Africa — with the Congo States, the great lakes, the high plateaux — and the existence of this roadway, which will soon have its road of steel, makes it quite possible for vast movements to be easily commenced, and steadily persevered in, the very moment some organisation has united the men of Africa to a common cause. It is England's duty to guard against these movements, because in Africa (as in Asia in more primitive days) she stands as the great representative of the principle of beneficent white conquest, which though it wrests the right of eminent domain from native rulers, though it becomes in the end, as it is to-day in India, a plain usurpation, still leaves the people and their cherished customs

Africa since the days of the Phœnicians and Carthaginians. Even the camel is not a native of Africa, but was brought in by the Arabs.

The historian Gibbon says of Egypt: "By its situation that celebrated kingdom is included within the immense peninsula of Africa, but it is accessible only on the side of Asia, whose revolutions, in almost every period of history, Egypt has humbly obeyed." — *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chap. I.

Is not this a remarkably apposite remark for the statesmen of the twentieth century to remember?

untouched, and is, undoubtedly, during a strictly limited period of probation, a good and honest and very helpful rule.¹

¹ Here is a very complete statement of England's commanding position *vis-à-vis* Africa:

"There is no more striking feature in the history of the British Empire, no point more characteristic of the race, than the extent to which Great Britain holds, so to speak, the keys of Africa. On the north, Gibraltar, all but an island, commands the entrance of the Mediterranean and the empire of Morocco, where Tangier was also once in British keeping. Malta lies over against the central promontory of the North African coast, watching the site which in the days of old gave Carthage so much strength and so great a name. Cyprus is not too far from the Suez Canal to be reckoned as in a sense an outpost of Africa, although the present British occupation of Egypt has for the time being diminished its importance in this respect. Aden, Perim, Socotra, and the Somali Protectorate keep North-Eastern Africa and the mouth of the Red Sea secure for British trade. Next come Mombasa and the great territory which was secured to Great Britain by the Imperial British East Africa Company, and which stretches from the sea to the inland lakes.

"In mid-ocean, but yet within African limits, the beautiful Seychelles Archipelago, with its harbour of Mahé, is a British dependency. Lower down and close to the mainland coast, the island of Zanzibar, now under direct British protection, is still, as it has ever been, a great emporium of East African trade. Further south again, treaty arrangements with Portugal secure access by the Zambesi and Pungwe rivers from the coast to British Central Africa, and to the plateaux of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, won by the British South Africa Company.

"Out at sea lies the British colony of Mauritius with its invaluable harbour of Port Louis, perhaps the best in the Indian Ocean, a stronghold and coaling station on the direct line from the Cape to India. Then comes the living place of English in Africa, the southern peninsula, whose coast is all British from above Sordwana Point on the eastern to the mouth of the Orange river on the western coast, and whose inland frontier has now been carried far into the interior to territories already named. Going up the western coast we find Walfisch Bay, the one harbour on many

But in the natural order of things the same movement that is now going on in Asia must one day commence in Africa, as we have already said; and when it does commence it will bode no good for the white man, since Africa is not Asia and can never show the same spirit. Furthermore, the white man, whilst he is doubtless convinced that he is now tightening his hold on Africa in a great variety of ways, is really doing nothing of the sort — save where he is actually settled on the soil, as he is in South Africa and in small portions of Algeria, and where, by so locking himself to the soil, he identifies himself permanently with such regions. Elsewhere his claims to dominion rest on the slenderest foundations or no foundations at all; he is only administering vast regions because the African has yet no reason to resist such administration. Therefore, just as the 'eighties of the last century saw the "scramble" in Africa commence, so may some decade of the present century see the "scuttle" in Africa commence. Received opinions are for the moment completely against such a possibility: but received opinions are generally based on old and misleading data, and in the modern world the greatest changes occur so quickly that it is

miles of barren coast, held by the Cape Colony. Further north, the islands of St. Helena and Ascension are British. In the angle of the Gulf of Guinea, the Niger Protectorates command the mouth and lower basin of the greatest river of West Africa. Next come Lagos, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone, island, coast stations, and peninsula, with a background of protected territories; and lastly, at the mouth and on the lower waters of the Gambia, near the westernmost point of Africa, the English still hold, under the guise of a Crown Colony, the earliest scene of their West African trade. Thus do British possessions encircle Africa." — Lucas: *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, Vol. III, page 7.

often only after the event that men become wise. Commodore Perry, for one, would never have believed that Japan would beat Russia, annex Korea, dominate Manchuria, and openly threaten the political existence of China in something less than half a century from the time when, quaking at the sight of the ships in Tokyo Bay, she suddenly decided herself to use, as soon as possible, the armed arguments of Europe.

The re-shaping of the Far East commenced the re-shaping of the Middle East and the Near East. The force of the present movement has spent itself for the time being on the shores of the Nile and the Bosphorus, because the times are not yet ripe for the movement to go any farther. But the next great shock in Asia will travel much farther and will produce much more abiding results; and as that next shock will certainly come, unless very wise counsels prevail, during the lifetime of the present generation, it may be assumed as a fact that one day the white nations will have to fight again for their supremacy in Africa on a new basis, just as they are already beginning to fight for their supremacy in Asia on a new basis, while still pretending that nothing in the past ten years has really been changed.

For as the silent struggle in armaments in Europe goes on, and strength is accumulated for an Armageddon which should never be contemplated, the watchful Asiatic and the stirring African understand more clearly the meaning of the dread words which are so constantly intoned, "Might is Right." And when it comes down to a question of butcher's work, the Arab and the cross-breed, as well as the Zulu, have nothing to learn. They require only weapons and organisation. The marvellous battle of Yakusa, which Mr. Meredith

Townsend does well to quote as an example of future possibilities — that fight fought in A.D. 634, which prostrated Heraclius and deprived the Eastern Empire of Syria, may yet be duplicated; and what the picked Roman legions, aided by vast clouds of auxiliaries, found themselves unable to do, modern white troops may find themselves equally incompetent to accomplish. It is true that Arabs and not negroes formed the bulk of the assailants who utterly broke the Roman legions in that earth-shaking contest; but the English have already shown that discipline and arms make the once despised Egyptian *fellah* the equal of the Baggara Arab; and what is true of one man is true of another. Omdurman may seem the modern counterpart of south battles; and yet it is quite clear to political students that that battle, fierce as it undoubtedly was, so far from being a decisive battle of far-reaching importance was only a very local affair. Nor is it wise to forget just now that, though the collapse was ultimately complete, the issue trembled in the balance in a most disturbing way. It is not a Mahdi preaching a *Jehad* who is to be feared, until the creation of solid States has preceded the devastating shock of battles.

It may be argued that all this has nothing to do with the black question proper, since the prime movers in any uprising of Africa must still be Arabs in the future, just as they have always been the prime movers in the past. Yet this is just why it has everything to do with the problem; for the building of railways, the cutting of roads, the improvement of communications and conditions generally, the spread of industrialism — in a word, the spread of the material products of European civilisation — instead of binding the man of Africa to the

white man, as many appear to believe, will merely educate him to a sense of his real position, just as the Asiatic has already been so educated, and incline him towards those who are racially not far removed from him, and who, because they understand him and have interbred with him, will be far readier than any other men to evolve a scheme of government which will satisfy his natural cravings. It is the Arab — and allied with the Arab, possibly later the Turk — towards whom the negro will inevitably be pushed; for political purposes the geographical division between western Asia and northern Africa will in the future tend to become even slighter than it has been in the past.

Thus, as years go by, the Asiatic problem and the African problem will tend to blend more and more. For the great link between the two, the Arab, already roves over a great part of Africa; and though his trading *dhow* does not go much south of Zanzibar, as a dealer the man is almost ubiquitous in all portions of the continent save the extreme south. It is the peculiar mental bent of the white man, his deliberate blindness in coloured lands, his desire at all costs to secure administrative uniformity, to conform to received opinions, which in the last analysis invites revolt. He has pity for the weak, but no sense of sympathy, no inclination really to understand a point of view other than his own. For him such an attitude of mind is the sign of racial weakness and nothing else. When — as in the Southern States of America, in Brazil, in the West Indies, in parts of South Africa — the coloured man is inexorably assigned a definite place by mere force of numbers or from other dominant considerations, and is, moreover, because of particular circumstances, necessary

for the prosperity and even the continued existence of the white man, then only does he agree to accept him at a somewhat different valuation; and regionalism received yet another meaning, and that regionalism springs into being because black frankly copies white and calls him master. But in the major part of Africa the black man will never try to make himself the closest imitation possible of the white man, as he does where he is an exotic; nor, again, can he become half-white in his thoughts, as he perhaps manages to do in America. The African conditions forbid that; and because they forbid it the problem becomes more and more involved.

Still admitting all this, it remains to be said that the Christianising of the negro, weaning him from the militant bent of mind which he assumes under Islam, can still effect something towards diminishing the dangers which have now been roughly outlined; and therefore the Christianising of the negro will certainly have in future days much greater political importance than it has now. Africa indeed is the one remaining region in the world where the spread of Christianity is to be heartily desired on every possible ground, for much of Africa is really virgin soil. If the negro, in measure as he is civilised, goes towards Islamism, he must become a greater peril than ever; if he is Christianised his destructive strength is stripped from him, much as was Samson's strength when his locks were cut. The part the white man is politically called upon to play in Africa is, then, the part of Delilah and no other. For over the length and breadth of Africa the white man can never be much more than a temporary schoolmaster, who will be listened to in proportion

to the large-mindedness he displays in dealing with unfamiliar problems. His present success as an administrator has nothing whatever to do with the ultimate problems which must arise; for administrative ability is a peculiar mechanical talent which almost all white men have to a greater or lesser extent — a talent bearing scant relation to more serious matters, and largely consisting, in the lands of the coloured man, in solving questions of elementary finance and elementary justice.

Let us give an illustration of this which will hardly be welcomed, but which is none the less illuminating, as it shows that what is beneath the surface is not changed by what is noted on the surface. There have been few more able administrators than Lord Cromer in modern times; yet his entire political policy in Egypt has meant nothing at all, however clever his finance may have been. And yet it might have been very different. For when the so-called “maker of modern Egypt” arrived in that country a quarter of a century ago to undertake his gigantic task, the instrument for governing lay ready to his hand in the resident Turkish aristocracy. In spite of the financial disaster in which these men had plunged the country, they knew how to deal with the Egyptians in a way which Englishmen can never know. Yet, instead of setting them to work to aid in the grand reconstruction, their services were ignored, and it was once more that political danger — the ignorant young Englishman fresh from the schools — who was requisitioned for work only suited to mature men. The lesson of Egypt has travelled very far, much farther than even far-seeing men think; for coloured men

laugh at the things which are among the dearest idols of Europe, and know that when those idols are carried abroad, the days of their existence are strictly limited. And this is perhaps as much as it is politic to say.

To sum up. For the white man the black problem may thus be finally divided into two distant halves—that is, what may be called internal black problems, and the great external black problem, the real and final problem. The “internal black problems” are more or less local issues. The future of the negro in America, of the native in Madagascar, in the Philippines, in the countless islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific, cannot affect the progress of the world very materially. Here the man of colour, if he is not “cribbed, cabined, and confined,” is at least so situated that the white man can and will effectively control him. In all these cases the black man has been either for longer or shorter periods the obedient follower of the white man. He has been the white man’s imitator, his henchman. He may rebel, but he cannot bring about a great and abiding revolution in the relations between the races, unless, as was the case with the French in Hayti a century ago, vacillation and folly become the order of the day. Thus, for instance, in Sumatra the Dutch have been fighting dark-skinned native tribes for more than a generation; but though this warfare has lasted so long, it is of no general importance. For since the white man commands the sea, by means of the sea he isolates such recalcitrants; and such contests have consequently nothing but purely local interest.

The outer problem is very different. It is the great problem. It is the problem of the future of all Africa

to which such extended reference has already been made; and it is a problem which must be considered as it is, with the grievous limitations of the whites steadily borne in mind. Just as a leading British soldier did not hesitate to say that the north of India contains materials sufficient to shake half-a-dozen empires to their foundations, so does Northern Africa with its mixture of negro and Arab — not to speak of limitless Central Africa — contain materials just as combustible and as little understood. It is perhaps fortunate for the world that no stagnant Power, but a virile Power such as England, still stands entrenched on the banks of the Nile, whilst from the south men of the same confederation reach towards Central Africa with their new white commonwealth. For even though England may be outstripped in the frantic race which has commenced in Europe, the new Englands can never be outstripped; and the brawn and muscle of Canada, Australasia and South Africa can always re-adjust the general balance throughout the world. That a stagnant Power such as France should dominate all North-Western Africa adds to the black menace.¹ The crime of an arrested birth-rate may

¹ The question of North Africa — where France, as the master of Algeria, the protector of Tunis, and the dominator of Morocco and Tripoli, is the white man's representative — is from day to day becoming more acute, because, primarily, of the steady fall in the French birth-rate. Thus the military levies of France, which in 1907 were 457,000 men, have now fallen to 433,000 men, and statistics show that within ten years this annual number will be reduced to 399,000 men.

In these circumstances the garrisoning of Algeria, which has a European population of three-quarters of a million, out of a total population of more than five million natives surrounded by countless millions of kith and kin living across the open frontiers,

be punished far beyond the limits of the sands of the Sahara; and the efforts of more virile races may be unavailing to speak the last word properly because of the inherent weakness of a white Power that owns a large portion of a vast potential powder-magazine.

The total conclusion is not very satisfactory for the European — far less satisfactory than it has been in the case of the detailed consideration of Asia. The subject is to-day too complex, the details too confused to be properly handled. The negro must be conquered to improve, and the only man who can really conquer and improve him in his African home seems to be the Arab. The political future of the Arab, during the present century at least, hinges largely on the future of Turkey and the extent to which the modern idea of

is a grave question; and the manner in which the French are now determined to make good their deficiency in white troops is highly significant. Senegalese sharpshooter battalions, already extensively employed in West Africa and Madagascar, are to be gradually brought into North Africa until a strong black army is locally formed. As the supply of Senegal Soudanese blacks is practically unlimited, it is merely a question of training and officers to raise, in the case of necessity, unlimited forces of men, who have proved their devotion to their masters too clearly in the past to leave any doubt as to their attitude in the future. As France in 1870 did not hesitate to use Arab troops in small numbers against Germany, it is quite conceivable that some day dozens of Soudanese battalions may be flung against the Teuton if he dares to cross the frontiers of Alsace-Lorraine. What vistas does not this open up! For if France shows her willingness to adopt such tactics, England will not linger far behind, and divisions of Indian troops may some day be entrained on the Persian frontier for the Mediterranean coasts. History will be repeating itself, and the balance of power maintained by methods which were familiar in the days of the Roman Empire.

a State, with all that it implies, can be diffused over the vast Moslem regions which still remain in a condition of solution.

But this much can be said — that far more savagery must be expected in this quarter of the coloured world than in any other part. This is the one region where no mercy need be expected, where the old Crusader's idea is still a useful beacon. The need for establishing an Asiatic balance of power which shall exist independent of Europe, a need already so strongly urged in these pages, becomes more pressing when one realises how much in all Africa will depend on this, and how intimately the negro and the cross-breed will be affected in a few decades by the march of events across the Suez cuttings.

Still there is one more word to be said. The sun is the white man's last ally in hot countries, just as the snow is Russia's last ally in her ice-bound home. The sun speaks the first and last word — it says, Rise and fight with blind rage; and it says, Lie down and die silently like fatalists, because men who possess the magic contained in cold air reservoirs cannot be conquered beyond certain limits. The sun has marked men with its taint, more and more darkly as the Equator is approached, until ebony black and rank cannibalism show the depths to which human beings can be reduced. That the nobler races should ever be called upon to measure strength with such as these is itself ignoble. Yet it is not from the ebony-black that so much is to be feared as from lighter-coloured men. It is these men who may rise against Europe and lead the others, it is these who may inspire a general black revolt, thus

upsetting in many vital particulars in distant days the confident calculations of those who, born and bred in temperate climes, can never know more of men's thoughts and ambitions in such mysterious lands than they do of the thoughts and ambitions of the possible men of Mars. And with that one must end.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

THE survey which has been made of the peculiar conditions prevailing to-day throughout the non-Caucasian world — that is, the analysis of the treble problem of Yellow, Brown, and Black — though necessarily condensed, and in many other respects very imperfect, should be sufficient to afford in a variety of ways some proof of the pressing need that really exists for abandoning the old and narrow views regarding Asia and Africa which, while perhaps permissible until the end of last century, are now hopelessly out-of-date.

Briefly, unless the future progress of the world is to be upset by vast conflicts, those Powers which are vitally and truly interested in the maintenance of a general peace should see to it that permanent, and not temporary, measures of relief are undertaken without undue delay. Such measures will only be practicable when the intimate connection between all the coloured world is officially recognised, and the real goal — an Asiatic-African balance of power which shall ultimately exist independent of Europe — is earnestly aimed at. That can be the one and only true means of securing peace.

Fortunately, so rapidly can reform be effected in points of view, one is able to-day at last to note that a respectable proportion of the intelligent men throughout the world are at last abandoning stereotyped ideas, and are showing, in many different countries, that they earnestly wish to march with the times. In other words, there are some signs to be seen that European civilisation, which has now been for so long in close contact with the civilisations of India, China, Japan, Persia, Egypt, and Turkey, and other minor countries, a civilisation which has been in some haste to drive home the necessity of employing its own peculiar political forms — notably, constitutionalism and representative government — is now willing to admit that the judicial forms it has derived from Rome, the religion it has taken from Palestine, and the ideals of beauty which it has borrowed from Greece, as well as the system of government it owes to the barbarian conquerors of Rome, do not necessarily comprise all that is good in the world ; and that other civilisations, equally eclectic, may flourish and bring contentment to their owners. Men, having too long been fully occupied in examining historical causation, may soon be tempted to study climatic influences. There is, in any case, a perceptible pause to be noted in the propagandist activities of the white man, probably because he instinctively realises that, though his inventions and his forms may be readily accepted, the spirit of the non-white populations of the world remains precisely the same as it has always been; in a word, that no matter how much externals may be altered, men retain certain unalterable qualities and ideas which are rooted in

climate and environment. To him who knows both East and West there must always be a certain element of amusement in the present conflict, with its pulpit protestations and pious wishes, and all its sombre underlying enmity and ill-feeling. Let us say it outright — the world, in international affairs, is now almost openly given over to play-acting; and yet only a few keen-minded are frank enough to admit that this is so.

For though the opinions of many of those who may be called “intellectuals” have changed, such men form only tiny handfuls, living far in advance of the bulk of their countrymen, and distrusted by them because their newer doctrines necessarily clash with received opinions inherited from olden days. Such latter-day opinions are therefore still without first-class political importance. Politically, both in Europe and America, in the last analysis the main factors still remain the prejudiced and unintelligent millions, whose passions and ambitions can only be fully aroused by old and well-known war-cries, and who turn unmeaning faces towards that which is novel. To them the coloured man has always been an enemy to be blindly contemned; an enemy he still remains. The geography of two such immense continents as Africa and Asia is no more understood than is their destiny; and the popular mind still peoples these lands much as Gulliver peopled Lilliput and Brobdingnag and Laputa, with pygmies and giants and knavish projectors.

This real domination of unintelligent opinion is what politicians would seem to acknowledge in their exterior policy, if one is to understand their motives from the unscientific and piecemeal manner in which foreign

affairs are still dealt with in the chancelleries of all save perhaps autocratic countries. And this is the very reason why it is to be feared that, until there have been fresh catastrophes in Asia and Africa, the necessity for a proper and radical revision of the political relationships existing between West and East will never be recognised. When, for instance, one contrasts the amount of scientific labour which Asiatic countries themselves already expend on treating problems arising from contact with Europe, with the small place Asiatic affairs still occupy in important European chancelleries in comparison with European affairs — when one fully realises this lack of political reciprocity — there can only be a feeling of profound dissatisfaction at the want of foresight shown by those who are so constantly proclaiming that they lead. All their energies would appear to be consumed in idle work; for it is only possible to designate as idle work such things as *ententes* and other temporary alliances not entered into for the permanent advantage of mankind, but from a false orientation of political rivalries.

For to-day it has been made plain once again in a variety of ways that just as the average Englishman finds it so hard to get rid of the old “colonial” idea — the idea that countries such as Canada and Australia and New Zealand, and now South Africa, belong to him and are his very own to exploit and patronise as he will — so would the average white man appear to cling with desperation to old-fashioned assumptions in regard to Asia, which, in the same degree as the “colonial” idea is irritating to the men of England’s overseas dominions, arouse the open ire of intelligent Asiatics. It is true that the American is the least

inclined of all men of the white races to accept such established prejudices, since his own history has taught him the peculiar nature of colour questions, whilst patronising opinions, belonging to unintelligent monarchies rather than to open-eyed republics, are not popular with him. And this is the reason why the very brusqueness with which the Washington State Department handles vast issues, the very unconcern with which it dogmatises on burning questions, is to-day so eminently refreshing. At least it denotes an openness of mind, as well as frankness and moral courage, instead of that dolorous formalism, that subserviency to received opinions, that timorous backing and filling, which remains the curse of official Europe. The American attitude gives promise of great possibilities when public opinion is ripe for the taking of great measures; and for this every open-minded man should be thankful.

For great measures will soon be necessary — no one need any longer doubt that — if to-day, when there is still time to shape the march of events by wise diplomacy, a childish complacency regarding the future is the general attitude, and especially the attitude of England.

By far the most important development which has come during three centuries of Asiatic history — a development which is bound to have the most profound influence in future times on all nations — is the rise of the first real Asiatic sea Power, without there being any real indications of the rise of a second or third Asiatic sea Power to counterbalance this great and remarkable force, which is determined at all costs to preserve the predominance it has so signally won, and is content to be second to no one on the waters

of the Pacific. This is a fact that now flames up like a torch in the night.

It is true that to go no farther back than the later Middle Ages, when the world was very narrow and confined, Turkey, the other Asiatic David, was a sea Power of some importance, and Turkish galleys incessantly fought with the galleys of the Italian Republics, not to speak of others, for the mastery of the Mediterranean lake. But that was rather infantile warfare when compared with modern affairs of permanent world-importance, when compared with the immense forces which the world's innumerable drilled millions now put in intelligent battle-array. It was similar to the warfare which England had as a common experience from the time of King Alfred and the Danes, and which, while it may be considered valuable as a schooling for the nations, was without general historical importance.

For, to keep to the same example, it may be said that the bounds of Turkish dominion were set by forces other than human forces — that a reading of history and physiographic study make clear. Turkey made three great efforts to secure a commanding navy in the Mediterranean, and each time it was deemed necessary by Europe, and was therefore possible, to destroy that navy. At Lepanto, in 1571, the united fleets of Spain, Malta, Genoa, Venice, and Pius V. crushed the Turk; once more, at the passage of Scio in 1770, Russia and England defeated him; and finally at Navarino in 1827 England, France, and Russia repeated this signal performance. Maritime Turkey was therefore really always a hostage in the hands of Europe, when Europe chose to rise up and strike hard. Though to-day the Turkish navy has a paper strength of six vice-admirals, eleven

rear-admirals, 208 captains, 289 commanders, 228 lieutenants, 187 ensigns, and 39,000 sailors and marines, and though European gold and European officers are engaged in converting this paper force into something more effective, Turkey as a sea Power can never escape from the trap of the Mediterranean. In a word, offensively — offensive power being the only true measure of strength — Turkey is a negligible quantity.

The growth of a real Asiatic sea Power efficient in every way, a Power whose conceptions are not paludic but truly pelagic, a Power which has the greatest ocean in the world lying free around it, is of far greater consequence to the white man than has yet been properly realised, though a great deal has already been tentatively written on the subject. For the modern counterpart of Navarino is Tsushima. This is equivalent to admitting that Japan can already restrain Europe in eastern Asia, just as eastern Europe has always been able to restrain the Turk. But there is more than that. So far from geography setting any limits to Japanese strength, geography sets no limits at all.¹ America is the nearest restraint, and America is five thousand miles away.

¹ It is significant and worthy of being specially referred to that Japan has already commenced discussing the advisability of adopting a two-Power naval standard, that is, a navy sufficiently strong to withstand the fleets which any two Powers could afford to concentrate in the waters of eastern Asia without jeopardising their other interests. It seems plain that the only naval combination she need ever fear is an Anglo-American combination, which, even with a hostile Germany, could concentrate a battle-fleet superior to any the Japanese can afford to build for many decades, unless, and this is the important point, the resources of China are placed at her disposal. *Verbum sat sapienti.*

When it is remembered that deep-sea navigation, that is, trans-oceanic navigation, has hitherto been the special prerogative of the white man, and that even he only learned the secret some four centuries ago, the remarkable importance of modern Japan should be better understood. For four hundred years the mastery of the ocean has given the white man the virtual mastery of the world. Though small portions of the world were more or less civilised certainly as far back as fifty centuries ago; though man has been on this planet for at least a thousand centuries, and some now say for ten thousand centuries, it is only during the last four hundred years that the regular and systematic navigation of the ocean highway has been possible. That was the vigorous white man's prerogative; he learnt it in the bitter school of suffering and not solely by the aid of the mariner's compass, which China, for instance, possessed long ago. Now on the Pacific that prerogative has been partially lost.

It is true, of course, that long before the sailing of the Atlantic and the rediscovery of America by Columbus four hundred years ago — that spectacular voyage in cockle-shell craft, which opened this marvellous chapter of maritime history and which is one of Europe's proudest achievements — Arab and Chinese navigators had coasted regularly all round Asia and built up a profitable trade. The great Venetian, Marco Polo, has left on clear record how he brought an imperial bride from China to Persia by sea, and he himself described how enormous were the Chinese junks and their crews even in those distant days.

Still, all maritime activity in the thirteenth century and of earlier times was really coastwise; and though there is reason to believe that Buddhist monks from

China, sailing boldy across the greatest ocean in the world, actually reached the Pacific coasts of America fifteen hundred years ago — the mariner's compass having been discovered independently by the Chinese, just as gun-powder was so discovered by them — that voyage must be classed with the adventurous Norsemen's first discovery of the Atlantic coasts of America in a slighty later period. Each was a marine *tour de force* having no abiding results. Regular ocean navigation only commenced with the activities of the daring Portuguese and Spanish and other navigators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries — activities which soon resulted in the discovery of the sea-routes to every part of the world. Before those discoveries geography was so obscure and maps so fanciful that when Columbus set sail to cross the Atlantic he did not dream of reaching America, a continent whose existence was then not even suspected, but only the islands of Japan marked on Marco Polo's thirteenth century maps as Chipangu, and long falsely celebrated for their gold. Thus it is exceedingly curious to-day to reflect that indirectly it was Japan, just as much as the Indies, which was the golden lure that started Europe on that vast trans-oceanic activity which has led to such great and far-reaching results. There is perhaps some poetic justice in the fact that these islands of the East are at last taking payment for the moral debt which is owed them.

Now, if the vigour and strength of Europe were to-day ranged in the forefront of world-politics, as they were in those old explorers' days, when Spain and Portugal, and later, Holland and France and England, were employing their best endeavours and all the genius

they could summon in trans-oceanic activities, it is hard to believe that even in the political to-morrow the conflict of colour would find the white man worsted, no matter on what terms that conflict might be fought. For the Teutonic and Slav races have gathered strength and vigour in measure as the Latin races — the first leaders in this ocean-race — have lost strength and vigour; and to-day the great masses of population acknowledging either German Kaiser or Russian Czar as overlord, are now almost equal to the rest of Europe's population.

But though this growth of numbers has transferred the European balance of power to hands other than those which once held it, it is a melancholy fact that in the outer world, that is, in the non-European world, the old-time conditions still remain much the same. That France, the last of the Latin Powers to remain among the world's great navigators, should still be in possession of vast colonies in Africa and Asia which she cannot be counted on permanently to retain, since she is standing still whilst the rest of the world is rapidly advancing, is an open menace to European supremacy throughout the world. That she is being maintained in that position principally to prevent Germany from taking her place, is another well-acknowledged and melancholy fact. Spain and Portugal having virtually lost all their colonies, and having finally sunk to fourth-rate Powers, it is amply clear that if the white man's overlordship is to remain even during this present century, it will be entirely through the agency of the Teutonic races on sea — the English, the American, the Germans — and largely through the agency of the Slavs on land. No amount of argument,

no amount of insane shouting, can gainsay the fact that Germany does not to-day occupy the position throughout the world which racially she is now entitled to occupy.¹ As the whole strength of Great Britain's foreign policy is concentrated on maintaining the present unstable *status quo* — that is, restraining Germany and aiding a decadent Power, France; pitting Japan against Russia in the Far East; refusing to assist in any large constructive plans in China; bolstering up Turkey without any clear conception of what that policy may lead to; vainly hoping that the Korea of the Middle East, Persia, will somehow remain intact; coquetting with the internal problem of India — in a word playing, rather than properly dealing, with a mass of serious problems; as this is the avowed British policy, there is no possible means of forecasting what may or may not happen in the near future. In spite of the renown which they have won, it may be said that practically every one of the political arrangements entered into of recent years by England savour of mere politicians' devices for warding off evils rather than of statesman-like attempts to go to the root of troubles and determine once and for all what should be done during a long

¹ The manner in which the recent continuous agitation against the designs of Germany has awakened a thrill of sympathy in every part of the British Empire must not be taken as weakening in any way the force of this argument. Of course, men of the same race must always have many things in common. A year before Bunker's Hill Americans always spoke of England as "Home." But though a senseless animosity may be kindled by a persistent campaign of words, such ebullitions of feeling are necessarily short-lived, and men, when they have been calmed by the flux of a little time, return to a belief in what may be called primal political considerations. These can all be summed up in one compound word — self-interest.

term of years. This is precisely the policy of the ancient Chinese — the policy of building Great Walls to ward off evils; the use of negative power rather than of positive power; the policy of postponement; and what such a policy inevitably brings in its train has a hundred times been made clear. To over-concentration on European affairs, primarily induced by the supplanting of France by Germany, must then be traced the present very real deadlock throughout the entire world.¹

Yet, if men were willing to-day to take a proper panoramic view of history, and to see things in their true proportions, this inevitable change would not appear so fearful. It was just such a change wrought in the eighteenth century which gave England her present position; and to-day, no matter what new changes may come to Europe, there should be no harm to England if England to herself remains true. The objective point of view is admittedly the only one which can have permanent political importance, the only one, surely, which should be constantly sought; but it is precisely that point of view which is to-day carefully avoided. Self-interest has assumed such importance; the needs of the passing hour are deemed so supreme; the craven fears regarding the rise of trium-

¹ But let us note this. If Germany to-day overshadows France, to-morrow Russia, with the aid of her immense birth-rate, must overshadow Germany. In 1950 one hundred million Germans may menace forty million Frenchmen twice as cruelly as to-day; but these hundred million Germans will in turn be then menaced by two hundred and fifty million Russians, who can thus crush them by mere weight of numbers. And by the end of the century there should be four hundred millions of such Russians!

phant ochlocracies are so widespread, that the world has rapidly become filled with a generation of misologists who know not what they seek. "Sufficient unto the hour is the evil thereof" is the popular political shibboleth; everyone displays a cunctative disposition; and whilst even thirty years ago an Armenian massacre aroused concern, to-day synalgia is looked upon as the forerunner of a stupid antiperistasis which can only lead to the most unfortunate results. Any plan which is really logical is looked upon as prompted by a Catilinarian attitude. A common phenomenon is held to be a noumenon, and hands are often helplessly raised, and fears constantly expressed, that European civilisation may one day be engulfed in a vast Asiatic-African movement. That things should have come to such a pass is the crowning irony of a sapient age.

For to those who have not hopelessly surrendered themselves to narrow conceptions, the origin of which must be sought in the modern growth of nationalism and the resultant friction, world-politics during very many centuries indeed can be reduced to a few grand movements, by far the most significant of which is the rôle Asia has constantly and consistently played towards Europe, to Europe's lasting advantage. Briefly, not only has Asia been Europe's schoolmaster in thought, but Asia has been the anvil on which the steel of Europe has been hardened. To-day, if Asia is properly used, Asia can re-adjust the European balance. Let us first look at the rôle Asia has already played.

From the days of the dismemberment of the Roman Empire, brought about, let us not forget, by the migrations of those very white barbarians who have now grown into the rulers of the world, the state of

solution in which Europe was left would have certainly endured much longer had it not been for this one cause — Asia. By a succession of vast onslaughts, widely distant perhaps in point of time and place, but always directed with the utmost vehemence, and thereby setting in motion other vast movements, Asia shook and hardened Europe to new life, thus re-opening a second chapter in the never-ending story of the conflict between East and West, the first chapter of which had been the Græco-Roman period, when Greek and Roman had struggled for mastery with Oriental Empires. This second chapter, like the first chapter, roughly covered a period of a thousand years.

The terrible Huns or Tartars, whose invasions deflected from a south-easterly direction to a north-westerly direction by the Great Wall of China, were the first men to carry fire and sword into the very heart of Europe, always annihilating or driving the white barbarians in front of them, until their crushing defeat in France in the fifth century became the signal for the sudden rise of the more advanced Germanic races, which had already absorbed the outlying portions of the Roman Empire. Considered from the point of view of the foundations of modern Europe, this battle of white Europe against Attila and the Huns, so fitly immortalised by Gibbon in his great work, was the first hammer-blow on the Asiatic anvil — a blow which, while it marked the final disappearance of a world-empire, brought about the birth of several nations. Asia, therefore, acted the part of a maleutic; and that was the part it soon acted again.

The next blow came from the Arabs three centuries later. Having already conquered Spain and almost

annihilated the Visigoths, at the beginning of the eighth century vast clouds of Arabs poured across the Pyrenees. Once again on French soil was it that the man of colour was smitten hip and thigh, and by so doing France was born. Charles, fitly surnamed the Hammer, had once more come down on the anvil, this time with such crushing force that, although the Moors retained parts of Spain for more than seven hundred years, four centuries were to elapse before there were any fresh assaults on Europe by non-Aryan races. Then the second Tartar invasion began, and the Mongols, streaming across the vast plains of south-eastern Europe and conquering all Russia, were beaten under the very walls of Vienna largely by the aid of the Hungarians — themselves nothing but Asiatics left behind from the flood of the first Asiatic invasions of the fifth century. Finally the Ottoman Turks, beginning the attack in the extreme south-east, crossed from Asia Minor and rivalling the successes of the Arabs in Spain eight centuries before, captured the whole Byzantine Empire, and were only arrested after immense struggles along the line of the Danube — thus terminating in the fifteenth century the vast series of forays which had been deliberately undertaken against Europe. Four times, then, in the course of a thousand years was Europe invaded by most powerful hordes, and each time that the invaders were finally shattered powerful European nations arose from the ruins of battlefields. That is one aspect which it is well to-day to remember, for though each case is well known, men are apt to forget that the conflict with Asia was practically unending, hundreds of years being consumed in winning final victory and completely ejecting the

invaders. This was the case with the Huns, with the Arabs, with the Mongols, with the Turks, and with them the last word has not yet been spoken.

This historic struggle, which is seldom rightfully considered in its action and reaction on the peoples of Europe, together with one other factor, is undoubtedly the explanation of the white man's present position all the world over. Had it been possible for Europe to isolate herself, as China largely succeeded in doing for two thousand years, by building artificial barriers; had Europe not been forced to fight almost unendingly along open frontiers; had she not been so close to Asia and Africa that they were always in view, the world would be a very different place to-day. First one European nation, then another went through that hardening process which necessarily awakens all the highest faculties and brings the highest virtues into play; and in this connection it is a noteworthy fact that the English until the time of Elizabeth — that is, until they began to go to distant foreign parts to fight — were noted throughout Europe for their dulness, their lethargy and their general lack of enterprise. What is the explanation of this phenomenon? That whilst Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Hungary, Germany, and Muscovy had been continually engaged in warfare with coloured foes, with whom it was almost constantly a question of winning or being exterminated, England remained entirely immune from such onslaughts. Had it not been for her French wars, all valour, all ambition might have vanished. Competition is good, warfare is better, and terrific onslaughts are the best of all. It is adversity — the battle, murder and sudden death against which we pray, but which remains our surest hope of earthly

salvation — which alone strengthens the character of nations and determines men to win or die. And to-day that there should be a new menace in Europe is good and proper.¹

¹ A great deal of misleading writing would be avoided if on the subject of modern armaments, in relation to modern trade, industry and capitalism as well as modern numbers, a proper method of comparison were followed. Concerning these burdens — for armaments are now universally so-called, though the expression is inaccurate — it is best to look at figures.

At the time that England was engaged in erecting the British Empire a century and a half ago by persistent warfare, it was common for the fleet to have no less than 70,000 or 80,000 seamen aboard ship (in 1800 the number was 135,000); whilst no fewer than a quarter of a million men manned the eight thousand sail which traded to all parts of the world. The population of the United Kingdom, together with the North American Colonies, was then perhaps nine or ten millions, or only one-fifth of the present population of Great Britain and Ireland. To-day, that is, in the registers of the year 1908, there are in the Royal Navy a total number of seamen only amounting to 128,000 men; in the merchant marine there are 11,626 steamers and 9,542 small and large sailing vessels manned by 275,721 persons. To be in the same numerical proportion as 150 years ago, the war strength of the British Navy should be anywhere from 350,000 to 400,000 men; the merchant marine should be manned by 1,000,000 persons! Sea-power then does not entail anything like the drain of men it once did, which is an important point, whilst in the matter of cost the burden, relatively speaking, has enormously fallen. In round numbers England has lately been spending about £70,000,000 sterling upon her army and navy—or a sum equivalent to 7 per cent. of the gross value of her foreign trade. To put it differently, assuming that foreign and colonial investments represent an invested capital of three thousand million sterling, producing a revenue of £150,000,000 sterling per annum; and that British steam-tonnage represents an invested capital of £1,500,000,000 (roughly ten million tons at £15 per ton), earning at 5 per cent. per annum £75,000,000, then from these two foreign sources there is yearly incoming no less than £215,000,000 sterling, or more than three times the yearly cost of British arma-

There was, of course, another factor in this vast evolution of the white races in conflict with other races. This factor, of course, was nothing less than Christianity; but not, as theologians love erroneously to point out, because Christianity as a religious system has any special virtue, but because Christianity supplied just that permanent and universal organisation and inspiration which were needed by rude and unimaginative peoples to give them discipline, and to intensify

ments. No account is here taken of trading profits on a gross annual United Kingdom trade of a thousand millions sterling. Considering that a hundred years ago the trade of all England was not above a hundred millions sterling and that 150 years ago it was not fifty millions sterling — with no investments abroad of any value — it is difficult to understand how costly wars were then continually waged, unless it was that the temper of the people was very different. Thus the Seven Years' War cost £122,000,000 sterling, a sum equal to-day to several times that amount, whilst the Napoleonic Wars probably cost at least seven times the cost of the Boer War.

The conclusion is that, comparatively speaking, armaments are to-day not costly, if considered in relation to what they protect; and that, even regarded as unproductive capital, war-fleets are somewhat wrongly considered. Apart from the fact that they represent the highest mechanical application of the human faculties; that they are a direct encouragement to inventors; that their production directly affects the activities of hundreds of thousands of the most skilled workers — apart from these considerations, they are among the most valuable schools in Europe and therefore merit permanent and continuous endowment. Ethically speaking they are of far greater value than classical universities: if you destroyed such universities the loss would scarcely be felt, whereas the abolition of navies and armies would in two generations produce the most profound and terrible results, not only in ideals, but in the economic welfare of the white races. It is time, then, that so-called pacifists were told in no uncertain language to hold their tongues — not by politicians, but by statisticians. In all truth a little learning has made them mad.

the conflict with Asia and Africa. The discipline of the Christian church was absolutely essential in Europe at a time when the idea of nationality was virtually non-existent, and colour, creed, and camp were the sole guiding beacons.¹ The political mark which the Christian church has consequently made in Europe can never be wholly effaced, though it is a mark entirely different from anything which could be anticipated from a reading of the Gospels. The Crusades, by promoting this discipline and giving to it a military character, by taking men abroad and teaching them the story of the outer world, completed the valuable work begun by Asia and Africa, and consequently by the time of the last Turkish forays a very different Europe had sprung into existence.

A new abuse, however, had been born from the very fact that the imposition of church discipline on the white races had been so eminently successful; and here, in the correction which followed, Europe was once again not indirectly but directly indebted to Asia. The renascence of learning in Europe was mainly brought about by the Turkish conquest of Constantinople and the consequent dispersal of Byzantine scholars over the length and breadth of Europe. As the knowledge which these men possessed, faulty and

¹ The natural corollary of this is that in an age like the present age when not only is nationality well fixed, but education well advanced, and enlightenment almost general, such institutions as established churches, *i.e.*, *quasi-government* churches, are anachronisms. Such mediæval survivals, though they may do some good, do more harm, not unwittingly but unwittingly, which is the worst form of all. Religion is a strictly private matter and not a public matter; this has been understood in China for many centuries.

peculiar though it was, spread far and wide, historical causation was better understood, and there speedily grew up that rationalism, the first clear expression of which was the Reformation, a movement which is one of the most remarkable proofs ever given that the human mind can rise superior to all artificial impediments. The scales fell from the eyes of many who had been blind, and the Reformation was soon in full swing. Though reaction followed action it mattered nothing, for the necessary impulse had been given to set in motion the vast train of events which resulted in the white man's mastery, if not of the whole earth, at least of the five seas. It was the Asiatic conquest of Constantinople which lighted that flaming torch.

The consequence was that there followed for the coloured peoples exactly what the most vigorous among them had for ages attempted to do to the white men. Yet there was one important difference. Instead of conducting frontal attacks, that is, land attacks, the conquest of the sea, conferring the priceless advantage of making flank-attacks, gave a different aspect, and thus success was easily won.¹ Navigators first 'dis-

¹ "From the days of the Romans down to the fifteenth century, the peoples of Western Europe were never brought into contact with uncivilised coloured races. They fought and traded with Eastern nations, but they fought and traded with them as equals. The Saracen was at least as civilised as the Crusader, the Moor was more civilised than the Gothic noble of Spain. If Christians took Mohammedans captive, Moslems in their turn owned Christian slaves; and the competition between East and West was a competition between rival races and rival religions, neither of which could claim any marked outward superiority over the other. The result of the discoveries of the fifteenth century was to bring Europeans for the first time face to face with multitudes of human beings on an obviously lower level than

covered' new lands in every direction in which they sailed. Quickly the whole world was unmasked to the eyes of the white man. Then he began landing suddenly on the most distant shores, and mainly with the aid of his modern magic — firearms — soon made the most rapid conquests.

It was indeed magic when one realises the condition of Europe up to the time of the discovery of America, in spite of its reputed civilisation. Narrow, circumscribed, superstitious, childish, with the remains of feudalism still openly cumbering the ground, it was enough to make wise men weep. Europe knew next to nothing that was worth knowing; it was so bigoted that the fiercest cruelties were exalted into holy punishments ordered under the name of Christ; it was so childish that what Shakespeare wrote about the savage men "whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders," was firmly believed in and pictorially represented on

themselves, the more promising among them being child-like and childish, the less promising, little removed from the beasts that perish. Even where a civilisation was found, like that of the Aztecs, it was clearly based on savagery and paganism, attracting the animal instinct of the invaders, their lust, and their avarice, but not in any way appealing to any higher sense or suggesting favourable comparison with European types of life. Into these strange new worlds of Africa and America there came white men from beyond the seas, bold, strong, enthusiastic, but withal half-civilised themselves, fierce and brutal, fanatical to the last degree, the law of whose life was force. Bond-service and villeinage had long been an integral element in the social system of Europe, and slavery was countenanced at once by custom and by religion. The roughest and rudest specimens of rough and rude peoples, in a rough and rude time, found themselves in the presence of men and women who feared, who admired, who in some cases adored them as almost divine." — Lucas: *Historical Geography of the Colonies*, Vol. III., page 72.

maps; it was so superstitious that the modern schoolboy could scarcely be restrained from mirth at the very mention of some of its most cherished beliefs.

Yet in spite of all this Europe knew how to do one thing: it could fight superbly under the strictest discipline, and immense privations were borne in silence in order to accomplish given ends. The iron of Europe had been hardened on the Asiatic anvil into the finest steel; and with the priceless advantage of firearms it was a mere question of time for the whole world to be dominated, if not entirely conquered.

This is what actually happened. Columbus discovered America in 1492. In less than a single generation from that historic discovery, maritime activity resulted in the charting of most of the world.¹ From the Cape of Good Hope to the Indies; from China to the Straits of Magellan; in a word from one end of the world to the other, men at last boldly sailed the seas. Though the Turk, for a few short decades after his capture of Constantinople, imagined that he had seized the

¹ The voyages of the Elizabethan seaman are not especially mentioned here for the very good reason that Hawkins, Frobisher, Drake, and the rest of the illustrious company of the sixteenth century English navigators, were only amplifying Portuguese discoveries — to use an expression which is slightly jesuitical. The epoch-making discoveries were all made between 1492 and 1517 — that is, during a period of twenty-five years, or roughly one generation. Queen Elizabeth did not come to the throne until 1558; and the new race of Englishmen, devoted to a maritime career, was really formed by the endorsement given both by throne and people to the piratical warfare which was waged against Spain in the New World. To put it frankly, England was quite asleep until the lust of gold bit her; then her destiny asserted itself and she rushed forth to the conquest of the world.

very gateway of European commerce with the East, had throttled Europe, he was soon disillusioned. New routes, new oceans, new continents had suddenly been discovered, and the Mediterranean and the Red Sea soon sank to possessing the importance of great lakes and nothing more. On the broad waters of the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean, the aspirations of a greater Europe were unmasked. Portuguese and Spaniard, giving to their conquest a semi-religious character — fighting under the Cross rather than under the flag—repeated the remarkable exploits of Islamism and well deserved the Papal Bull which was their earthly reward. Their fabulous conquests in the new world, in the Indies, in Africa, in the islands of the Pacific, in the extreme East, have never been paralleled save perhaps by eighteenth century England. It was warfare and competition between the other Atlantic Powers and these men of the advance-guard which made Holland, France and England successively great.¹ And this is another thing which it is good to-day to remember.

¹ It is a significant fact, due primarily to geographical considerations, that only those European nations with an ocean frontage have been of world-importance (Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, England). Other northern Europeans — Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Russia — might perhaps have played a greater rôle in the sailing-ship days had they not been engaged constantly in local warfare. As it was, Sweden and Denmark did make some attempts at colonising, more notably the former on the American Continent, the latter in the West Indies and in West Africa — but such attempts were trifling. Italy, with all its wonderful traditions of the trading Republics, has had no influence on world-history because it was shut in by the shores of the Mediterranean. To effect any historical mission the open sea is a prime necessity. Japan well understands this.

But time was needed in those unscientific days to accomplish far-reaching work. Therefore though Europe discovered practically the whole outer world in so few years, the work of conquest has gone on unendingly from the beginning of the sixteenth century down to within memory of the present day. Though the same motive inspired the white invaders as had inspired the early coloured invaders of Europe, the desire for loot and nothing else, they accomplished their end, as we have said, by a new means—by using the ocean as their highroad and not dry land. This gave him the priceless advantage of striking before his presence was properly understood, and withal invested him with terrifying importance. His very human motives, his desire for wealth, were recognised as natural; and as, save in the Atlantic Settlements, where wandering and warlike tribes alone opposed him, he showed no great desire to settle on the soil and cultivate the soil—the one thing which is considered by all men of colour as conferring real ownership and insuring permanency—his presence was looked upon mainly as transitory.¹ He was therefore a suzerain rather than a sovereign, and as all men of colour from time immemorial have always considered that there is nothing derogatory in acknowledging as

¹ Agriculture—the tilling of the soil—is not only the sole real title to a soil but the only means of permanently holding it. Thus if the Red Indians had learnt agriculture from the first European settlers in North America they would soon have been numerous enough to bar all progress west. And conversely, though the Indians of Mexico, Central America, Peru and other South American States were atrociously treated, they could not be exterminated because of the numbers which the pursuit of agriculture had won for them. That the tilling of the soil is in the last analysis the best title to that soil in the face of all odds, is self-evident.

such anyone who accumulates a striking force against which it would be vain to contend, the idea quickly spread in many lands that policy demanded temporary submission to this powerful newcomer. He was an evil which had to be tolerated for the time being — an evil which would infallibly disappear, as other evils had done. In no case can it truly be said of the white man, save in America, that his presence was looked upon as permanent; and this fact at the present moment also acquires special significance.¹

This revival of the old militant barbarianism of

¹ Captain Mahan puts this so well in *The Influence of Sea-Power upon History*, Chap. I., that the passage merits quotation:—

"In earlier times the merchant seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made his gain at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and profitable freight. He therefore intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favour, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the merchantable products of the land could be continually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet which should carry them to the mother-country. As there was immense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such establishments naturally multiplied and grew until they became colonies; whose ultimate development and success depended upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they sprang, and from a very great part of the history, and particularly the sea history of the world. All colonies had not the simple and natural birth and growth above described. Many were more formal, and purely political, in their conception and founding, the act of the rulers of the people rather than of private individuals; but the trading-station with its after expansion, the work simply of the adventurer seeking gain, was in its reasons and essence the same as the elaborately organised and chartered colony. In both cases the mother-country had won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking a new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself."

Europe, though it was now masked by pleasant fictions, was the fitting apotheosis of a long-worshipped doctrine of force. It was force which had given the first-fruits of empire in Europe; it was the consolidation and standardisation of force which had swept back invaders and made nations out of mixed races; it was the worship of force which sent down in ships to the sea unending companies and battalions of men. Sole among all these many adventurous bands, which for the sake of profit bore every privation and faced every danger, the Pilgrim Fathers were prompted by more altruistic motives; and that America can to-day view Asia and Africa from a special standpoint is therefore perhaps clearly justified. But into the rest of Europe so deep had this other spirit eaten, that the lure of gold was really the leading motive in all those far-reaching struggles for foreign empire which culminated in the Napoleonic wars and found England at their close unquestionably the victor.¹

¹ In his *History of Europe*, Alison in his preface has the following remarkable outburst on continental jealousy:—

“While justice requires, however, that this general praise should be bestowed on the continental and transatlantic writers who have treated of this period, there is one particular which it is impossible to pass over without an expression of a different kind. Of whatever party, nation, or shade of opinion, they seem all at bottom imbued with a profound hatred of this country, and, in consequence, they generally ascribe to the British cabinet a dark or Macchiavellian policy, in matters where it is well known to every person in England, and will be obvious to posterity, they were regulated by very different motives, and often proceeded, from inexperience of warlike measures, without any fixed principle at all. The existence of so general and unfounded a prejudice, in so many authors, of such great and varied ability, would be inexplicable if we did not reflect on the splendid post which England occupied throughout the whole

By the middle of last century the force of this grand and remarkable movement had spent itself, and henceforth matters moved more leisurely. But still the tradition remained and was acted upon whenever possible. For the inventions of the scientific age — steamers, railways, telegraphs — permitted the white conquerors to extend and strengthen their hold in alien lands and apparently to make such rights incontestable. Yet they were by no means doing so in many conquered regions, for very manifest reasons.

For the very rapidity with which modern inventions now enabled men to come and go — the very fact that the difference between white and coloured was made unmistakably clear by this process — emphasised the transitory nature of Europe's dominion. Here, indeed, lies the weakness of coming by sea to alien lands which are already densely populated; here, indeed, is an aspect of sea-power that has been but little remarked upon even by that great student, Mahan. For true conquest in Asia — that is, assimilation — can undoubtedly only be made by advancing slowly by land, as Russia has done, and to accomplish even that one must possess enormous and quickly-expanding numbers. And it is this last fact which completes the explanation why the whole struggle, and recollect that, in nations equally as individuals, the conferring of obligations too often engenders no other feeling but that of antipathy; that no compliment is so flattering, because none is so sincere, as the vituperation of an adversary who has been inspired with dread; and that, though the successful party in a strife is always secretly flattered by the praises bestowed on his antagonists, it is too much to expect of human magnanimity a similar feeling in those to whom fortune has proved adverse."

The real explanation of continental jealousy must be sought in the fact that Europe — save Russia — is a water-locked continent of which England was at last well understood to hold the key.

coloured world is now in the throes of an agitation which must necessarily grow from year to year. It is not merely because one Asiatic Power has taught all other kindred peoples that the white man can now be repaid in his own coin, but it is because the inherently weak nature of European claims are at last properly and universally understood. Men now fully understand that it is not mere suzerainty, but actual ownership, which is claimed by the white man wherever he has raised his flag; and since it has been clearly proved by past history that this virtual slavery of the coloured man is unnatural and can never lead to the fusion of the races, it is only just and logical to admit that the attitude of the man of colour in demanding back rights long usurped by intruders, is one which is bound in the end to be crowned with signal success.

The very ease with which many so-called conquests have been made, as late as the nineteenth century, is explained by this native belief that it was suzerainty, and not permanent sovereignty, which was involved—that no question had arisen calling for a struggle *à l'outrance*. In the table of statistics in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* recording the partition of Africa, we find the following figures, which surely, in the light of recent events, make tragic rather than comforting reading:—

EUROPEAN POWERS IN AFRICA.

	SQ. MILES
French territories in Africa (exclusive of the Sahara)	3,804,974
British (inclusive of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, but exclusive of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 610,000 sq. miles)	2,713,910
German	933,380
Congo Free State	900,000
Portuguese	790,124
Italian	188,500
Total	<u>9,330,888</u>

Considering that the major part of all this vast area of nearly ten million square miles was formally pre-empted subsequent to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 — that is, after that Congress in which the cynical yet sapient Bismarck pointed to Africa as the sole means of satisfying the insatiable European greed for territory — the surprising nature of such so-called “conquests” is evident. They have been a series of spoliations, carried out mainly through the ignorance of those despoiled. That they have no permanency about them need not be doubted. Of this we have a striking example in the manner in which the once celebrated German, Dr. Carl Peters, descended on Zanzibar and other African territories with blank treaty forms in his pocket, fully prepared to draw up any document which under specious disguises would cede the right of eminent domain to his Emperor. The marks set on these documents by ignorant native chiefs as the price for a few bottles of intoxicants and a few antiquated weapons nominally gave away territories as large, if not as populous, as European kingdoms. In coming times the absurdity of such transactions will be made very clear.

Sufficient insistence has now been laid upon the really extraordinary nature of European expansion over the world since the beginning of the sixteenth century; and enough has also been said in many parts of this inquiry to show that the pendulum is already swinging the other way. In the Far East the return-swing of the pendulum is clear; in the Middle East it has commenced; and elsewhere smaller oscillations have to be noted — for instance, in Egypt, in Morocco, in Algeria, in the French Soudan. It only remains to add

a few words more, dealing with general principles rather than with particular instances.

Real and lasting stability and satisfaction in the world of colour, as has already been repeatedly said, can only be secured by the gradual establishment of a balance of power which shall exist independent of European nations, so that that balance may itself directly affect the balance of power in Europe.¹ That alone would be a real guarantee of a permanent peace: that alone should be the goal to be aimed at by intelligent statesmen. For just as industrially the real coloured peril does not lie in the possible movement of labour from Asia to other lands, since that can be restrained, but in the almost certain movement of capital from Europe to Asia, with its resultant vast development of competing Asiatic industries, so politically does the real peril not lie in the fact that Asia (or Africa) desires to destroy, or even to harm Europe; but that Asia is to-day fully cognisant of the fact that the present peace hinges on artificial and temporary arrangements which are based on no proper attention to racial considerations, but which have been carelessly entered into, and which are manifestly unjust, since, to quote one glaring instance, England's Asiatic allies, the Japanese, are left permanently in a position superior to England's Asiatic subjects — the Indians. How long, one may here

¹ The following is an able definition of the balance of power in Europe, which it has become necessary to repeat in Asia: —

"Since the war of the Spanish Succession, all European Governments have adhered to that principle of international politics which has so largely shaped European history — the balance of power. This principle implies that no State shall become so powerful as to menace the safety of the other States."

ask, would any men, save those imbued with the Eastern capacity for long-suffering, with the great Eastern belief in final adjustments from the operation of natural laws, tolerate such a condition of affairs? The mass of present discontents and other combustible matter, should it ever burst into flames, will consume all existing paper guarantees with the speed of a bonfire — and it is only right and logical that this should be so. But prudence demands that a wiser policy be pursued forthwith towards both China and India, which between them to-day possess nearly one-half of the entire population of the world. In the Far East, China must be made to balance against Japan, as she once did; in the Nearer East, India of her own strength must be made to balance against the chaotic world lying beyond her frontiers and reaching to Egypt and Turkey, as well as against any new European menace. That this is logical, that this is sound, that this is in the highest sense expedient, no one can possibly deny; and it is well to know that if such a view does not soon enter into practical politics in England there are others who, using the European lever in a way which easily suggests itself, will know how to do so, and by so doing extract therefrom for themselves lasting profit and advantage. Some Power is destined to champion Asia, and the Power which can first do so and win real sympathy, will virtually control the rest of the world.

For it is perfectly impossible to believe that matters are going to remain very long as they are at present. So long as England is small enough and blind enough to suppose that a temporary arrangement, such as the Japanese alliance, definitely secures the position in Asia, so long will it be necessary to admit the possibility of a complete

change in the political geography of more than half the world. The prospect of such a change is no mad dream; it will be the logical outcome of the present situation; it can only be averted by making both India and China modern empires in the true sense of the words.

Only the settling of comprehensive programmes and their rapid enforcement can bring about the desired change. Unless India speedily plays her proper rôle in relation to Afghanistan, Persia, Asia Minor and Egypt — the rôle which Lord Beaconsfield dreamed of but never dared really to attempt — English domination of the Suez route must ultimately end. For it is well to understand clearly that the real centre of gravity of the Ottoman Empire, that great potential storm-centre, is no longer in Europe, but in Asia Minor, and that the pressure of white Europe on the conquerors of Constantinople is destined soon to become irresistible. European Turkey, already reduced to the shabby pittance of 26,018 square miles of territory, is plainly living on the shadow of her past; and just as the sacred banner and relics of the Prophet were transferred from the Arabian Princes at Cairo to St. Sophia in the sixteenth century, so in the twentieth century they may be transferred back again to the land of their former custodians, thereby wiping out by one signal act the constructive work of decades and crystallising into definite form the lurking menace which observers have already detected in every region of the Near and Middle East. It is only by a consummate policy — by a genuine alliance between interests which should be identical — that such a storm can be averted.

Unfortunately, however, whenever it is a question of considering exhaustively the large general problems of the world, among the English-speaking peoples it is rather the philosopher, sitting in his study at the close of a long life, who wins attention sooner than other men, and whose academic discussions, tinged as they always are with the false and decadent intellectualism of a vanished civilisation, influence perceptibly practical statesmen who should have but one view-point — that is, what may be called the Hebraic view-point — the belief in responsibility to God and to no one else. Thus to-day it would actually seem that the melancholy conclusions which Professor Pearson reached twenty years ago regarding Europe and its civilisation are those on which British statesmen base their decadent diplomacy — decadent here in the modern literary sense; that is, without vigour or originality. Professor Pearson, after having exhaustively reviewed the position throughout the strange world of colour which circles the earth, wrote the following summary:—

"Summing up, then, we seem to find that we are slowly but demonstrably approaching what we may regard as the age of reason or of a sublimated humanity; and that this will give us a great deal that we are expecting from it — well-ordered politics, security to labour, education, freedom from gross superstitions, improved health and longer life, the destruction of privilege in society and of caprice in family life, better guarantees for the peace of the world, and enhanced regard for life and property when war unfortunately breaks out. It is possible to conceive the administration of the most advanced States so equitable and efficient that no one will even desire seriously to disturb it. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that religion will gradually pass into a recognition of ethical

precepts and a graceful habit of morality; that the mind will occupy itself less and less with works of genius, and more and more with trivial results and ephemeral discussions; that husband and wife, parents and children, will come to mean less to one another; and that romantic feeling will die out in consequence; that the old will increase upon the young; that the two great incentives to effort, the desire to use power for noble ends, and the desire to be highly esteemed, will come to promise less to capable men as the field of human energy is crowded; and generally, that the world will be left without deep convictions or enthusiasm, without the regenerating influence of the ardour for political reform, and the fervour of pious faith which have quickened men for centuries past as nothing else has quickened them, with a passion purifying the soul. It would clearly be unreasonable to murmur at changes that express the realisation by the world of its highest thought, whether the issue be good or bad. The etiolated religion which it seems likely we shall subside upon; the complicated but on the whole satisfactory State mechanism, that will prescribe education, limit industry, and direct enjoyment, will become, when they are once arrived at, natural and satisfactory. The decline of the higher classes as an influence in society, the organisation of the inferior races in menacing forms throughout the Tropical Zone, are the natural result of principles that we cannot disown if we would. It would be impossible for a conservatively-minded monarch to reconstruct the nobility of the eighteenth century in the twentieth; and even now no practical statesman could dream of arresting Chinese power or Hindoo or negro expansion by wholesale massacres. The world is becoming too fibreless, too weak, and too good to contemplate or to carry out great changes which imply lamentable suffering. It trusts more and more to experience; less and less to insight and will.”¹

¹ *National Life and Character*, Chap. VI.

Is this remarkable soliloquy, the product of a penetrating intellect, truer to-day than it was yesterday? And, more important still, has this pessimist's stand-point begun to influence politicians in their non-European policies? Undoubtedly, within certain limits, it is more true; undoubtedly it is influencing politicians, not so much because of the ethical and social changes which have slowly come in Europe, but because of the false political conditions maintained throughout Asia and Africa — conditions which must ultimately react on the higher races themselves and force them to a position from whence they may emerge again and again not with peace with honour, but peace with disgrace.¹ Whilst, then, it is by no means necessary to agree with the gloomy assumptions on which this investigator bases his deductions — that the age of reason means for Europe an age of decay — it cannot but be admitted that the political deductions drawn regarding the relations which will come into existence between the coloured world and the white world already do not fall wide of the mark, because an ignorant attitude is so deliberately encouraged in regard to matters which must exercise a powerful reflex action on Europe itself.

In other words, the present writer sees in this academic pessimism the natural product of a race of intellectuals, who, carefully preserving a sort of "apostolic succession" from the days of Homer to the present day, really believe that the disappearance of their classical ideals means the submersion of Europe, because for them no hope for their peculiar intellectualism is no hope at all.

¹ There is now no doubt, for instance, that the Portsmouth Treaty of August, 1905, must be called a "peace with disgrace" for the Russians.

The decay of a religion which, in the last analysis, is not a religion but an ecclesiastical system, to such men implies moral death, whereas such decay is really the fore-runner of some new and most beneficial growth. The destruction of privilege — of feudal privilege, mark well — is to such men another untoward sign, whereas in reality that destruction is the greatest mark of real progress that has ever been seen. The growth of some State mechanism which shall secure complete economic justice for the millions is similarly deprecated, when in the ears of the present generation should surely only ring the echoes of the piteous hunger — the cries of the countless millions who have cruelly starved in Europe during its twenty centuries of Christianity, and who, as a class, are only now — after 2,000 years — being seriously thought of. The decline of the higher classes as an influence, instead of being applauded — the higher classes being higher here only in the false sense and not in the true and proper sense — is held as an evil sign, when in reality all higher classes can be nothing in the main but the heirs of a purse-proud and ignorant plutocracy of former days. Thus arguing from a series of premises which are falsely used, these pessimist inquiries culminate in the expressed belief that for the white races the end of their glory is virtually in sight.

For, in another place,¹ Professor Pearson ventures on another forecast, which locked on immediately to the one above, gains weight with every sentence: —

“Now, it is surely probable that the European nations, with their production limited, and its price enhanced by Socialism, and with exchange among themselves fettered by Protection, would find themselves at

¹ *National Life and Character*, Chap. II.

a great disadvantage in competing with a really industrial China.¹ The resources of China are immense, the capacity of its people for toil is almost unlimited, and their wants are of the slenderest. The great mass of the people lives ascetically, and retains its habits, even when it is thrown among wasteful races like the English of America and Australia, who despise and distrust asceticism. The organisation of labour appears to be largely in the hands of employers, who maintain their ascendancy by murder. We may assume all this to be modified, but we cannot assume the change to be so sudden and complete that Chinese industry will conform to the standards of the Western world. What is true of the Chinese is true more or less of Hindoos and negroes. A hundred years hence, when these races, which are now as two to one to the higher, shall be as three to one; when they have borrowed the science of Europe, and developed their still virgin worlds, the pressure of their competition upon the white man will be irresistible. He will be driven from every neutral market and forced to confine himself within his own. Ultimately he will have to conform to the Oriental standard of existence, or — and this is the probable solution — to stint the increase of population. If he does this by methods that are inconsistent with

¹ It is hardly necessary here to point out the stupid fallacy which Professor Pearson uses as so many others have used before him, *viz.*, that because the standard of living has been low in China in the past, it is always going to continue low, and that consequently the relative cost of production in China will always be very low. Nothing is further from the truth, and on this matter the writer can speak with some little authority. Briefly, in fifteen years, *i.e.*, since the Chino-Japanese war of 1894–95, prices in China have risen nearly 100 per cent., and are still rapidly rising.

The Oriental standard of existence will rise, just as the European standard has risen, with the growth of wealth. The habit of making inexorable economic laws only apply to Europe is another grotesque mediæval survival.

morality, the very life-springs of the race will be tainted. If he does it by a patient self-restraint that shows itself in a limitation to late marriages, national character will be unimpaired, but material decline will have commenced. With civilisation equally diffused, the most populous country must ultimately be the most powerful; and the preponderance of China over any rival — even over the United States of America — is likely to be overwhelming.

"Let us conceive the leading European nations to be stationary, while the Black and Yellow Belt, including China, Malaysia, India, Central Africa, and Tropical America, is all teeming with life, developed by industrial enterprise, fairly well administered by native governments, and owning the better part of the carrying trade of the world. Can anyone suppose that, in such a condition of political society, the habitual temper of mind in Europe would not be profoundly changed? Depression, hopelessness, a disregard of invention and improvement would replace the sanguine confidence of races that at present are always panting for new worlds to conquer. Here and there, it may be, the more adventurous would profit by the tradition of old supremacy to get their services accepted in the new nations, but as a rule there would be no outlet for energy, no future for statesmanship. The despondency of the English people, when their dream of conquest in France was dissipated, was attended with a complete decay of thought, with civil war, and with a standing still, or perhaps a decline of population, and to a less degree of wealth. The discovery of the New World, the resurrection of old literature, the trumpet of the Reformation scarcely quickened the national pulse with real life till the reign of Elizabeth. Then, however, there was revival, because there were possibilities of golden conquest in America, speculative treasures in the re-animate learning of Greece, and a new faith that seemed to thrust aside the curtain drawn by priests, and

to open heaven. It is conceivable that our later world may find itself deprived of all that it valued on earth, of the pageantry of subject provinces and the reality of commerce, while it has neither a disinterred literature to amuse it, nor a vitalised religion to give it spiritual strength."

And farther on:¹— "It is now more than probable that our science, our civilisation, our great and real advance in the practice of government are only bringing us nearer to the day when the lower races will predominate in the world, when the higher races will lose their noblest elements, when we shall ask nothing from the day but to live, nor from the future but that we may not deteriorate."

It is well to ponder over these eloquent, illuminating, yet amazing words — words which, because they confound false ideals with true ideals, because they encourage men really to believe that the discovery of the New World, the Reformation, the revival of Greek literature, and savage foreign conquest with all its accompanying brutality, were anything more than historical periods, incite statesmen deliberately to undertake false actions.

For the most lamentable feature of the day is that at a time when foresight and political instinct have become of such supreme importance, there still exists only a choice between two political policies advocated by two radically different classes of men — first, the old, stupid policy of force without reason, advocated by men steeped in the false intellectualism of vanished days, men whose very presence in Asia or Africa is an incitement to revolt — and, second, the new so-called humanist or *pacificist* policy, which, confounding theory with fact and unaware of the peculiar regionalism which climate and soil infallibly impose, is willing to

¹ *National Life and Character*, Chap. VI.

put into practice in distant lands academic formulas which have not yet been proved true even in Europe.¹ That a third policy should be possible—a policy scientific, insomuch as Orientalism with its inherent hedonism would find a proper place; a policy dictated by true Liberalism; let us say a Puritan policy, because

¹ It would be extremely instructive, and very valuable to mankind at large, if some English economist, instead of analysing the present day expenditure of nations, and animadverting on that unfortunate subject—the burden of armaments—were to compile a volume dealing exhaustively with the question of national finance in Europe since the discovery of America. If the rise and fall of nations were considered from this standpoint much good would be done, for it would be found that it is not unproductive expenditure which has grievously wounded, and even destroyed nations, but simply bad finance. Spain was certainly ruined more by this one cause than by military defeat; but by far the most interesting case is the case of France. French finance, unlike English finance, which in spite of political corruption at certain periods has been very good for many centuries, has been periodically bad. Thus to go no farther than the end of the sixteenth century, at the accession of Henry IV. of Navarre, the public debt was estimated at 345,000,000 *livres*, a truly enormous sum for those days. As the rate of interest varied from eight to ten per cent., it absorbed the whole of the annual revenue, which was not more than 30,000,000 *livres*. The careful administration of the Duke of Sully, the most conscientious, if not the most able of French administrators, reduced the national debt by nearly one-half, and, until the reckless reign of Louis XIV., all went well. From thence onward the story of French finance becomes the story of France, culminating in the drama of the Revolution. Nothing illustrates so well the immense natural wealth of this imperial country as the history of its reckless finance. Had France been economically administered, her natural wealth would have made of her the bank—and therefore the arbiter—of Europe centuries ago, when the superior numbers which she has now lost by Malthusianising her population would have peacefully afforded the necessary guarantees.

it is pure — is not yet considered at all save perhaps by America, where, as we have shown in another place, the people will not be ripe for many years to play their true rôle in world-politics, and where therefore any advocacy of a truly rational policy is tentative rather than final, since the whole strength, the whole intelligence, the whole instinct of the nation does not lie behind such advocacy. Yet let us here remember that if there is one Power whose whole future is bound up with Orientalism, that Power is England.

Whilst therefore local European rivalries continue to receive an endless amount of meticulous attention, the great world rolls onward towards developments which if they cannot be impeded can at least be cleverly guided, but which, because they are unheeded or contemned, must infallibly bring a large measure of political ruin in their train, and vastly change the existing balance of power. With countless scientific aids to fortify and stimulate them; with the wisdom of a score of centuries and the true knowledge of the nineteenth century to draw upon; with history lying ready to point the way, men were never politically blinder than to-day, never more sunk in localism, never more absorbed in the trivialities of the hour. The specialists in Asiatic questions — the British specialists — are mainly specialists after the manner of those Grand Inquisitioners of the old Catholic Church in bygone days, who demanded either that the True Faith which they preached be accepted, or else that their victims be abandoned to the condign punishment of an auto-da-fé. In years to come a wiser generation may ponder over the extraordinary moral in a spirit of profound perplexity; but to-day there is no

time or place for such pondering, but only for unrestrained grief.

For England such questions have long been supreme questions, though men may plead that such cannot be the case; and every day that now passes adds a little to their urgency. For her, indeed, these questions of Asia, of Africa, with their teeming races, have paramount importance, in a way that was never the case before. Her Empire, and indeed every vestige of her power, is scattered so far and so wide over the world, and is so diversified and so materially affected by every radical change in the political relationship between the smallest as between the greatest of nations, that no longer will two virtues which have served her well in the past — bravery and persistence — avail her anything, unless the weight of numbers, the conflict of ideals and aims, pressing against her are offset by cleverness. The doctrines preached by men who would see in England a copyist of the Roman Empire are false doctrines; between the two empires there can be no real analogy.¹ Rome, in spite of her greatness, fell, as she deserved to fall, because she never dreamt of what real liberty implied, and because for her the splendour of a court was always the happiness of a people. The day is fast approaching when all men will be not only free but independent; and those who still refuse to see this and trust to temporising measures, behind which

¹ The proud words, *Civis Romanus sum*, are still so constantly quoted, as if they meant anything to the modern individualist, that it would be well to remember that to-day they can only suggest a Prussian ideal such as was recently proclaimed by a speaker in the Reichstag — that if the Emperor ordered it, any lieutenant of the German Army would take ten soldiers and forcibly close the seat of German freedom.

lurks the shadow of force, are undoubtedly the real enemies of their country and not the patriots, the imperialists, they so constantly proclaim themselves. That a leaven is at last at work in England to an ever-increasing extent, the history of the last few years has made clear; but to leaven a whole nation is the work not of a few years but of generations, and let us remember that some of those pregnant generations are still unborn.

For in spite of certain good indications it remains abundantly true that in the main the home-staying Englishman still utterly fails to realise that even his own race, scattered over the world, is to-day composed of a large number of varieties of men who view with very mixed feelings, in which a growing contempt finds a prominent place, the self-complacent dogma, still so consistently preached by word of mouth and by printed word, that in world-problems, in questions of peace and war, in affairs of honour, in matters of taste and expediency, there is only one orthodox view-point permissible to those who acknowledge the overlordship of the British crown.¹ That view-point is still what

¹ *The Times*, in an article published in 1909, makes the following good remarks, which are worthy of being preserved:—

“One of the anomalies of our Empire — one of the many results of the fact that it has grown, and has not been made according to any plan or scheme — arises out of the powers of the Crown as to treaties and the position of the self-governing colonies. Here theory seems to be at variance with practice; the former made for a state of things which no longer exists. A new practice is being formed; it has not yet found its theoretical exponent. There are efforts to preserve, as one of the essentials of sovereignty, the unity of the Empire, while free play is given to the aspirations of the Dominions beyond the sea.

“To invest them with unlimited power of negotiating treaties

may be called the aristocratic or old-time view-point. It has but little real sympathy with the differences which have grown up; it believes that nothing different can be good, and because it is so dogmatic it is wholly bad. Yet if the Englishman of England would only know it, what has often been wittily remarked of the American — that his is not so much a nationality as a temperament — has to-day become partially true of himself, for the temper and temperament of men overseas has inevitably and very sensibly altered. This is equivalent to saying that while the political hegemony of the British world remains nominally where it has been ever since the lessons of the American Revolution were grudgingly admitted — that is, since self-government was given to the New Britains beyond the seas — secretly the moral leadership has largely disappeared, because

would be to clothe them with an international status, to make them sovereign States, and in the end, it might be, to break up the Empire. That must be averted without thwarting the reasonable demands of colonial statesmen to be considered and consulted in all that directly affects them.

“Every Colonial Secretary since the ‘seventies has been confronted with this difficult problem in some form, with the result that a fairly workable compromise has been established; not, indeed, a complete arrangement, but one which gives reasonable hopes that eventually all points of difference will be amicably settled. The history of the struggle between two opposing forces, those making for unity and those tending towards decentralisation, has not yet been written.

“According to our Constitution, it rests with the King to make treaties of all kinds. In some countries their validity depends upon the approval of the Legislature or a branch of it. Thus in the United States the assent of the Senate is necessary to render treaties binding. When that is given a treaty is as valid as if it were a statute. No such assent is with us requisite to give effect to a treaty; that power is vested solely in the Crown.”

England remains infected with a feudalism which every day finds new recruits from among those who, able to win wealth but unable to think, are content in their ignorance to believe that nothing has really changed. The rapid growth of other English nations, which in the end are destined to exceed in numbers, in wealth, and possibly in intelligence, the nation inhabiting the original home of the race, must in not very distant days shift the balance of power between the component parts of the Empire, since the present system has no elements of permanency. New Zealanders and Australians are already very different men to home-staying Englishmen; Canadians and Africanders still more so; smaller communities, dotted in different quarters of the globe, though hitherto accustomed to look solely to the mother country for guidance in almost all matters, are rapidly acquiring, thanks to modern progress, their own peculiar regionalism: and though, of course, it is only on self-governing Dominions that the eye is cast, even in small and somewhat humble colonies it is noticeable that there exists to-day the germ of future nations.¹

Now of this regionalism, the most remarkable feature is the growth of independence in its true sense; for though the Englishman of England may well boast of his freedom when contrasting it with what is under-

¹ A question which Englishmen of England frequently ask concerning the Australian people or the Canadian people is— are they loyal? There is, of course, no answer to this question, since the definition of loyalty very greatly varies. If by loyalty is understood a blind and servile obedience to the Crown, then enlightened men in these Commonwealths are certainly not loyal. If, on the other hand, by loyalty is understood devotion to the principles of all English conditions and customs — love of home and duty and honour — then these men are possibly more loyal than the English of England.

stood by that word in the rest of Europe, it is well to observe that he has never been completely independent. That servile spirit, which is feudal in its origin, and which should have fled for ever in the days of Cromwell, had not the forces of reaction been fed by overseas conquests and, an immense growth in commerce and industry, has too long exercised its pernicious power.¹ That servile spirit, which was first laid in the dust by Englishmen in the old North-American colonies, has died out among the English-speaking peoples, save in England itself. Real independence has arisen, proving that servility is un-English, and was grafted on to England from elsewhere.

Now the especial significance of the proposition

¹ While the feudal tradition is actually the most powerful influence in producing this melancholy state of affairs, a very great contributory cause is undoubtedly the system of education still obtaining in England among the richer classes of the population—a system which some day will be classed as nothing short of criminal. The public schools of England, like the older universities, in the main tend to produce a type of man who abroad is heartily despised by all save his own kind, who is useless until he has learnt something practical in the school of life, and who is therefore one of the real menaces to the future existence of the British Empire. It is such grotesque phrases as that which traces the victory of Waterloo to the playing-fields of Eton which still ensure the popularity of an antiquated and pernicious system—phrases, it may be remarked, which are untrue, since the victory of Waterloo was due to exactly the same causes as the victories of Crécy and Poitiers. Until in England the State becomes as solicitous of the educational welfare of every boy and girl as the State is in the United States, where everyone without distinction goes to the public schools (the Board Schools of England) there to receive a first-class education—until that day comes, we shall see the crippling and dangerous effect of the steady nourishing of a class-sentiment resting, not on ability, or character, or achievement, but on vanity. That is surely the last word necessary.

which is here added to the other strictures passed — that the spirit in England, and primarily of that part of England which may be called official England, is no longer the spirit in other parts of the Empire — will perhaps only become dramatically apparent when some matter of world-wide interest, in which there is no mere question of the local European balance of power, arrests universal attention; and then it will be too late to act, as it was too late to act after Saratoga and Yorktown. It is a noticeable fact, already possessing political importance, that not only in Canada, but in other parts of the British Dominions—for instance, in New Zealand — men are inclining more and more to the American ideal, and less and less to the British ideal, because instinctively they hate class-subservience and traditional observances, and the Roman project of empire.¹ The feudalism of England is disliked and despised; it is that lingering feudalism which is the real bar to the erection of a permanent edifice which shall unite for all time men of the same blood and speech, and yet retain as real allies those still held in open subjection by the mediæval right of conquest. This is seen in all manner of small things, indicative of the tendencies at work; it is being commented on more and more by word of mouth, rather than publicly; it is in the air, and what is in the air at length comes to earth.

¹ Another very suggestive difference between the English of England and the English of elsewhere, is to be found in the general aspect of their towns. In Australasia, in South Africa, just as in Canada, the towns have an American aspect rather than a British one. Under the influence of a different environment, it is clear that American becomes synonymous with “simplified English” — that is to say, that the English who have shaken themselves free from conventional restraints revert to an earlier type.

For this vague antagonism — this clashing of ideals and ambitions — between the component groups of a great race, is exactly the sort of antagonism which existed in the old American colonial days, and which led in the eighteenth century from the acrid and barren controversies of the 'sixties to the armed conflicts of the 'seventies — thereby inviting the intervention of jealous rivals, and changing the whole course of world-history. The blame which has been so consistently thrown on George III. for this unfortunate chapter of politics has been much exaggerated: had not the population of England been predisposed to subserviency, had it not frankly endorsed the Roman imperial idea with its slavish tribute system — in a word, had men not been willing to accept autocratic theories in impersonal issues, that is, where their own taxation was not concerned, the American War of Independence would never have been fought. The vast eighteenth century growth of British commerce and industry, made possible by the partial displacement of Holland and France as sea Powers, as well as the great Asiatic and African conquests, by creating a new plutocracy, effectively killed the lingering democratic spirit of the seventeenth century, and thereby increased class subservience. Commerce and capitalism, purchasing places in that citadel of feudalism, the House of Peers, soon had remarkably increased its moral strength, and from that citadel was projected a sinister influence which even to-day has not yet been destroyed. Though George III. ostensibly fought the old oligarchy which had placed and maintained his ancestors on the throne, he only did so within certain narrow limits to serve his own political ends, since their real interests, their ideals,

their ambitions, were his very own. And so the forces of reaction, ever gathering strength, fed as they were during a strenuous generation by that most powerful anti-democratic engine, foreign wars, have proved again and again too powerful for reformers; and thus does it happen that to-day, in spite of Reform Acts, in spite of the vast extension of education, in spite of the rise of an intelligent proletariat, in spite of many democratic reforms, half England is still devoted to principles and ideals which are antiquated, impolitic, pernicious and illiberal. And, worst of all, that half England is the half which directs foreign policy and refuses to a democracy the right to interfere. British Imperialism, as that Imperialism is still understood, is therefore a false quantity, full of menace not only to the British world, but to the real interests of the whole world; full of inherent weakness, because it is based on false assumptions; full of deceit, because it juggles with facts which are really undeniable. The panacea of Protection, latest proposal of a Power surely doomed, finds enthusiastic support because, in England, from its very nature it is oligarchical; and, backed by the great parasitic, speculative classes, the echoes which this strange project has sent throughout the world is, in the last analysis, the greatest denunciation that modern Imperialism has ever received.¹

¹ On the question of the industrial development of Asia it is necessary to insert a few words of warning to those who, masking their Protectionist ideas under that ill-sounding shibboleth, Tariff Reform, still divide up the markets of the world into three divisions; (1) those of competing manufacturing countries with protected markets, (2) those of countries in the intermediate stage, like the countries of South America, (3) those of the so-called complementary regions, like the tropics, which are classed as non-

The effect of all this, of this encouragement of false ideals, of this blurring and confounding of the real issues, on the questions which have in this volume been more specially considered — the conflict of colour throughout the world — is, for England, very peculiar and must never be lost sight of. For whilst self-government is still withheld from races which have claims on the dominant race, the Government of England is openly forced to acquiesce in the Dominions barring out British subjects because they are not white. Already ring-fences have been put round Australia and Canada and South Africa and New Zealand; and though this discrimination has not yet provoked acute trouble, and has only been a source of serious concern in South Africa, it is after all merely a question of time for new shoals of embarrassments to be spawned from these first

manufacturing and non-competitive, and where no Protection prevails. List, the father of modern Protection, believed that the basis of all great industries in international trade in the future would be the exchange between the manufacturing temperate regions and the non-manufacturing and non-competitive tropics. But List had hardly heard of Japan, and showed withal in all his elaborate theories a scant knowledge of human nature. It is a fact which is becoming more and more evident that the use of machinery on a wholesale scale in Asia is merely a matter of time. Japan is rapidly reaching the industrial stage — China and India will soon enter it. When these three countries have fully developed their resources, it will be interesting to ask what has become of List's principal theory. The fact simply is that in temperate climes what may be called the "higher manufactures" will soon predominate, and that these will be exchanged against the raw products and the "lower manufactures" of other climes. Beyond this there is no reason to go at present. Still there can be no doubt that the fallacy of Protection will ultimately be fully exposed by Asiatic retaliation, which is a thought which does not appear to have reached Tariff Reformers in England.

ones. Because the white man remains much ahead of all coloured men, and — save in the waters of Eastern Asia — maintains his overwhelming predominance at sea, he can still act for the time being in this particular matter as he pleases. But though this policy of segregation which his kind are adopting cannot yet be opposed, and certainly will not be opposed in any positive manner for some years to come, it is already possible, as has been shown elsewhere, to begin to oppose negatively this feeling about colour; and though nothing has occurred so far to show the enormous extent to which such a policy may ultimately affect commerce and industry — and through them the very life of white races — it is already very easy to write a tolerably accurate forecast of what a revivified Asia, partially allied to warlike Africa, not only may attempt to do but must inevitably try to do.

It is, of course, true that the white races — especially the English-speaking races — now own and are firmly settled on such enormous portions of the land-surface of the world, that if needs be they could contemplate with resignation the ultimate loss of control over, and the complete isolation of, the whole coloured world. But such a thing as really effective isolation is becoming every day more impossible, as exchange in all forms reaches ever more gigantic proportions; and when there is no effective isolation there must be continuous contact. Peaceful contact necessitates equitable arrangements, or else no contact can be truly peaceful. Thus it may logically follow that every penalisation of one people by another people must sooner or later bring a corresponding discrimination, a corresponding disability; and thus will be gradually woven a regular web of

limitations and distinctions not only between races and nations, but between regions as well.

Now it is highly unsatisfactory—deleting the stronger word which suggests itself—that such immensely grave questions, the outlines of which are already fairly clear, should in the case of England be virtually left in the hands of a small bureaucracy, but little more able to judge real values than in those gloomy colonial days of a hundred and forty years ago. The control of British policy all the world over—no matter what that control may once have been—has entirely and completely slipped from the hands of those who are its only fit guardians—the people's representatives—and is to-day monopolised by a departmentalism which, because it is departmentalism, can only possess a strictly limited intelligence. The very name of one great Department is to-day as much an anachronism as if it were called, in the language of a century ago, the Board of Plantations, whilst in other directions the passage of twelve decades has brought no change. That in the British Empire of to-day Secretaries of State should not only labour without proper supervision and control, but should be competent to enter into the most far-reaching arrangements virtually on their own initiative, has surely become a very menacing thing, and one which no wise man should for a minute endorse. It is impossible to believe that had there been in England the equivalent of the United States Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs, such a treaty as the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have been passed in its present ambiguous and dangerous form. It is in such directions, rather than in those which an acute but academic observer such as Professor Pearson emphasises, that the

real political and sociological dangers of the future lie. That nothing but confusion can result from the policy of unscientific and hasty work is a self-evident conclusion.

Yet there exists in the study of history, not only an infallible guide to the shortcomings of foreign policy, but a constant exhortation to understand the necessity of taking long views instead of short views. By properly grasping the meaning of a phrase which so constantly re-occurs in Mahan's masterly examination of the influence of sea-power upon history, we come to an understanding of the present difficulties and see how they arise. This great American student of strategy shows most clearly how more than a century ago, just as to-day, England suffered severely from not seizing the meaning of the French strategical formula which is summed up in that eloquent expression "ulterior projects."¹ The French, in spite of all the limitations which the defeats inspired and organised by Chatham, and the crippling loss of Canada and especially of India,

¹ This is by no means an unimportant point. The English character, just because of its positive qualities, has most serious defects. It is apt always to demand continuous and excessive concentration of the especial problem momentarily in hand, ignoring "ulterior projects." The policy of always looking at ulterior projects demands a synthetic diplomacy — one which, fixing attention on the final end to be achieved, combines closely all forces and levers of power so as better to achieve that end. In strategy of all sorts — save in the Napoleonic struggle, when England, fighting for her very life, could not but see what her true course must be — France has always been superior to England; had Frenchmen to-day the immense power and resources which Englishmen have, they would understand at once that the key to European and world supremacy lies out of Europe and not in Europe.

had imposed upon them, by never losing sight of the strategical end which they had in view, waged during the latter part of the eighteenth century a most dangerous and devastating warfare which shook England to her very foundations, and which might have actually led to her eclipse had it not been for the fortunate circumstance of the French Revolution. By the subordination of all means to attain the given end, by never wasting strength to gain an ephemeral advantage — in a word, by thinking perpetually of “ulterior projects” and of nothing but those ulterior projects — the French emerged from a position of utter weakness to a position of great strength which only a later folly destroyed.

The final question which we may now ask is, what may be the ulterior projects of British statesmen to-day? Do they really expect that the British Empire, like the Roman Empire, is destined to drift quietly out of existence because the shadow of former power is held as the substance; or do they aspire to something a degree more noble? In other words, is there any definite goal ahead? or is it simply the policy of the ancient Chinese which is being pursued, the policy of building Great Walls to ward off evils, to keep them at arm’s length, rather than go out and meet and defeat them? Candour forces the confession that it is this procrastinating policy which seems to have become the avowed foreign policy of the British Government.

Yet such a policy is wholly unnecessary. The local autonomy which the great Dominions all possess — and which India should soon win — not only postulates the rise of local spheres of influence,

but demands that every effort should be made to develop such a division of responsibilities, with the utmost possible speed.¹ It is responsibility, and the menace which always underlies great responsibility, which is the sole connecting link between partners in national affairs, as it is between partners in private affairs. Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, New Zealand — each has a definite rôle to play. Where the waters impose a restraint, powerful local fleets to ride the waters become necessities — not coast-guard fleets, but deep-sea fleets; and where land meets land, there must forces be prepared to march. That this devolution, the first principle in world-politics, has been long perceived is a commonplace; but the admission has only been made in a tentative and hesitating manner which leaves open the possibility of a return to more primitive methods, and seems to be qualified with that

¹ "The conclusion continually recurs. Whatever may be the determining factors in strifes between neighbouring continental States, when a question arises of control over distant regions, politically weak — whether they be crumbling empires, anarchical republics, colonies, isolated military posts, or islands below a certain size — it must ultimately be decided by naval power, by the organised military force afloat, which represents the communications that form so prominent a feature in all strategy. The magnificent defence of Gibraltar hinged upon this; upon this depended the military results of the war in America; upon this the final fate of the West India Islands; upon this, certainly, the possession of India. Upon this will depend the control of the Central American Isthmus, if that question take a military colouring; and though modified by the continental position and surroundings of Turkey, the same sea-power must be a weighty factor in shaping the outcome of the Eastern Question in Europe." — Mahan: *Influence of Sea-Power upon History*, Chap. XI.

inherent British distrust of everything that has not been sanctified by centuries of custom.¹

The continent of America is a self-contained and isolated continent; the continent of Europe, save for Russia, is a water-locked continent. So long as England holds the key to this second continent, the problems of the outer world — the world of colour — will be worked out largely regardless of what the continent of Europe may think,² and largely un-

¹ Here are some good remarks on the question of federation:

"Of all systems of government and political guarantee, the federative system is certainly the most difficult to establish and to render prevalent; a system which consists in leaving in each locality and each particular society all that portion of the government which can remain there, and in taking from it only that portion which is indispensable to the maintenance of the general society, and carrying this to the centre of that society, there to constitute of it a central government. The federative system, logically the most simple, is, in fact, the most complex. In order to reconcile the degree of local independence and liberty which it allows to remain, with the degree of general order and submission which it demands and supposes in certain cases, a very advanced degree of civilisation is evidently requisite; it is necessary that the will of man, that individual liberty, should concur in the establishment and maintenance of this system much more than in that of any other, for its means of coercion are far less than those of any other." — *Guizot: History of Civilisation in Europe*, Fourth Lecture.

² The question of armed intervention on the continent of Europe — to adjust the so-called balance of power — has for England to-day the same dangerous fascination it has always exercised. Though it is needless to deny that in at least two most important crises in the history of European development the armed intervention of England on land contributed largely to securing results favourable not only to British policy, but to that much abused ideal, the general balance of power, no one has yet been found to say what would have happened had neither Marlborough nor Wellington fought so long and so

influenced by the continent of America, save where a powerful sentiment may demand intervention. Before this position is materially changed many years must pass. Re-stated, then, the problem of colour becomes finally an almost British problem — a problem the solution of which really contains the future solution of the question of the British Empire. Let every English democracy understand this; let them press forward the solution as their common-sense may ordain. It is at last quite certain that the question of colour is the rock on which the Empire must split, or on which may be builded the greatest edifice the world has ever seen.

well in the interests of their country. If we subtract their victories, it can only be said that the uncomfortable feeling remains that some other factor might have done the work equally well.

APPENDIX I

THE CHIEF COLONIAL POWERS AND THEIR POSSESSIONS

- 1. GREAT BRITAIN.
- 2. FRANCE.
- 3. GERMANY.

- 4. UNITED STATES.
- 5. HOLLAND.
- 6. PORTUGAL.

APPENDIX I

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE AMERICAS.

[N.B.—These tables of British possessions are abstracted from Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*.]

NAME OF DEPENDENCY.	HOW ACQUIRED.	DATE.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION AT LAST CENSUS (1901).
1. British N. America.				
1. Newfoundland and Labrador.....	Settled.....	1583-1623	42,734	217,037
2. Dominion of Canada.....	Conquered (Quebec).....	1759	3,745,574	5,371,315
2. The Bermudas.....	Settled.....	1609-12	19	17,535
3. The West Indies.				
1. The Bahamas.....	Settled (New Providence).....	1666	4,466	53,735
2. { Jamaica and The Caymans.....	Conquered.....	1655	4,296	755,730 ¹
Turks Islands.....	87
3. Leeward Islands.	Settled.....	1678	166	5,287
a. { Antigua.....	Settled.....	1632	108	34,178
Barbuda.....	Settled.....	1661-2	62	775
Redonda.....	Settled.....	½	18
b. St. Kitts.....	Settled.....	1623	65½	29,782
c. Nevis.....	Settled.....	1628	50	12,774
d. Anguilla.....	Settled.....	1650	35	3,890
e. Montserrat.....	Settled.....	1632	32	12,215
d. Dominica.....	Settled and (1761) conquered.....	1761	291	28,894
e. Virgin Islands	Conquered (Tortola).....	1672	58	4,908
4. Barbados.....	Settled.....	1624-5	166	195,588 ¹
5. Windward Islands.				
a. St. Lucia.....	Conquered.....	1803	233	49,883 ¹
b. St. Vincent.....	Occupied.....	1762	147	47,548 ¹
c. Grenada.....	Conquered.....	1762	133	63,438
d. Trinidad.....	Conquered.....	1797	1,754	255,148
e. Tobago.....	Settled and (1803) conquered.....	1803	114	18,751
7. British Guiana	Conquered.....	1803	100,000	295,896 ¹
8. British Honduras	Settled and (1798) conquered.....	1798	7,562	37,479
4. The Falkland Islands and South Georgia.....	Occupied (finally).....	1832-3	6,500	2,043
		1,000	

Total area of the American dependencies of Great Britain, 4,035,653 sq. miles.

Total population of American dependencies of Great Britain, 7,517,794.

¹ No census taken. Estimate only.

GREAT BRITAIN IN AFRICA.

NAME OF DEPENDENCY.	HOW ACQUIRED.	DATE.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION (1891 CENSUS FOR THE COLONIES).
West Africa.	1. Gambia.....	Settlement and Cession 1816	1618	3,550 ¹ 14,266 ²
	2. Sierra Leone.....	Cession.....	1816	30,000 ¹ 74,835 ³
	3. Gold Coast.....	Settlement.....	1618	40,000 ⁴ 1,500,000 ⁴
	4. Lagos.....	Cession.....	1861	1,100 ⁵ 85,607 ⁵
	5. Niger Protectorates (Northern and Southern Nigeria)	Declaration of Protection	1884-5	500,000 ⁶ 25,000,000 ⁶
Total West Africa.....			574,650	26,647,708

¹ Including the Protectorate.² Population of the Colony only.³ Population of the enumerated districts of the Colony only.⁴ Estimated area and population of the Colony and older Protectorate only.⁵ Incomplete estimate of the area and population of the Colony only.⁶ The very roughest estimate only.

APPENDIX I

GREAT BRITAIN IN AFRICA — *Continued.*

NAME OF DEPENDENCY.	HOW ACQUIRED.	DATE.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION (1891 CEN- SUS FOR THE COLONIES).
South and Central Africa.	1. Cape Colony . . .	Conquest and settlement	1806	276,551 1,586,125 ¹
	2. Basutoland . . .	Cession	{ 1868 1884 }	10,293 218,902
	3. Natal, including Zululand and Amatongaland	Conquest and settlement	from 1840	35,461 782,000
	4. Bechuanaland Protectorate and territories south of the Zambezi	Treaties and proclamation	from 1885	412,000 ² ?
	5. British Central Africa	Treaties and proclamation	from 1888	350,000 ² ?
Total South and Central Africa			1,084,305	?
East Africa.	1. Zanzibar and Pemba	Declaration of protection	1890	
	2. British East Africa	Treaties and proclamations	1886-90	1,200,000 ²
	3. Somali Protectorate	Treaties and proclamations	1887	
Total East Africa			1,200,000	
Islands.	1. Ascension . . .	Occupation	1815	34 160 ³
	2. St. Helena . . .	Occupation	1651	47 3,877 ⁴
	3. Tristan da Cunha	Occupation	1816	20 (1896) 64
	4. Mauritius . . .	Conquest	1810	708 371,655
	5. Seychelles . . .	Conquest	1794	100 ³ 16,592
	6. Minor dependencies of Mauritius	Conquest	1810	100 ³ 3,224
Total of Islands			1,009	395,572
Grand total of Africa			2,859,964	(Incomplete)

¹ Exclusive of the native population in the Gordonia district.² The very roughest estimate only.³ Estimate only.⁴ Civil population only.

GREAT BRITAIN IN AFRICA — *Continued.*

NAME OF DEPENDENCY.	HOW ACQUIRED.	DATE.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION AT LAST CENSUS (1901).
Somaliland.....	Protectorate	1884	68,000 ¹	300,000 ¹
Mauritius.....	Taken	1810	708	373,336
Rodrigues.....	Taken	1810	46 ¹	3,162
Smaller dependencies of Mauritius	Taken	1810	64 ¹	1,697
Seychelles.....	Taken	1794	148 $\frac{1}{4}$	19,237

¹ Estimates only.

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

NAME OF DEPENDENCY.	HOW ACQUIRED.	DATE.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION AT LAST CENSUS (1901).
Gibraltar.....	Taken	1704	1 $\frac{7}{8}$	27,460
Malta.....	Taken	1800	117	207,890
Cyprus.....	Occupied under Treaty	1878	3,584	237,152

GREAT BRITAIN IN ASIA.

NAME OF DEPENDENCY.	HOW ACQUIRED.	DATE.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION AT LAST CENSUS (1901).
Aden	Taken	1839	75	43,974
Perim	Occupied	1857	5	
Kuria Muria Islands	Ceded	1854		
Socotra	Protectorate	1886	1,400*	12,000*
Ceylon	Taken	1796	25,481	3,578,333
Maldivie Islands	Taken	1796	?	30,000*
<i>Straits Settlements:</i>				
Singapore	Ceded	1819 ¹	223	228,555
Penang	Ceded	1786	107	128,830
Province Wellesley	Ceded	1800	288	115,264
Malacca	Ceded	1824	659	95,487
Dindings	Ceded	1874 ²	265	4,113
Cocos-Keeling Islands	Occupied	1857	?	645
Christmas Islands	Occupied	1888	43	704
<i>Federated Malay States:</i>				
Perak	Protectorate	1874	6,500	329,665
Selangor	Protectorate	1874	3,200	168,789
Negri Sembilan	Protectorate	1874-86 ³	2,600	96,028
Pahang	Protectorate	1888	14,000	84,113
Johore	Protectorate	1885	9,000*	200,000*
Labuan	Ceded	1846	30	8,411
Brunei	Protectorate	1888	4,000*	30,000*
North Borneo	Protectorate	1888	31,000*	120,000*
Sarawak	Protectorate	1888	42,000*	500,000*
Hongkong	Ceded	1841	329	399,366
Weihaiwei	Leased	1898	285	150,000*

¹ Date of occupation. The island was not formally ceded until 1824.

² Part of the Dindings district was ceded in 1826, but not occupied.

³ The various states of the confederation known as the Negri Sembilan did not all come under British control at the same time.

* Estimates only.

FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE.

N.B. — The estimates of population are already out of date.

	YEAR OF ACQUISITION.	AREA IN SQ. MILES.	POPULATION.
<i>In Asia.</i>			
India.....	1679	196	277,000
Annam.....	1884		
Cambodia.....	1862		
Cochin-China.....	1861	309,980	16,317,000
Tonking.....	1884		
Laos.....	1893		
Total Asia.....		310,176	16,594,000
<i>In Africa.</i>			
Algeria.....	1830-1902	343,500 ¹	5,231,850
Sahara.....	1,544,000	800,000
Tunis.....	1881	45,779	1,500,000
Senegal.....	1637-1880		
Upper Senegal and Niger.....	1893		915,000
Guinea.....	1843		4,415,000
Ivory Coast.....	1843	1,585,810 ²	1,498,000
Dahomey.....	1803		890,000
Mauritania.....	1893		749,000
Congo.....	1884	669,280	400,000
Reunion.....	1649	970	5,000,000
Madagascar.....	1642-1896	226,015	2,701,000
Mayotte.....	1843	840	96,000
Somali Coast.....	1864	5,790	180,000
Total Africa.....		4,421,984	24,576,850
<i>In America.</i>			
St. Pierre and Miquelon.....	1635	96	6,000
Guadeloupe.....	1634	688	182,000
Martinique.....	1635	378	182,000
Guiana.....	1626	34,060	27,000
Total America.....		35,222	397,000
<i>In Oceania.</i>			
New Caledonia.....	1854-1887	7,200	55,800
Tahiti, &c.	1841-1881	1,544	30,000
Total Oceania.....		8,744	85,800
Grand total.....		4,776,126	41,653,650

¹ Including the Algerian Sahara.

² Including military territories.

GERMAN COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES.

[From *The Statesman's Year-Book*.]

The following is a list of the various colonies and regions under the protection or influence of Germany, the estimates given being necessarily vague.

	DATE OF ACQUISITION.	METHOD OF GOVERNMENT.	ESTIMATED AREA SQ. MILES.	ESTIMATED POPULATION.
<i>In Africa.</i>				
Togoland.....	1884	Imp. Governor	33,700	1,000,000
Kamerun.....	1884	Imp. Governor	191,130	3,000,000
German South-west Africa.....	1884-90	Imp. Governor	322,450	120,000
German East Africa ..	1885-90	Imp. Governor	384,180	10,000,000
Total Africa possessions..	1884-90	931,460	14,120,000
<i>In Asia.</i>				
Kiauchau Bay	1897	Imp. Governor	{ 1,200	{ 133,000
<i>In the Pacific.</i>				
German New Guinea :				
Kaiser Wilhelm's Land	1885-86		70,000	
Bismarck Archipelago	1885		20,000	{ 300,000
Caroline Islands.....	1899		560	
Palau or Pelew Islands	1899		250	
Marianne Islands.....	1899		4,200	{ 56,000
Solomon Islands.....	1886		150	
Marshall Islands, &c. .	1886			
Samoan Islands :				
Savaii.....	1899		660	
Upolu.....	1899		340	{ 37,000
Total Pacific possessions ..	1884-99	96,160	393,000
Total foreign dependencies	1884-99	1,027,820	14,546,000

¹ Exclusive of the Bay with an area of about 200 square miles, and the neutral zone with an area of about 2,500 square miles and population of 1,200,000.

OUTLYING TERRITORIES AND COLONIES OF THE
UNITED STATES.

	AREA SQUARE MILES.	POPULATION.
1. Alaska.....	590,800	80,000
2. Hawaii.....	6,499	190,000
3. Porto Rico.....	3,435	1,100,000
4. Philippine Islands.....	127,853	8,000,000
5. Guam.....	200	11,000
6. Samoan Islands.....	100	6,000
Total area.....	728,887	9,387,000

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE NETHERLANDS.

	ENGLISH SQUARE MILES.	TOTAL POPULATION.
1. Dutch East Indies: (Java, Madura, Sumatra, Celebes, Dutch Borneo, Molucca Islands, Timor Archipelago, New Guinea, and minor groups).....	783,000	38,000,000
2. Dutch West Indies:— (a) Surinam	46,000	80,000
(b) Curaçao	403	53,000

PORTUGUESE DEPENDENCIES.

[From *The Statesman's Year-Book*.]

The colonial possessions of Portugal, situated in Africa and Asia, are as follows:—

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS.	AREA, ENGLISH SQUARE MILES.	POPULATION.
<i>Possessions in Africa.</i>		
Cape Verde Islands (1900).....	1,480	147,424
Guinea.....	13,940	820,000
Prince's and St. Thomas' Islands (1902)	360	42,103
Angola.....	484,800	4,119,000
East Africa.....	293,400	3,120,000
Total Africa.....	793,980	8,248,527
<i>Possessions in Asia.</i>		
In India, Goa (1900).....	1,469	475,513
Damão Diu (1900).....	169	56,285
Indian Archipelago (Timor, &c.).....	7,330	300,000
China : Macao, &c. (1900).....	4	63,991
Total Asia.....	8,972	895,789
Total Colonies.....	802,952	9,144,316

APPENDIX II

DENSITY OF POPULATIONS

(Compiled from the latest estimates available; mainly from the statistical decennial, 1900-1901.)

Examples from European Countries.

1.	Great Britain—	
	England.....	558 per square mile.
	Scotland.....	150 "
	Ireland.....	136.7 "
2.	Germany.....	290 "
3.	France.....	189.5 "
4.	Belgium.....	589 "
5.	Holland.....	454 "
6.	Italy.....	306 "
7.	Spain.....	96.7 "
8.	{ Austria.....	226 "
	Hungary.....	154 "
9.	Russia—	
	European Russia.....	59.7 "
	Poland.....	227.2 "
	Siberia.....	1.4 "
10.	Bulgaria.....	105 "

Examples in American Continent.

1.	United States (excluding Alaska).....	25.6 per square mile.
2.	Canada.....	1.48 "
3.	Mexico.....	17.7 "
4.	Brazil.....	5.4 "
5.	Argentine.....	5.4 "

Examples in Asiatic Continent.

1.	India (British).....	211 per square mile.
	All India.....	167 "
2.	China.....	266 "
3.	Japan.....	320 "
4.	Persia.....	15 "
5.	Siam.....	35 "
6.	Afghanistan.....	20 "

APPENDIX II

Examples in Australasia, Oceania, and East Indies.

1. Australia.....	1.5	per square mile.
2. New Zealand.....	10	"
3. Java.....	600	"
4. Sumatra.....	25	"
5. Borneo.....	6	"

Examples in Africa.

1. Algeria.....	28	"
2. Cape Colony.....	8.7	"
3. Transvaal.....	10	"
4. Egypt (settled land surface).....	950	"
5. Congo Free State.....	15	"

The great empty spaces of the world susceptible of immense development by population-increase are:—

1. Siberia.
2. Brazil and Argentine.
3. Canada.
4. Australia.
5. Mongolia and Manchuria.

These areas could support twice or even thrice the entire present population of the world.

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"This is a work of the highest importance to any student of the Far Eastern Crisis. The author, who has spent his life among the Chinese, gives a minute and detailed account of a journey through Manchuria with the avowed object of showing the character of the Russian occupation. He shows first that Manchuria is a grain-producing country of the first rank, which in its settled and cultivated parts is thoroughly Chinese. . . . The thesis of the book is to prove, in short, that the supposed Russification of Manchuria is a myth; that the occupation is purely military, and lacks all the elements of permanence. This is illustrated by a stringent and very amusing examination of the railway system, the operations of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the whole conduct of affairs. The author has the gift of observation and of conveying his impressions so that the whole picture of the rapidly built fabrication of Russian civilization, in contrast with the steady and rooted organism of Chinese agricultural and trading life, stands out vividly. His forecast dating from last February, of much that has happened [e.g., the taking of Dalny] and much that may yet happen, together with his summary of Russia's military resources and Japan's chances, makes most curious and interesting reading. But in its essence the book is an impeachment of Russia's business methods from the point of view of an Englishman who knows the East and understands business thoroughly." — *The Publishers' Circular*, London (1904).

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